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TOWARD A THEOLOGY OF WOMAN

I. INTRODUCTION.

Two frescos of Michelangelo on the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel bear the special stamp of genius: the creation of man and the creation of woman.

In the first, the creation of man: God the Father, to Whom theology attributes the works of power, and therefore creation, is represented as a man of great years with an air of majesty, clothed¹ in a light luminous tunic, which floats in the heavens. Above Him, supported by angels, is a dark drapery, which suggests a full sail with a graceful wing-like spread. Under His left arm is the figure of a woman,² whose shining eyes are turned towards the man who has just been formed "of the slime of the earth"—a magnificent expression of the creative thought, according to which man is not to be left alone, but is to have a companion. The extended index finger of God's right hand almost touches the slightly bent index finger of Adam's left hand. Adam, who reclines upon the ground with

¹ It is well known that clothing was added to the original frescos.

² So at least it seems to me. An authority in the history of art gives confirmation, if not to the necessity of my interpretation, at least to its reasonableness.

one leg drawn up and head and shoulders raised a little, rests upon his right elbow. His left arm and the right arm of God, in their extension of the one from the other, form a living and supple line that joins earth to heaven. Adam and God look into each other's eyes; the gaze of the man seems to express his wonder and gratitude for the splendid gifts of life, intelligence and liberty, the consciousness of his dignity and of his responsibility as a creature left "in the hand of his own counsel," and -- formidable honor! — capable of furthering or hindering the plan of the Creator, who, in His fatherly and tender love, destines him, on the condition of faithfulness in trial, to an everlasting share in His own blessedness. To this end God endowed him with grace, placed love in his heart, and held ready His help as a response to appeals that His inspiration would call forth.

Consider now the other fresco, the creation of woman: Adam, resting against the trunk of a tree in sound and tranquil sleep, has the appearance of extreme youth, and his serene countenance expresses the peace and innocence of his recently created soul. Eve has been formed of a rib taken from Adam by the Divine Surgeon without rousing him from his mysterious slumber. Her long brown hair, gracefully full, covers her shoulders, her lips are half-open as if she were in prayer. With her hands joined and her eyes fixed on God, she bows before Him. Her mien is wholly one of thankfulness and love, reverence and adoration. The Creator, standing on the earth upon which these two human beings are to live, draws before Him with His left hand the folds of His large cloak, and raises His right hand to the level of His head, which is slightly bowed. The meaning of the gesture is indicated by His gaze, in which are expressed mingled feelings of respect and complacence, admiration and tenderness, and — what is a more daring but sublime anthropomorphism³ — hope and solicitude, indeed almost anxiety, as if, in the presence of the woman He is about to give to the awakened man, He were in suspense between expectation of marvellous success and fear of lamentable failure,

³ Like that of Pégu: "The repentance of man crowns a *hope* of God."

or as if, foreseeing the fall and already thinking of the Incarnation of His Son, the new Adam, He contemplated the new Eve, Mary, and found, for the disappointment to be given Him by the first, consolation in the purity and immaculate glory of the second.

It is known that Michelangelo, sculptor and architect, turned to painting with the view of decorating the Sistine Chapel with those immense frescos that represent the works of God even to the last judgment. In the two compositions that take us back to the first moment of our history, he wishes to express the mystery of the divine thought respecting the first human couple and the human race that was to proceed from them, respecting Adam, made of the earth, and Eve, taken from the body of Adam, the future mother of all human beings. This divine thought contains the last secret of the nature and of the soul of woman, of her place and mission in the plan of creation and salvation. But it is hidden in the mind of God. Will He not make it known to the man and his consort, who are its object, and to their innumerable descendants? However incompletely He would reveal it, this ray of divine light would be more precious, more enlightening, than all efforts of mankind to learn the secret by the light of reason alone. But it pleased God to let His thought be incompletely discovered in the inspired books of the Old and New Testaments. He spoke by the prophets and at last by Jesus Christ. The Word, Who is eternally in the bosom of the Father, became incarnate; the Son of God is "born of a woman," therefore, according to the Fathers, He is called the "Son of man." He bore witness to the truth, and His testimony is of a weight incomparably greater than that of any other: Jesus knew, as no one else could know, what there is in man, whom in the beginning His Father and He Himself (*per ipsum omnia facta sunt*) made male and female. He Himself is Truth.

All that God has been pleased to teach us through His prophets and His Son is very truth. The doctrine contained in the authentic words of the Master, or implied in His ways and deeds, is the infallible rule of faith and conduct for all

Christian men and women. Since this doctrine has to be transmitted and interpreted by an infallible authority, and since the Church assisted by the Spirit of Jesus is that divinely qualified messenger and interpreter, every Catholic conscious of his faith knows that the doctrine defined by the Church is unchangeable and requires his absolute assent. As in all other points regulating faith and morals, this is so in regard to the dogmas relative to the nature and to the supernatural destinies of the human person without distinction of sex: the spirituality and immortality of the soul, the call to grace and glory, the rights and duties in the service of God, the means of sanctification, the principles that concern sex relations, the law of chastity, the sixth and ninth precepts of the decalogue; the goodness and excellence of virginity embraced for the kingdom of heaven; the sacramental character, unity, and absolute indissolubility of consummated Christian marriage;⁴ and the like.

But, while the dogmatic definitions of the Church are infallibly true, while the living Catholic tradition, which is superior to and transcends all separate and distinct testimonies, is not subject to error, while theology, as a rigorously demonstrative science, is absolutely certain in its conclusions; subsequent explanations or syntheses, proposed by the Fathers, Doctors, theologians or particular schools and traditions, can be deficient or imperfect, and risk being so in the proportion that they include human, contingent and uncertain elements. The necessity for a revision or elimination of these elements becomes apparent only gradually, and sometimes arises with progress in sciences that have only a remote relation to theology. The facts of divine revelation, which are the principles of theology,

⁴ I repeat here in almost the very same words some ideas expressed in an article in *Etudes Carmélitaines*, entitled "L'Idée divine du mariage," which is closely related to the object of the present study. The causes that explain certain age-old defects in the presentation of the theology of marriage explain the imperfections and omissions—or even the lack—of a *theology of woman*. If her relations with man in marriage are not perfectly adjusted, it is evidently because there has not been an accounting of *all* the aspects of her personal mission, of *all* the richness of the divine idea of which she is the realization.

are received in minds whose education, scientific formation, notional equipment, and philosophic tools differ in the extreme according to times, places and types of civilization and culture. Those upon whom rests the task of expounding, propagating or defending Christian faith and morals have had, still have, and no doubt until the end of history, will have to face, often simultaneously, characteristic errors or dangerous tendencies that recur periodically; will have to go back to the sources of currents which, although running counter to each other, are likewise equally opposed to delicate and subtle truth, and to Christian life. For example, there are, in the question of the sexes and their relations, encratism, Manicheism and its offshoots or its remains, exaggerated spiritualism on the one hand; and, on the other, theoretical denial and practical horror of all forms of asceticism and mortification: sensualism, epicureanism, naturalism, romanticism of passion, moral positivism, sociologism, and the like. Fallen human nature is afflicted in all its faculties by dangerous wounds. It is only too easy to explain that men, always limited in some respects, fail to arrive immediately at a full discovery of all the aspects of a complex and difficult truth, or that they fall insensibly into error, even by most logical ways, starting from most incontrovertible, even revealed, principles, because to these principles they unite some inexact notions or false data. The weight of historical fatalities dulls the human intelligence which, even when aided by a divine light, retains much of the darkness of ignorance. Among the impediments it meets are: obsolete social and legal institutions, ideas commonly received in a given place and time, sociological prejudices, customs; regression, or too slow an advancement in many sciences having man as their object, such as biology, physiology, psychology, comparative psychology of the sexes; wrong trails in which those who are at the head of the line entangle those who follow; the urgency and special difficulties of certain problems that hold the attention for a long time and absorb the energies of thinkers and searchers; age-old somnolence, owing to a thousand accidental causes, with respect to certain other problems which concern human life and

especially that of woman; a somewhat superstitious respect for venerable authorities, whose worth has been proven many times and beyond whose horizon one dares not go, an exclusive adherence to venerable teachers and their heritage, a reluctance, as of shame, to yield to doubt even in matters of method, and a difficulty in verifying old propositions long held as axioms. These, and I have not mentioned all, are many of the obstacles to the attainment of the complete truth and its development into a scientific synthesis without error or omission.

In special relation to the understanding of Holy Scripture, wherein God speaks to us through the inspired authors, we know that an ensemble of conditions are required which are rarely fulfilled simultaneously in their entirety. Scripture is too rich; God, necessarily speaking in human language, charges it with meaning whose depths man can never cease sounding. One-sided and limited interpretations of certain particularly valuable and pregnant texts, which but for neglect would have been clarified and completed by comparison with other texts, can, if not actually lead to errors that would compromise the substance of faith or cause a grave deflection in morals, at least long remain short of the final truth and veil many of its aspects.

If one can often, without great effort, understand the Old Testament thanks to the light shed by the New, it is not, however, always easy to discern with certainty and precision what is taught as the thought of God, or what is related with approbation or simply attested as an historical fact, or what is the expression of an immutable divine precept, or a permission, or a temporary toleration suffered to exist among the chosen people owing to their submission to the pressure of the customs or laws of pagan peoples surrounding or tyrannizing over them. "Israel," says Father Lagrange, "had its customs, some good and approved, others openly bad and condemned as practices of idolatry or sorcery, still others of inferior morality which God was pleased to tolerate for a period, such as polygamy and repudiation."⁵

⁵ *L'Evangile de Jésus Christ* (first French edition, 1928, no. 214, p. 395). Cf. the very admirable study by Mme. Raisse Maritain, *Histoire d'Abraham ou la sainteté dans l'état de nature*. "Nova et Vetera" (1935, pp. 239-266).

Even in the New Testament there are some cases in which it is difficult to distinguish what is an unchangeable rule made for all times and places, and what is only a prescription dictated by Apostolic prudence in view of historical conditions. There is, for instance, the decision of St. Paul regarding what should be the part, deportment and headdress of women in the Christian assemblies. It is not to be denied a priori that certain ideas that were specifically Jewish left more traces than they should have in the minds of some Fathers or Doctors. Some simple directions of the Apostles that were good for the first communities, and necessary in order to curb dangerous tendencies (even then one saw a manifestation of feminine emancipation), have been considered at times as definite and absolute rules and have brought about an excessive rigor in the restoration of man's supremacy over women, of husband over wife, and of the submission becoming to her; bringing also a certain failure to insist upon the duties of husband towards wife, which are so forcefully emphasized by St. Paul and summed up in his precept: "Husbands love your wives as Christ loved the Church," and which matches the other: "Let women be subject to their husbands as to the Lord."

Leaving aside generalizations that so readily exaggerate, and not subscribing to certain very pessimistic descriptions of woman's condition, while fully admitting that in very many cases family morals could be better (as they are often worse) than legal texts indicate, one can truly affirm that the following phenomenon is well established in history: when the social, juridical, and political institutions of a people or of a period legally sanction the servitude of women and the unjust dominion of man over her, a day comes when the oppressed women try and finally manage to throw off the yoke. But then instead of prudently claiming her just rights as a human person and regulating her use of the new liberty, she readily abandons herself to the excesses of license. Together with the oppression and the unjust duties imposed upon her by the old institutions that are breaking down, she respects all the natural duties that are engraved in her physical structure and in her soul. Nothing

is more easily explained than such a course. The tyranny of man over woman far from aiding in the development of her virtues tends rather to enfeeble her energies and deprave her.⁶ Her master did not try to elevate her either morally or spiritually, provided that she remained submissive to him; and he resigned himself even to the depravity of his consort, so long as he could use her for the purposes of his pride and passion. One understands, therefore, the special difficulty that woman in a given society encounters in making apprenticeship of her liberty without catastrophe when, long oppressed by too harsh a law, she succeeds in gaining her emancipation. She is exposed to the risk of exchanging one servitude for another. The yoke that she breaks is replaced by the heavier and more shameful yoke of dissoluteness or mistaken heroism; and this mirage of enfranchisement, this illusion, is encouraged as long as possible by all those who regard it as something to be turned to their own advantage. And there lies a new danger. People who remain sane or who recover quickly multiply efforts to bring woman back to a sense of her unappreciated dignity and to the glorious humility there is in the duties she has given up. There is then the risk of summarily condemning, with the pretensions of emancipation from all law, the legitimate aspirations which this unfortunate association has compromised. The consequence is a sort of flow and ebb, a succession of doubtful gains and real losses. To avoid these vicissitudes, these ups and downs, there is needed a discernment, a balanced judgment, a restraint, a serenity, which are not readily found, and are as far from being general in men as in women.

The ventures and crises, of which a synopsis has just been sketched, cannot be wholly avoided even through the contact of Christianity with human societies. The dough of peoples resists the action of the divine leaven. The Church which did not stir up slaves to revolt because she brought salvation to

⁶ Even in the worst conditions there are always some noble-minded women, superior to their lot in life, who know how to resist all the causes of decadence. They are the honor and redemption of their sex, which owes to them its most exalted victories.

them, even when they were in chains, had more pressing cares than the preaching to women of rebellion against all the excesses of man's domination; happy to baptize, to discipline, to soften the soul of man, she strove to imitate the patience of God and, while giving encouragement prudently, waited for the social transformations of which her doctrines contained the principle. Until the proclamation of a Christian liberty common to both sexes, until the enunciation by St. Paul of the principle: "There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free, there is neither male nor female, for you all are one in Christ Jesus," there was none that was not exposed to the imprudent exploitation of ill-disposed persons (men and women), and of importunate women and their champions, and there was nothing that could not serve as a pretext for riotous claims. Disturbances that arose in the first Christian communities, the history of sects in which women went so far as to arrogate the priesthood to themselves, could furnish these general reflections with very many illustrations. Passion got mixed up with the best of reasons for reacting against unbearable and dangerous pretensions. The pride of men, which the pride of women aggravated especially, the more or less conscious misogyny of some (the reason for which will be indicated presently) influenced them to profit by the occasion of indiscretions and usurpations of women to condemn, along with every excess, certain aspirations that were more than justified. And so progress was correspondingly retarded.

Though theology is benign, theologians (by this term I do not mean only theologians in contradistinction to the Fathers and Doctors of the Church; I mean all those who, beginning with the first ecclesiastical writers, have applied themselves in the course of centuries to the interpretation of Scripture and the dogmatic and moral teaching of the Church) are men with all the possibilities of failure that word implies. It is not a matter of right or necessity, but of historical fact, that with very few exceptions they are clerics or monks, and therefore celibates.⁷ Their mode of life and their vows oblige

⁷ It is not forgotten that clerical celibacy never became the object of a universal

them to be on their guard against the temptations of Eve. They run the risk, at the same time, of falling into error by considering it as an aid to virtue to have a rather low opinion of woman, and of paying more attention in reading the Bible to complaints made by the wise man against the wicked woman, the dangerous temptress, than to the beautiful and delicate commendations bestowed on the valiant and chaste woman, and on the noble figures of which the Old Testament alone contains such a beautiful gallery. The supreme perfection of the Virgin Mary, whose cult the theologians propagate; the virtues of the saints; the heroism of the martyrs; the purity of the virgins; the holiness of the widows, whose history they read and whose praises they chant in the divine office; the virtues of pious women, whether cloistered or living in the world, whose souls they direct in the way of God; often the merits of each one's own mother or sisters—all of these things should tend to give them the highest and truest idea of woman, and should aid them above all other writers to understand the divine thought regarding Eve. But on the other hand they see dangers, frailties, falls, pretensions, excesses; they discern the dangers; and in social and institutional circumstances that are still hard for woman it is difficult for them to free themselves entirely from prejudices against her.

Thus it is most easily explained that not only writers like the gloomy Tertullian (who moreover, by an irony of fate, joined the Montanists among whom there were women in authority), not only men like Saint Jerome, whose language we know to be anything but a model of restraint and moderation (his intellectual and spiritual ministrations to an admirable and select group of women should have helped him to overcome this defect), not only popular preachers who did not hesitate to indulge in triviality and the grossest irony (in certain periods their language was incredibly bold), but theologians, who were more thoughtful, more calm and less impassioned, did not succeed in freeing themselves completely from the burden of

law in the Eastern Church, and in the Western only after the lapse of several centuries.

human traditions, did not go beyond their time by bringing out the splendor of certain truths that now seem to us to be elementary, thanks to the progress of modern disciplines. Many moralists, in order to check the pretensions of the daughters of Eve and to inspire them with humility, insist much more than did Saint Paul on the reproach of their having been, in the person of their mother, the cause of the fall and of the misfortunes of humanity. They sometimes speak as if Adam, whose reason, it would seem, must have been stronger, had not followed his wife in the sin, and with very little reluctance. It is useless for them to know that the Virgin, the new Eve, blotted out the opprobrium of the first; they are less ready than Saint Augustine to concede to the female sex the entire honor of being, in the person of Mary, the beginning of salvation. The Bishop of Hippo wrote: "As the honor of the male sex is in the flesh of Christ, the honor of the female sex is in the Mother of Christ." Henry Suso stepped aside for a beggar-woman and, in answer to her words of astonishment, said that in every woman he honored her who is blessed among women, the Virgin Mary. But all will not have such refinement. Many, in exhorting women to a sense of duty when they are but little inclined to imitate the Blessed Virgin, stress the sad fact that in original sin the first Eve had priority, but they do not use the same care to emphasize how greatly to the honor of woman were the eminent part of Mary in the work of grace and salvation, the devotion of the women of Galilee in the service of Jesus, the presence of women before the Cross, their eagerness at the tomb, their glorious privilege of being the first to see the risen Savior and of making the great miracle of Easter known to men (who were slow to believe) their place in the history of martyrs, their holiness in all its forms. Many preachers, therefore, are or appear to be severe or too ungenerous in regard to Eve. Now, it is rather of these, and of their unfortunate texts, that real or pretended friends of woman—but by no means of the Church—think with bitterness; they make use of these utterances and writings to turn against the Church women, yes, and even men, who, whether or not they are

anxious to defend the rights of their sisters, seize upon every pretext to condemn Christianity.

The influence of Greco-Latin philosophy and literature, of Roman law, of the laws of uncivilized peoples, even of rabbinical exegesis, which had so little of the true spirit of the Old Testament, could therefore unduly affect some theologians, bias their minds with prejudices or ideas that were altogether unfavorable to woman. It is enough to recall how long it took to get rid of the vexatious Aristotelian phrase, *femina est mas occasionatus* (which however was retained by many after the theologians had given it up as being a dead weight), and to consider the efforts of several Doctors, some of the greatest indeed, to propose an explanation of it that would be acceptable to Christianity. It was futile for theologians to know and proclaim the equality of man and woman as human persons in relation to grace and salvation, morality, and especially marriage rights and duties, before the special psychology of woman had been developed; it was difficult for them to break with an age-old habit of taking man (the male) as the standard and pattern of every thing human, of evaluating woman by a comparison with him and not preferably with her own type, and of appreciating her mind from the point of view of her aptitude for reasoning, without taking into account the admirable compensations for her lack of logic that are furnished by her faculties of intuition. That barrier has been passed.

What theologian approaching today the theological problem of woman would neglect to learn the facts of sciences that concern her, especially those of psychology, and would be so presumptuous as to believe that no profit is to be gained, for example, from such books as *L'Ame de la femme* by Gina Lombroso, to cite only one work that has become a classic and been translated into all the languages of the civilized world?

There is no objection to admitting that in this field, as in others, certain attacks against the teaching of the Church or against that of her witnesses have served to put theologians in the way of progress and to provoke a salutary critical examination of certain positions long held to be sure and immovable.

The preceding reflections⁸ suffice to show that there is no reason to be surprised or disconcerted, above all, to be scandalized by defects in human interpretations that churchmen have given to the divine idea of woman. We have no need nor desire to make an apology for them. It is enough to account for them, and, if possible, to avoid being like them, and to keep from falling into opposite excesses through infatuation for ideas that are as ephemeral as a fashion.

No one will be able to reproach us with having tried in this introduction to dissemble defects or to palliate wrongs. But it would be unjust to suspect us, for that reason, of imprudent complacence with regard to a feminism that is naïvely indiscreet.

This has been merely a matter of pointing out clearly the duty of the theologian to be open to all truth, for all truth comes from the Holy Spirit. In acknowledging at the outset that some theologians can be reproached without injustice for not having been perfectly fair to women, we do not forget that, taking a position contrary to the one described in foregoing pages, misogynists and anti-feminists find fault with Christianity for having professed and spread throughout the world a respect for Eve and her daughters that they judge to be excessive and deplorable. In this regard the case of Arthur Schopenhauer has all the value of a symbol.⁹ And what of Nietzsche? In its own way the whole opposition manifested by the complaints is a testimonial.

The need of working out an irreproachable theology of woman, and of making it as widely known as possible, is all the more urgent because it is one of the favorite subjects of misunderstanding between Christians and non-Christians, indeed among Christians who are of an equally docile disposition towards the Church, but who are unequally informed or of different turns of thought and of different cultures. These

⁸ If he cares to, the reader will find a complement of this in the article published in *Etudes Carmélitaines* that has been referred to.

⁹ *Orientations* (la Sarte-Huy, Belgium) for May 1939 (pp. 598 sqq.) has a new translation that I made of the pessimists' significant texts. Its June number contains "Fragments de réponse à Schopenhauer."

misunderstandings are pregnant with consequences, and much would be gained by their removal.

Whatever may be the intellectual authority or tradition that they follow, authors who write of the nature or mission of woman are nearly always led to declare what they think of the teaching of the Church and of theology regarding this subject. The influence of the Church and of her doctrine upon minds, even upon the minds of those who consider themselves completely emancipated, has been and is now (and will remain) too deeply felt for any one to give up all interest in what she thinks regarding a human problem of such vital importance. When one endeavors to modify the idea that all mankind (masculine and feminine) forms of woman, when one tries to change the juridical, social and moral status of man's companion, one is constrained, in spite of oneself, to take into account the solutions of theology and their age-long and actual effect upon humanity, especially upon "the devout female sex,"¹⁰ as the Church phrases it in her motherly way when recommending womankind to Mary, its ideal figure and supreme glory.

Accordingly one takes a stand, but, because of special difficulties that have been mentioned, haste in making investigations, mixed sources from which one draws without sufficient discernment, and for yet other reasons, it is not always an authentic theology of woman that one pronounces, but often a misrepresentation of it, which is sometimes no more than a caricature, or which at least jumbles together, as if forming one indissoluble body, the genuine dogmas of the Church and the personal ideas of such and such Fathers, Doctors or theologians.

Feminist movements that are removed from the positive influence of the Church are more or less openly hostile to her, because their adherents believe that she refuses to admit any

¹⁰ It seems that the expression *Intercede pro devoto femineo sexu* does not designate all women, or even all pious women, but only those who are consecrated to God. The greater religiousness of women is a phenomenon sufficiently well-known and sufficiently universal for the meaning of the expression to be extended or accommodated without scruple.

equality between man and woman.¹¹ Hostility is declared, war is conducted, sometimes with great violence, by innumerable supporters of different theories who decide problems of interest to woman, especially the one concerning her relations with man, contrary to, and in defiance of the Christian laws of marriage and the family, either because they do not see, or they deny, the justification and the peculiar motive of a virtue of chastity distinct from justice or even from hygiene (personal or social), at least from justice and hygiene according to their own notions. The hostility to the Christian idea of woman, wrongfully confused with the "bourgeois" idea, which is a corruption and caricature of it, reaches a paroxysm in Bolshevik Marxism; evidence of this is seen in the statements and deeds of the system and especially throughout the whole history of the Russian revolution.¹²

The Catholic Church has been accused of wishing to keep woman in subjection to man or in domestic slavery, "at dishes and the family wash," of being opposed to any emancipation of woman, in spite of the fact that she condemns only the deceptive emancipation that destroys the family, and by withdrawing woman from her natural duties, causes her to fall into a real servitude that is worse than the supposed servitude from which, it is pretended, she has been freed. State capitalism, which, under cover of the proletarian revolution, governs in Russia, enslaves woman as much as it enslaves man, and even more. Slavery in the same labors is harder on woman than it is on man, for she is not fitted by nature to undergo all the labors for which he is suited; she is enfeebled where he is only fatigued; moreover, she alone must bear burdens from which, no matter what any one says or does, in spite of any ideology, man is exempted by nature.

¹¹ The accusation is absolutely unjustified with regard to the Church, but is fully justified against a Schopenhauer, who takes every occasion to declare that woman is the *sexus sequior*, and against a Nietzsche.

¹² Cf. *Les grands textes du marxisme sur la famille*, contributed by Jean Fréville to "Les Editions sociales internationales." See also, for the changes for a long time developing in Soviet Russia, the little book, *Femmes soviétiques*, by Hélène Iswolsky. (Collection "Les Iles," n. 10. Desclée de Brouwer.)

Relative to morality and Christian life nothing is so misunderstood or held in greater dishonor than the idea of a special virtue of virginity, and of effective renunciation of marriage and motherhood. All the doctrines which admit and proclaim that concupiscence or sex instinct cannot be overcome, that there is harmfulness in chastity (Luther held and taught this, and in a form of extreme virulence), that woman is to be completely subordinated to her procreative function—all such doctrines hold in particular aversion the virginity and celibacy of woman, just as they abhor ecclesiastical celibacy. This is the case today in the system of the totalitarian state, at least in its national-socialistic form; but every form of statism tends to it logically. Voices are raised which claim for the state not only the right to dissolve unfruitful marriages on the sole grounds that unfruitfulness makes marriage unions "of no advantage to the community of the people," but also the right to prohibit religious celibacy and to impose upon every capable man and woman the legal obligation of begetting sound and vigorous children, of marrying or at the very least of procreating. These demands are nearly always accompanied by violent attacks against the teaching of the Catholic Church regarding the propriety and excellence of virginity "for the Kingdom of Heaven," which is fundamental for the institution of religious orders and congregations of women. (It is known that the number of religious women is greater than the number of the regular and secular clergy taken together.)

Among the doctrines to which allusion has just been made, there are some whose opposition to Christian thought regarding woman is irremediable and irreducible, for they are derived from a more general and deeper opposition. It is none the less true that this hostility is supported to some extent by misconceptions which serve to captivate simple persons and draw them away from the Church. There are also movements and authors disagreeing with the Church in regard to woman, particularly because of involuntary misunderstandings and errors of interpretation. And so it is evident that it is of great importance to multiply and spread abroad exact explanations of

the Christian idea of Eve and her daughters. If this can be done, then those who in good faith are mistaken about the mind of the Church will have a means of learning the truth and freeing themselves of their involuntary errors. Doctrines that are hostile to the Church and interpretations that intentionally distort the truth will then offer less danger of leading any one astray, and only those persons would run a risk of being misled who neglect to turn to sources of enlightenment within easy reach.

II. THE CREATION OF EVE.

The first allusion to the creation of woman is given briefly in the first chapter of the Book of Genesis.¹³

And Elohim said: Let us make man ("Adam") in our form and to our own likeness and that he have dominion over the fishes of the sea, and over the winged creatures of the heavens, and over the animals and over the whole earth and over every reptile which walks the earth! And Elohim created "Adam" to His own image; in the image of Elohim he created him; *male and female he created them*. And Elohim blessed them and Elohim said to them: *Be fruitful and multiply*, and fill the earth and subdue it . . . (*Gen.*, i, 26-28). Now Elohim saw all that he had made, and behold it was very good; and it was evening and it was morning: the sixth day (i, 31).

The second account is more explicit:

Then a spring rose out of the earth and it watered all the surface of the adamâh and Jahveh-Elohim formed Adam of dust of the adamâh and breathed into his nostrils a breath of life and man became (a being having) breath of life.

And Jahveh-Elohim planted a garden in Eden, in the East, and he placed Adam whom he had formed and Jahveh-Elohim caused

¹³ This version springs from an unpublished translation of the Hebrew, obligingly offered for my use by a confrère, a distinguished Hebraist, which, however, I do not fully transcribe: it shows clearly the close relation of the names designating earth, *adamâh*, and man, *Adam*, formed from the earth by God; the derivation of the name, *Ishshâh*, designating woman from *Ish*, the common name of man.

A minimum of context is given as being indispensable for an understanding of the verses that concern woman directly or exclusively; the latter are printed in *italics*.

to spring up from the adamâh every tree pleasing to the sight and good to eat, and the tree of life in the midst of the garden and the tree of knowledge of good and evil.

Now Jahveh-Elohim took Adam and left him in the garden of Eden to cultivate it and to keep it. And Jahveh-Elohim gave a precept to Adam in these terms: Of every tree of the garden thou mayest eat, but of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, eat not of that, for on the day that thou shalt eat of it, dying thou shalt die: And Jahveh-Elohim said: *It is not good that Adam should live alone. I shall give him a helper corresponding to him.* And Jahveh-Elohim, who had formed from the adamâh every beast of the fields and every bird of the heavens, sent each to Adam to see how we would name it . . . and Adam gave names to all the animals . . . *but Adam found no helper similar to himself.* Then Jahveh-Elohim caused a deep sleep (a torpor) to fall upon the Adam and he fell asleep. Next he took one of his ribs and he closed up the flesh in its place. And Jahveh-Elohim formed into an "Ishshâh" (woman) the rib that he had taken from Adam. And the Adam said: *This, finally, is bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh: as for this, let her be called "Ishshâh," for it is from "Ish" (man) that she was taken.* This is why an "Ish" leaves his father and his mother and cleaves to his "Ishshâh," and they make one flesh only. And they were both nude, the Adam and his "Ishshâh," but they were not ashamed (*Gen.*, ii, 6-25).

It is not to the point to set forth here the different methods of biblical interpretation and their application to the first chapters of Genesis, which are the most difficult to explain of all the sacred writings. Let it be said merely that the inspired writer does not intend to give a scientific teaching in regard to the origin and history of the universe and particularly of the earth, but only a religious doctrine. The superiority of the biblical cosmogony over Babylonian, Egyptian, Phoenician and other cosmogonies is to be looked for in the transcendence of its idea of God, "uncreated Creator, dependent on no one and holding all things in absolute dependence on Himself, a truth that comes not from Babylon, nor Memphis, nor Athens, but from Jerusalem."¹⁴

¹⁴ Louis Dumeste, O. P. "Le Poème de la Création" in *Orientations*, 1934, p. 210.

The translated verses inform us in a general way regarding the nature of man and his primal condition. "Created after the likeness of God, therefore superior to all the beings that surround them, the man and woman, distinct from one another by their sex, but equal to one another by their nature, share that same dignity. What fullness there is in that extreme conciseness! In the short and pithy phrases does not one see in germ the complete doctrine regarding the family in Christian society? It seems even there . . . that anything added to human life, in whatever way, was at once the endowment of a unique couple. The world comes from the Divine hands in a spring-time freshness, flooded with poetry and loaded with blessings, the privilege of innocence. . . . If the words of God are addressed even to inanimate beings, which cannot understand them, they are directed especially to man, who is supposed to be intellectually and morally perfect enough to receive the Revelation."¹⁵

* * *

Let us consider in detail the teachings that are drawn from the sacred text relative to woman.

In the first place it is obvious that there is nothing, absolutely nothing, in the biblical narrative to suggest the idea which was advanced by St. Athanasius, embraced by St. Gregory of Nyssa, and taken up again by St. Ambrose, that the distinction of sexes was intended and realized by God only in view of the fall and sin, or to suggest the even stranger opinion of St. John Chrysostom (in other questions such an eloquent defender of marriage and advocate of virginity),¹⁶ according to which God had provided for the multiplication of the human race in the state of innocence otherwise than by sex relations and generative functions. Even if there were no other reasons, the biblical text alone, understood in its obvious literal sense and not in an uncertain or arbitrary mystical sense, should, it would seem, have sufficed to keep one from those singular opinions that

¹⁵ *Loc. cit.*

¹⁶ See A. Moulard, *Saint Jean Chrysostom, défenseur du mariage et apôtre de la virginité*. Paris: Gabalda, 1923.

force an acceptance in a strictly spiritual sense of the divine blessing or precept: "Be fruitful and multiply," and to see in the other inspired words: "And they shall be two in one flesh," a prophecy of which the fulfillment was really contingent on the fall. St. Augustine did not long yield to the influence of such hypotheses, and he denied them all right to a place in theology. He taught steadfastly that the distinction of sexes and the multiplication of the human race through their union was in the mind of the Creator from the first. But because he had knowledge of those fantastic teachings and felt obliged to refute them, the question whether in the state of innocence there would have been procreation, and whether it would have been by the way of sexual union, became and remained for long centuries a classic question, an academic problem, which with its foreseen solution had to be proposed.

In declaring with utmost precision that the distinction of the sexes in view of their generative relations in marriage was in conformity with a primitive purpose of the Creator, Augustine rid himself definitely of whatever remained of opposition or distrust, whether of Manichean or other inspiration, in regard to the work of procreation.¹⁷ In affirming at the same time the natural mortality of man and the privilege of grace, granted to him in his state of innocence, by which he could escape death, he did away with every motive for looking on the institution of the sexes and their relations as a retouching of the divine plan or merely as a precaution of creative Providence against the ravages of death that would be brought on by sin.

¹⁷ My statement concerns the act of procreation and not precisely the pleasure that accompanies it. Indeed St. Augustine, through distrust of "concupiscence," inclines to believe that in the state of innocence there would not have been that "delight" (so keen that it sways the reason of fallen man) or at least that it would have been weaker than it has actually been. Following Aristotle who held that the pleasure—which in respect to the act is as the full bloom to youth—is good or bad according as the act that it accompanies is good or bad, Saint Thomas taught, contrary to St. Augustine, that the delight in the sexual relations of man and woman would have been greater for man in the state of innocence, without, however, involving any disorder or any swaying of a reason in absolute control of itself and all the faculties of the soul. But that is another problem which is left purposely out of the scope of this study.

He could not admit that the intervention of sin among men and of death as its punishment was the condition on which depended the multiplication of men and the constitution of a "City of God."

* * *

Indeed the relation of the female sex to procreation impressed him too exclusively. In his commentaries on Genesis (*De Genesi ad literam*) he affirms several times that no one could see or, at least, that he does not see any other plausible reason for the creation of woman with her sexual difference than that of aiding man in the duty of procreation, and he compares woman made fruitful by man to the earth made fruitful by grain;¹⁸ but one would search Augustine in vain, at least, in

¹⁸ "Si autem quaeritur, ad quam rem fieri oportuit hoc adjutorium, nihil aliud probabiliter occurrit quam propter filios procreandos, sicut adjutorium semini terra est ut virgultum ex utroque nascatur, hoc enim et in prima rerum conditione dictum erat: *masculum et feminam fecit eos et benedixit eos dicens: crescete et multiplicamini et implete terram et dominamini ei*" (*De Genesi ad litt. IX*, 3, CSEL, 28, I, p. 272).

"Quapropter non invenio, ad quod adjutorium facta sit mulier viro, si pariendi causa subtrahatur" (*Ibid. IX*, 5, p. 273).

"Propter quid aliud secundum ipsum quesitus est femineus sexus adjutor, nisi ut serentem genus humanus natura muliebris tanquam terrae fecunditas adjuvaret" (*IX*, 9, p. 278).

"Cum ergo quaeritur ad quod adjutorium factus sit ille sexus viro, diligenter, quantum valeo, cuncta consideranti, nonnisi causa prolixis occurrit, ut per eorum stirpem terra impleretur . . ." (*IX*, 11, 280).

"Quis enim nostrum negat ad opus pariendi a Domino Deo creatore omnium bonorum bono praeparatam fuisse muliere?" (*De Nupt. et Concupisc. II*, IV, 12, CSEL, 42, p. 264).

It would be a manifest absurdity for anyone to deny that the Creator of all good things prepared woman for child birth. It is clear that unless procreation be admitted as an end, the sexual differences in woman, at least in her primary and distinctly physical peculiarities, could not be explained. But could that of man be explained any better? In the hypothesis of a way of multiplying the human race other than that which was chosen, it would seem conformable to Divine Wisdom to have conceived and realized some sort of a human being that would have been sexually neuter. But it is one thing to recognize and affirm the evident orientation of the sexes to procreation, of the female sex to conception, child-birth, nursing, etc.; another to say that the distinction, the respective peculiarities and relations of the sexes taken in their full extent are no more than means for the attainment, or for the best possible attainment, of the end which is procreation along with its natural and necessary prolongation, the education of children. But let us not anticipate further.

that particular work, for views suggesting even remotely the views of modern psychologists regarding the richness and value of qualities that are peculiar to the feminine side of humanity, independently of generative and maternal functions. Augustine seems even to exclude those views in words which for a long time had the value of axioms among theologians. He says, on the whole, that if there had been a question of giving Adam a helper for the cultivation of the garden of Eden or the gladdening of its solitude, one who would afford him the consolation of friendship and the benefits of social life, then, in all these respects, a male companion would have been better than a female.¹⁹

From a consideration of these texts alone, it really appears that St. Augustine insufficiently perceived the peculiar excellences of femininity and the peculiar value for the very persons of the spouses, at least for the husband, of conjugal companionship, love, and the other relations. In the 13th century St. Thomas²⁰ and other doctors in general made the Augustinian idea their own without any change. In the 16th century Cardinal Cajetan, the great and astute commentator of the Angelic Doctor, was interested only in defending the idea against an objection which could not be passed over by such an observant Aristotelian as he was.

He puts the objection in this way:

It does not seem true that for every work except that of generation the aid given to a man by another man is of greater

¹⁹ "Aut si ad hoc adjutorium gignendi filios, non est facta mulier viro, ad quod adjutorium facta est? Si quae simul operaretur terram; nondum erat labor ut adjumento indigeret, et si opus esset, melius adjutorium masculos haberet. Hoc et de solatio dici potest, si solitudinis fortasse se taedebat. Quanto enim congruentius ad convivendum et colloquendum duo amici pariter quam vir et mulier habitarent? Quod si oportebat alium jubendo, alium obsequendo pariter vivere, ne contrariae voluntates pacem cohabitantium perturbarent; nec ad hoc retinendum ordo defuisse quo prior unus, alter posterior, maxime si posterior ex priore crearetur sicut femina creata est. An aliquis dixerit de costa hominis Deum feminam tantum, non etiam masculum, si hoc vellet, facere potuisse?"

²⁰ "Necessarium fuit feminam fieri, sicut Scriptura dicit, in adjutorium viri, non quidem in adjutorium alicujus alterius operis, ut quidam dixerunt, cum ad quodlibet aliud opus convenientius juvari possit vir per alium virum quam per mulierem, sed in adjutorium generationis" (*Summa Theol.*, I, 92, 1).

value than that given by a woman. Aristotle says in effect that in the household some activities belong properly to the husband and others to the wife. And the following article declares explicitly that in the human species male and female are united not only for the purposes of begetting offspring, but also in order that they may lead the domestic life, in which some duties are proper to man and others to woman. Now it is unquestionable that each one does better than anyone else that work which is peculiarly his own. Therefore, apart from generation there are some things that woman does better than man according to the words of Ecclesiasticus: "Where there is no wife, he mourneth that is in want" (xxxvi, 27).

To this single objection—it is very significant that no other objection occurred to such a subtle mind—Cajetan replies with a double distinction.

In the first place, one may speak of the wife in relation to her husband, or of the relation woman and man considered absolutely. Secondly, it is one thing to speak of woman and man, all conditions being otherwise equal; and another thing to speak of woman as having conceived this or that sentiment, as having received this or that formation, as having acquired this or that habit. St. Thomas treats here of woman and man considered absolutely. In the following article Aristotle and St. Thomas speak of the wife in relation to her husband. It is certain that in domestic life there are many things which are not only done better by the wife, but which are not at all proper for the husband, who moreover owes it as a duty to himself not to engage in them. . . . But from this it does not follow that those same things would not be done better by one or several men. From the fact that the wife does a work better than her husband it is not to be concluded: therefore woman does it better than man. There are likewise many activities that are expected from woman rather than from man because of affection, training, formation, and the like. It is for that reason that "where there is no wife, he mourneth that is in want." Man and woman unite for the work of domestic life, for the very close bond of friendly and perpetual union makes the married woman more apt for those works than a man who has not such bonds. Therefore the principle taken from St. Augustine that St. Thomas develops retains its value.²¹

²¹ Cajetan, In I, q. 92, a. 1, nn. II and III.

Thus Cajetan brings texts into agreement, only one of which refers, and only indirectly, to the interpretation of the inspired words of Scripture.

But does not reality exceed these texts in every respect even when, as one must admit, they are ingeniously harmonized and brought into conformity with *certain* facts of universal experience? Do not purely objective studies of the heart of woman and of the history of humanity suggest other objections; not only objections against the idea that St. Thomas took from St. Augustine, but also against that of Aristotle even when generous allowance is made for the context,²² in which, without going much further than most of the Greeks who recognized hardly anything in the lawful wife but a mother and housewife, the Stagyrite nevertheless rises to a certain appreciation of the friendship that is peculiarly conjugal insofar as it rests on the common good which is the child and common domestic life? Let us forget for a moment the texts of the Philosopher, the Father, the Doctor, and the commentator occupied in reconciling the opinions of his masters. Let us compare the simple verses of the first pages of Genesis with the realities of human life. The book is the first in a collection (the Pentateuch) containing in all its details a still imperfect law that grants to man rights over woman which Christianity so far failed to recognize that it expressly abrogated them. But the account of creation ingenuously reveals the divine idea of woman, not that into which it was turned by men of hard hearts, or even by men who were good and holy but inadvertently yielded to the influence of peoples in whom there was a profound ignorance of woman's genius and rights. In anticipation of the future, the account pictures all the truths that have been or can be brought out by psychology, comparative physiology of the sexes, and by the story of the rôle of woman in human societies and the Church. The aptitudes and habits that the state and sentiments of a wife and mother can develop in a woman suppose natural dispositions of the feminine sex, a genius that is peculiar to woman. God destined the great majority of women

²² *Ethica Nichomachea*, D. 14, 1162a, 16-33.

to wedlock and motherhood, but those for whom Providence provides neither a husband nor children are nonetheless called upon to achieve womanly perfection and to work out their salvation. Among these a legion will be the honor and glory of their sex in the Church. Undoubtedly, many theologians, seeking to determine what would have been the condition of mankind if there had been no sin, have thought that in the state of innocence an equal number of men and women would have been born, that sterility would have been an unknown misfortune, that there would have been no reason for perpetual virginity, since the motives for considering it superior to marriage are only relative to the states of humanity in which concupiscence is violent and has to be bridled, and that therefore all women would have become wives and mothers. There is too much conjecture in these assertions for one to feel that he should assent to them. However that may be, the affirmation of the divine intention to create a help-mate resembling man and the precision that came later regarding the union of husband and wife indicate to some extent that, in the view of God, the energies and virtues proper to the two sexes have to be perfected in accordance with still other plans than that of conjugal life, and that in conjugal life itself they are ordained not only to the joint work, primary as it is, of procreation and education, but also to the personal good of the spouse. Earnest efforts are being made in our days to demonstrate the idea that man and woman are mutually complementary even in respects distinct from the relations and functions of generation, and to analyze the riches proper to woman, the special resources that are found in her supple and skillful hands, in her keener sensibility, in her intuitive understanding and tenacious will, in the polarization of her psychology by love. Although the qualities of woman differ very much from those of man, they are no less precious and indispensable for the life of all mankind, the perfection of civilizations and cultures, the harmony of the works of grace, and the variety of the forms of holiness. All of that is contained implicitly in the first revelation of God's eternal purpose: "Let us make a help like unto himself."

Fathers, Doctors, and medieval theologians, interpreting in a strictly literal sense the production of woman from the rib of the man, make the most of its fitness and harmony, and look in it for the natural relations of man and woman in general, or at least for those of wife and husband. St. Thomas soberly sums up these considerations in which, together with the light shed on the subject by the New Testament there is the less brilliant, but yet precious, light afforded by the first pages of the Old. In forming the first woman from the first man, God conferred upon him a more perfect resemblance to Himself, the Creator of the universe: the first man really became the head of the entire human race. To know that his wife was formed from him, from his flesh and blood, is for him, and should be for everyone of his male descendants who marries, another reason for loving his wife and for attaching himself to her more inseparably. "She was taken out of man," says the sacred text, "wherefore a man shall leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife." Jesus and Paul quoted this verse. Moreover (and here is the thought of Aristotle in which Cajetan saw an objection against the text of St. Thomas that sums up the thought of St. Augustine) man and woman are united not only for the necessities of generation but also for the whole domestic life, in which the duties of man are quite distinct from those of woman, and in which the man is the head of the woman. It was therefore fitting that she should be formed from him as from a principle.

In short, there is a figurative and sacramental order in the manner chosen by God. According to the exegesis of St. Paul, on which St. Augustine makes excellent comments, woman, taken from man, is the figure of the Church, which takes its origin from Christ: "this is a great sacrament: but I speak in Christ and in the Church."

But why was it precisely from a rib that woman was taken? The classic answer, whose career can be followed from St. Augustine to St. Thomas and beyond, is this: Between man and woman there should be a social bond, *socialis conjunctio*. Now woman ought not to rule over man, but ought rather to

be subject to him with the honorable submission which is ordered to the good of the family circle and to the personal good of the wife herself. Therefore she was not taken from the head of man; that would have seemed to indicate that she ought to command him. On the other hand, it is imperative that she should not be looked down upon as being in a state of servile subjection. She is a companion, not a servant. Servile submission and corresponding dominion on the part of the head who uses for his benefit and not for the benefit of those whom he rules, are not natural nor are they intended by God: their introduction and continuance in the family can be attributed only to sin. Woman therefore was not formed from the lower part of the body of man. In order to show at the same time her dependence and her dignity, and the love that should unite her to her spouse, she was taken from the side of the sleeping man; thus she became an expressive figure of the Church. It was from the open side of Christ as He slept on the cross, the sleep of love and death, of death out of love, that the sacraments came, the streams of blood and water by which the Church was established and built up.²³

These classic views are admirably expressed by Bossuet in his *Elévations sur les mystères*. He too admits, and without any hesitancy, the strictly literal interpretation, which, as we know, may or may not be accepted.

When calling the other animals into being God created the two sexes at the same time; the formation of the second sex is a singularity of the creation of man.

Of what benefit was it to man to be placed in that paradise of delights, in the vast land given into his power by God, and in the midst of four great rivers, the rich waters of which carried treasures; under a sky so pure that it was not obscured by those heavy clouds which obscure ours and produce storms, since there arose from the earth, as the effect of a mild heat, a gentle vapour which being distilled in dews, moistened the earth and all its plants? Man was alone and the most lonely of all animals; for he saw all the others divided and fashioned into two sexes, and, says the Scripture, there was none but man for whom "was not found a helper

²³ St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, I, 92, 1.

like himself." Solitary, without company, without conversation, without sweetness, without hope of posterity and not knowing to whom he might leave, or with whom he might share, that great heritage and the abundance of good things God had bestowed on him, he lived undisturbed, trusting to Providence, asking for nothing. And God for His own part, not wishing to leave any deficiency in His work, spoke these words: "It is not good for man to be alone; let us make him a helper like unto himself.

And so is He perhaps going to form the second sex as He had formed the first? No, He wishes to give to the world in the two sexes the image of the most perfect unity and the future symbol of the great mystery of Jesus Christ. That is why He takes woman from man himself, and forms her from a superfluous rib that He had purposely put into his side. But to show that there was a great mystery in this and that it was to be seen with eyes of a purer nature than that of the eyes of the body, the woman was formed while Adam was in an ecstasy, and it was by a prophetic intuition that he knew the full meaning of so beautiful a work. "The Lord God cast a deep sleep upon Adam," a sleep say all the saints, that was a rapture and the most perfect of all ecstasies. "And God took one of his ribs, and filled up flesh for it." Do not therefore ask why, when wishing to form from the man the companion whom He was giving to him, He took a bone rather than some flesh; for if He had taken some flesh one could just as reasonably ask why He had taken that rather than a bone. Nor should we ask what He added to the rib of Adam for the formation of a perfect body. Material was not wanting to Him. However that may be, the bone was softened in His hands. From that hard substance He was pleased to form those delicate and tender members in which during the state of innocence nothing could be imagined that was not as pure as it was beautiful. . . .

. . . God constructed, He "built the rib which He took from Adam into a woman": this solemn expression of Scripture was used in order to make us see something great and magnificent in woman, something like an edifice exciting wonder and pleasure by its grace, majesty, admirable proportions and a usefulness equal to its beauty.

Woman formed in this manner was taken by the hand and presented by God to the first man, who, having already seen in ecstasy what God had done, exclaimed at once: "This is now bone of my bone, and flesh of my flesh; she shall be called *Virago*,²⁴ be-

²⁴ This, as is evident, is a Latin transcription of *Ishshâh*. *Virago* comes from *Vir*(man), as *ishshâh* from *ish*.

cause she was taken from man; wherefore a man shall leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife." On the strength of those words one can believe that God had formed woman from a bone clothed with flesh, and that as being the more important part of the formation only the bone is mentioned.

However that may be, without giving further thought to curious questions and merely calling attention in a few words to what appears in the sacred texts, let us once more contemplate in spirit that mysterious spouse, the holy Church, taken from the side of the new Adam during His ecstasy and formed, as it were, by means of that wound, in the bones and flesh of Jesus Christ, who incorporated her with Himself through the mystery of the Incarnation and of its wonderful extension, the Eucharist. He leaves all to unite Himself to her; to cleave to His spouse formed among the Gentiles, He leaves His Father, whom He had in heaven, and His Mother, the Synagogue, whence He had proceeded according to the flesh. It is we who are that spouse; it is we who have life of the bones and flesh of Jesus Christ through the two great mysteries just mentioned. As St. Peter says, it is we who are "this spiritual edifice and living temple of the Lord," built in spirit from the time of the formation of our Mother Eve, and from the beginning of the world. In the name of Eve, which means Mother of the living, let us meditate on the Church the Mother of the truly living, Mary, the true mother of the living, who gave birth to all of us with Jesus Christ whom she conceived in faith. Behold, O Man, what has been revealed to thee in this creation of woman. . . .²⁵

The beauty of this text is excuse enough for having given it almost in its entirety.

We could see in the passage that Bossuet all but expresses the thought, which reflects glory upon woman, that her formation from such perfect material as a part taken from the body close to the heart of man, who was formed from the earth like other animals, is an evidence of the delicacy and refinement of the feminine organism serving as the instrument of a soul that is still more delicate and refined. Nevertheless he immediately draws from it a lesson of humility for the "the second sex":

Women have only to bear their origin in mind and, instead of boasting of their delicate qualities, consider that after all they come from a superfluous rib, in which there was only the beauty that God

²⁵ *Elévation sur les mystères*, 2e sem., 2e élév.

had been pleased to give it. . . . However perfect the first woman was in body and more especially in mind she came immediately from the hands of God, and as for the body she was but a part of Adam and a sort of diminutive.^{25a}

Even genius does not easily free itself from a certain trend of thought that has been current for centuries. But, the eloquence notwithstanding, everyone readily sees that the inference of that lesson of humility is from premisses which have another meaning, and that it does not agree with the context. The connection of woman's origin with man does not make her, in either body or mind, "a sort of diminutive." By the same arbitrary procedure, the Bible can be made to justify that spiritual pleasantry, an amiable revenge which, wholly inoffensive and without irreverence towards the supreme art of the Creator, maintains that the formation of man was a sketch, an experiment; whereas that of woman was a masterpiece.

* * *

In any case, for the Bible and also for the entire system of theology that is derived from it, man and woman are both made to the likeness of God. They are images of God by the same title, one as immediately as the other, notwithstanding a precedence in the order of their creation; for their souls are equally spiritual and immortal, and equally capable of God. This essential equality of nature in the two persons sexually distinct cannot be called into question, and it never has been questioned by Christians and theologians aware of the principles of their faith. It is therefore quite useless to offer cultured readers a refutation of the absurd legend, long exploited against the Church and her theologians, that in the Middle Ages she denied that woman has a spiritual and immortal soul.

The flimsy pretext for that absurdity is unquestionably to be looked for in the wrong interpretation of a text in which there is really no ambiguity. St. Gregory of Tours, who, as is well known, was an historian with more liking for anecdotes than care to control his sources, relates an incident that oc-

^{25a} *Ibid.*, 6e sem., 2e élév.

curred at the Council of Macon (France) in 585. There was a Bishop present who, not having much knowledge of Latin grammar, made a declaration that woman cannot be called (said to be) *homo*. (Anyone familiar with the French language readily understands his difficulty: the French word *homme* is never applied indifferently to persons of the male and female sex; it always implies virility, whereas the Latin word *homo*, like the German word *mensch* and the English word *man*, can be used to designate any human being whether of the stronger sex or the weaker.) Explanations having been given by his colleagues, the Bishop did not press his objection. One sees how unimportant the discussion was, and that the Bishop in protesting against the naming of woman as *homo* was far from meaning to deny that, like all the sons of Adam, every woman has an immortal soul. There is no mention of the little dispute over a question of grammar in the Acts of the Council; and our only knowledge of it has come to us from an old historian of the Franks.²⁶ But in the Canons of the Councils which have been preserved for us, we find particular legislation for the defense and protection of wives and widows against acts of violence, robbery, and plunder committed by man. And so, by a gentle irony of history, it turns out, contrary to those by whom it was consciously or unconsciously falsified, that the Council was rather feminist, as Colette Yver remarks in her delightful book, *l'Eglise et la femme*.

* * *

Let us sum up the points of our theological interpretation of the account of woman's creation. In this short biblical poem

²⁶ The exact text is: "Exstitit . . . in hac synodo quidam ex episcopis, qui dicebat mulierem hominem non posse vocitari. Sed tamen ab episcopis ratione accepta, quievit: eo quod sacer veteris Testamenti edoceat, quod in principio Deo hominem creante, ait, *Masculum et feminam creavit eos*: vocavitque nomen eorum Adam (gen.) quod est homo terrenus; sic utique vocans mulierem ceu virum: utrumque enim hominem dixit. Sed et Dominus Jesus Christus ob hoc vocitatur filius hominis quod sit filius Virginis, id est mulieris. Ad quam, cum aquas in vinum transferre pararet: ait. Quid mihi et tibi est, mulier et reliqua. Multisque et aliis testimoniiis haec causa convicta quievit" (*Historia Francorum*, lib. VIII, XX, 393 PL 71, 462).

there is a marvelous richness: the divine decision to give a help-mate to Adam; the procession of living beings to which he gave names and over which he asserted the authority of intelligence but among which he found no helper in his own likeness to meet him on a common ground; the sleep sent upon him by God, which was filled no doubt—as supernatural sleeps mentioned in Scripture often were—with a prophetic vision revealing some deep design of the Lord; the significant manner of the creation of woman, taken with divine art from the side of man; the enthusiastic exclamation of Adam when he awoke and beheld in all the graces of her young and virginal femininity, the companion God had given to him, and recognized in her the realization of his inspired dream; the bond of origin, the identity of human nature in the diversity of sexes, manifested by the derivation of names; the close conjugal union of man and woman to be consummated in the flesh; the incomparable strength of the new bond suggested in the prophecy (whether Adam's or the sacred author's it comes in the same degree from God Who inspired it) declaring that two human beings born of distinct parents will leave them and cleave to one another—all that is expressed in those few verses.

Thus the first pages of the Book of God offer one of the most beautiful themes of the song of humanity. Literature and the arts will never come to the end of telling how great is woman in the human family and in the Church; what the wife is for the husband, the mother for the child, what love and joy, gentleness and peace and true happiness she can give, to what extent she is “a helper like unto” man and yet different, what incentive and recompense for man are given in all things by her presence and gentleness, the stirrings of her soul and the tenderness of her heart. But all that may be said in honor of woman will be only a symphonic development of the faultless melody sung by Adam when he received from the divine hands the companion formed from himself.

Haydn like other great artists understood this. In *The Creation* Adam and Eve after expressing their gratitude to the Creator for all His works thanked Him in a song of love for

having given them to each other; they are conscious that together, two and at the same time one, they are the masterpiece of creative art and that each is for the other the supreme gift of Providence.

Adam. Our duty we have now performed,
 In offering up to God our thanks:
 Now follow me, dear partner of my life:
 Thy guide I'll be: ²⁷ and every step
 Pours new delights into our breasts,
 Shows wonders everywhere.
 Then mayest thou feel and know the high degree
 Of bliss the Lord allotted us;
 And with devoted heart His bounties celebrate,
 Come follow me—thy guide I'll be.

Eve. O Thou for whom I am!
 My help, my shield, my all; ²⁸
 Thy will is law to me.
 So God our Lord ordains, and from obedience
 Grows my pride and happiness.

Adam. Graceful consort at thy side,
 Softly flow the golden hours;
 Ev'ry moment brings new rapture;
 Ev'ry care is lull'd to rest.

Eve. Spouse adored at thy side,
 Purest joys o'er-flow the heart
 Life and all I am is thine;
 My reward thy love shall be.

Adam. The dew dropping morn! O how she quickens all.
Eve. The coolness of ev'ning! O how she all restores.

Adam. How grateful is of fruits the savor sweet.
Eve. How pleasing is of fragrant bloom the smell.

Adam and Eve. But, without thee what is to me
 The morning dew, the breath of even,
 The savory fruit, the fragrant bloom?
 With thee is every joy enhanced.

²⁷ The text of the recitative emphasizes rather strongly the primacy of man, but the duet overlooks it. Von Hildenbrand says that one should distinguish in marriage the "community of life" (*Lebensgemeinschaft*), which implies authority, and the "community of love," in which no authority is implied. *Metaphysik der Gemeinschaft*, p. 284-5. Love that eliminates fear renders precepts superfluous and in a high degree supplies for obedience. We will meet this problem again.

²⁸ The context excludes idolatry of every form.

Adam and Eve. *With thee is life incessant bliss!*

Thine, thine, in all shall be.

Uriel. *O happy pair! and happy e'er to be,*

If not misled by false conceit

Ye strive at more than granted is,

And more desire to know than know ye should.

A fully developed commentary on the creation of woman and on the divine and primitive institution of marriage would permit the consideration of several questions that are purposely left out of this study. According to the best qualified theologians supernatural grace and preternatural gifts were conferred on Adam and the woman in the very act of their creation: these gifts constituted in the head of the human race an endowment of nature which, if he had remained in the friendship of God, Adam would have transmitted to his posterity. The womb of the woman where the life of offspring begins would have been the sanctuary in which divine grace would have been united to the human nature of the child. The child of man, the son of woman, would have come into the world a "son of God."

Jealousy moved Satan to use every effort to thwart the divine plan.

III. THE TEMPTATION, FALL, AND PUNISHMENT OF EVE.

Now the serpent was more subtle than any of the beasts of the earth which Jahveh-Elohim had made. *And he said to the woman (Ishshâh): Elohim has well said: Do not eat of every tree of the garden. And the woman said to the serpent: we do eat of the fruit of the trees of the garden, but of the fruit of the tree which is in the midst of the garden. Elohim has said: do not eat of it that you may not die. And the serpent said to the woman: You shall not die the death, but Elohim knows that the day you shall eat thereof your eyes will be opened and you will be as gods, knowing good and evil. Then the woman saw that the tree was good to eat, agreeable to the eyes and desirable for the gaining of wisdom; and she took of the fruit of it and did eat. And she gave the fruit to her husband (who was with her), and he ate of it. And the eyes of both were opened and they knew that they were naked, and they sewed together fig leaves and made themselves girdles. But they*

heard the voice of Jahveh-Elohim who walked in the garden in the afternoon air, and they hid themselves, the man and his wife, from the face of Jahveh-Elohim amidst the trees of the garden. And Jahveh-Elohim called the man and said to him: where art thou? And he said: I heard thy voice in the garden. Then I was afraid because I am naked and I hid myself. And Jahveh-Elohim said: who has told thee that thou are naked? Hast thou eaten of the tree that I commanded thee not to eat of? And the man said: the woman whom thou has placed with me gave me (of the fruit) of the tree and I ate. Jahveh-Elohim said to the woman: what hast thou done? And the woman said: the serpent deceived me and I did eat. And Jahveh-Elohim said to the serpent: because thou hast done this, be thou cursed among all the (domestic) animals and all the beasts of the fields; upon thy belly thou shalt go and dust thou shalt eat all the days of thy life. And I put enmity between thee and the woman, between her seed and thy seed; he shall crush thy head, and thou shalt lie in wait for his heel. To the woman he said: I will multiply thy groans and thy sorrows, in pain shalt thou bring forth children. Thy desire is toward thy husband—and he?—he shall have dominion over thee.

And to the man he said: Since thou hast hearkened to the voice of thy wife and hast eaten of the tree concerning which I gave thee a precept in these terms: do not eat thereof; cursed be the earth (adamâh) because of thee. In pain shalt thou draw from it thy sustenance all the days of thy life. (Behold) it will bring forth thorns and thistles and thou shalt eat of the herb of the fields. In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread till thy return to the earth from which thou wast taken; for dust thou art and into dust thou shalt return (Gen., iii, 19). And the man called the name of his wife Eve (Hawwâh) because she was the mother of all the living (Hai). Jahveh-Elohim made for Adam and his wife garments of skins and clothed them.

For Jahveh-Elohim said: Behold man is as one of us for the knowledge of good and evil. Let him not go now and stretch forth his hand, and take also of the tree of life and eat and live forever. And Jahveh-Elohim sent him out of the garden of Eden to till the earth from which he was taken. And he cast out man and he placed before the garden of Eden Cherubim and a sword of flame turning every way to guard the road to the tree of life.

Such is the biblical account of the first temptation and the first sin. This text poses many problems of textual and historical criticism, problems which we do not wish to touch upon;

for what interests us directly, even exclusively, here, is the temptation, fall, and punishment of Eve.

This is not the place to discuss whether the serpent was a real animal used as an instrument by the fallen angel eager for the ruin of man, or a sensible form taken by the devil that he might manifest himself to the eyes of Eve and suggest to her soul the thought of disobedience to God, or even only a symbolic designation of the evil spirit. It is sufficient to know that, according to the exegetes and all the theologians, it is the devil who is tempting: the ruse of the serpent is the ruse of the demon.

Why the Devil Tempted the Woman First?

The devil tempted the woman first and then let her, in her turn, seduce the man. Why? The interpreters of Holy Scripture have asked themselves this question. The history of the different opinions would be very long; two representative witnesses must suffice: Hugh of Saint Victor, of great weight in the Middle Ages, and Peter Lombard, who cites him in his *Sentences*.²⁹ To sum up their opinion, they say that the devil tempted Eve alone because "he knew that reason was less vigorous in the woman than in the man." "His malice, timid of tempting virtue (let us understand here: fearing to make a vain attack on the strength of the man) attacked human nature from the side where it appeared the weakest. He proposed, if he gained the advantage here, to turn a later and more confidant attack upon man, whom he knew to be more capable of repulsing the assault and, indeed, of overwhelming the assailant. So he put woman to the test first, loosing upon her all his force as tempter." (*II Sent.*, Dist. **XXI**, ch. 1.)

Among the innumerable commentators of Lombard, let us choose the Seraphic Doctor, who is very explicit on this point. According to the procedure so dear to the Schools, he first

²⁹ This work, so named because it is in large part made up of "Sentences" borrowed from the Fathers and Doctors, was the Western manual of theology for many centuries. It was the object of numberless commentaries both oral and written.

weighs the a priori reasons for and against the plan so effectively followed by the devil. These are his reasons.

The order of destruction and the order of construction are inverse. Now the woman was created last. Interior temptation commences in the inferior part and then passes to the reason or superior part, and exterior temptation, the direct work of the devil, normally follows the same procedure. Now in humanity the woman represents the inferior part, the man the superior part or reason; it is good strategy to attack the enemy who is presumed to be the weakest. If therefore the devil had hopes of being able to seduce Eve more easily than her husband, it was indicated that he should start with her. Besides, isn't it the clever thing to do, when one fears destruction in a direct attack on a powerful and able enemy, to worm agents into his most intimate company; so much the more reason for the devil to attack Eve first.

However, other considerations tend to prove that not only was there no motive for commencing with the temptation of Eve, there were positive reasons for the demon to make his attack directly on Adam. For it is not the flesh that sins, but the soul, by which man is the image of God, and this image is in the woman and in the man by exactly the same title; there was no more promise of easy conquest about the woman than the man, since she, being "innocent" as was he, had no more inclination to sin; her soul had no more bent to the flesh than had his. It is much more shameful to be vanquished by a woman than by a man, and much more glorious to triumph over a man than over a woman: the pride, presumption and daring of the devil should then have moved him to direct his first assault against the stronger sex.

These a priori reasons seem to neutralize each other, but, says Saint Bonaventure, the fact is there, unambiguously affirmed by Scripture: the temptation commenced with the woman and reached Adam through Eve. With a momentary reflection, one sees that it was in conformity with the divine wisdom to permit this order, as it was with the cunning of the devil to choose it. The Lord permitted the devil to act in this

way, first of all, to train man, with his strong soul and high virtue, not only to resist the temptation of the demon, but also the suggestions of his wife. Moreover the woman was without excuse in her fall; if the man, her master, having authority over her, had been tempted first and had fallen, the woman could have followed him in his sin with too much of an appearance of excuse. Finally, God permitted this to give all an ever valuable lesson: that the invisible temptation, like the visible temptation of the demon, goes from the inferior or sensible part, represented by Eve, to the superior or reasonable part, represented by Adam.

This particular strategy was well marked out for the craftiness of the devil. He noticed in the woman less of wisdom and constancy and could foresee more obstinacy in her. Less wise, she seemed to him easier to seduce; less constant, she was easier to lead astray: it seemed to him that on this side, the human city was much less well defended. He figured, and his calculations were right, that once vanquished herself the woman would not rest until she had dragged her husband down with her. Does not Ecclesiastes (vii, 27) say that a woman is "the hunter's snare, and her heart is a net, and her hands are bands"? These are the reasons why the cunning of the devil began its attack with the woman. The fact confirms, therefore, the first a priori reasons, while the series of other reasons reveals its weakness. One would say that the difference of sexes does not enter into the matter when it is a question of the image of God. It is indeed true that the image of God is no less clear in the woman than in the man, if we consider only the spiritual soul; nevertheless the soul accommodates itself in some fashion to the complexion of the body; it takes on a certain femininity, therefore, in the woman and so, by nature, the feminine sex is more easily inclined to sin, at least unless a greater power of grace sustains it. Before the fall, woman did not have an inclination to evil: but it does not follow from this that she was also firm in the good. Without leaning in that way at all, she could fall more easily than the man whose nature was stronger and whose grace was, one believes, more abundant. It

is more humiliating to be conquered by a woman than by a man, but it is more glorious to achieve success over a woman than to suffer a defeat in battling against a man. Fearing to encounter from Adam a truly virile resistance, the devil sought his victory with the greatest of precautions. Those who are openly daring and not cunning willingly launch their attacks on the strong; but the devil is not only daring and insolent, he is also a wily deceiver. He chooses, then, to achieve his ends, not in the most difficult, but in the surest way. Moreover, it is not permitted to him to exercise his power in any other way; and, not being able to conquer any but those who will to embrace defeat, he is fundamentally very weak.

Thus, or approximately thus, Saint Bonaventure (in *II Sent.*, d. 21, a. 1, q. 2).

It is evident from these representative examples in what manner, most unflattering to Eve, some of the great theologians, doctors and saints accept the current idea of woman's greater weakness not only in the physical but also in the spiritual, intellectual and moral orders. On the other hand, it is presumed as self-evident that man, stronger by nature, has received the greater supernatural gifts.

Four centuries later, Bossuet underlined with an even heavier stroke feminine inferiority as the reason for the tactics of Satan.

Whatever advantage he (the devil) had over us on the side of intelligence, he was far from being able to force us; the grace which we had, and which he had entirely lost by sin, made us his superiors in strength and in virtue: thus he could do nothing against us except by permission; and it was this which so flattered his pride to subject our spirit to his thorough cleverness, to make us fall into the trap which he laid for us.

The first effect of his cunning was to have tempted Adam by Eve and to have begun his attack on us from the weakest side. However perfect she may have been in body, and still more in soul, the first woman, issuing immediately from the hand of God, was, physically, only a portion of Adam and a kind of diminutive. Spiritually the proportion was more or less the same, for God has caused a wisdom to reign in His works which ranges throughout with a certain fittingness. It is not Eve but Adam who names the animals; it was to Adam and not to Eve that they were led.

Although Eve, as his cherished companion, participated in his empire, there remained to man a primacy that he could not lose except by his sin and by an excess of complacency. He had given Eve her name, as he had done to all the animals, and nature wished her to be in some way his subject. It was therefore in him that the superiority of wisdom resided; and Satan attacked him from the side which was less strong and, so to speak, less fortified.²⁹⁴

In speaking of the creation of Eve, we have already cited the phrase in which Bossuet speaks of woman as a "kind of diminutive." Eloquence cannot conceal the sophism. If woman is a kind of diminutive because she was formed from man, it could just as well be argued that man, because he was formed from the slime or the dust of the earth, is a diminutive of these things. Indeed, there is a sense in which this is true: from the corporal point of view, man is a microcosm, but by his intelligence immensely superior to the microcosm devoid of spirit. Bossuet has well said that God built up "bone" or "a superfluous rib" into a woman, to the image of God as was her husband; and that the Scripture, speaking thus, "wished us to see in woman something grand, magnificent." The phrases, so humiliating for Eve, are no more than the tribute paid to contemporary ideas which the eagle of Meaux took no more pains than others to submit to criticism. In spite of the sense of mystery which he brings out, particularly in this work, he wished perhaps to make the manner and the procedure of the satanic temptation too plausible.

To this end he points out other indications of feminine inferiority, indications that are hardly more demonstrative. Adam, and not Eve, names the animals. But according to the order of the biblical account, Eve was not yet created when Adam named the animals God led to him. It is not therefore in the lesser force of feminine reason that an explanation is to be sought for woman not taking part in that first work of intelligence; to name the animals is to know them and to say what they are, for the name, especially in the Bible, expresses the nature. Priority of creation, taken in itself, does not neces-

²⁹⁴ *Elévations*, 6e sem., 2e élév.

sarily signify excellence or superior worth, for the animals and all other creatures were created before man. Adam gave his wife her name, but the very names which he gave her (the first derives from the name of man) express without doubt that he recognized in her one sprung from his very being, but also a being made by God, a companion in no way inferior to himself, not in any sense, corporal or spiritual, a "diminutive," that is, a creature having a hardly sufficient portion of reason and spirit, the mediocre or relatively parsimonious measure of which could be compensated for by nothing else. The primacy of the husband over the wife, such at least as was originally conceived and willed by God (I do not say such as the customs of sinful humanity made it), has no need of these reasons which pay so little honor to woman and give so much less glory than is thought to the wisdom and goodness of the Creator.

Not a single word of the sacred text suggests the idea that Eve, less strong by nature, was proportionally less full of supernatural grace than her husband. Is not this idea, accepted by Saint Bonaventure, and by Saint Thomas, only a theological reflection of unfavorable prejudices against woman? It serves almost too well the purpose of apologetics (good in itself) of making the phases of the diabolic temptation more likely. Would it not be better simply to accept the order of the biblical account as a fact, rather than explain it by dubious considerations, the convenience of which ought not to increase their worth unduly? Everyone realizes that the theologians proposed these reasons, not as demonstrative, but as merely probable, arguments. Perhaps they believed, nevertheless, that these arguments were more efficacious than they really are. Would not the greater weakness of the feminine nature in the face of evil, if it is real, give a greater claim to compensatory helps of grace from the divine goodness, a greater assistance at the hour of temptation? Neither the experience of fallen humanity nor the sacred text describing the fall from the state of innocence suggests the idea of a greater capacity for resistance to a proposed evil in man than in woman. If Adam was stronger, he gave no evidence of it in surrendering without either discussion

or battle. At least the biblical account does not say that he offered the least objection or resistance to his wife. (If only this first time had been the last.)

Was Eve more guilty than Adam?

Whatever may have been his reasons for adopting this strategy, the fact is that the devil did approach Eve, and that she made the mistake of listening to him and entering into discussion with him. From the instant that he labored to raise a doubt in her mind as to the truth and justice of God, Bossuet persistently explains, she should have shut her ears, and left. She practised no deception in responding to the serpent as she did, but she should not have said a single word to him "who demanded reasons for a supreme command where there was no question of inquiry but only of obedience." Eve's curiosity increased the powers of Satan who, seeing her bedazzled, already inclined to doubt, came out flatly with a lie against the word of God, dissipating her fears and making the promise of un hoped-for goods shine before her eyes. In brief, Eve succumbed and dragged her husband with her in her fall. Reading the text, it would seem that nothing could have been easier.

Let us put aside the diverse interpretations of the exegetes and theologians concerning the nature of the divine precept which was transgressed, and concentrate on the exterior sin which was committed both by Eve, at the instigation of the serpent, and by Adam, at the instigation of Eve. In the first place, Eve sinned interiorly through pride, through her ambition to gain knowledge. In general it is well known that theologians have a great liking for the problem of the comparative gravity of sins, as for the problem of the relative excellence of the virtues. Thus they exercised their sagacity early and late in comparing the first two sins and their respective malice. A text of St. Paul seemed to them to throw a vivid light on the subject: "Adam was not seduced: it was the woman who, being seduced, fell into sin" (*I Tim.*, ii, 14). On this text St. Augustine wrote a commentary whose general sense is as follows: Adam was not seduced in the same manner as his wife. Adam did not believe the devil as did Eve. But he was misled

in this sense, that he saw only a venial transgression in a sin which brought death to the soul. He was not deceived, as was his wife, to the point of believing that God had forbidden them to touch the fruit of the tree in the midst of the garden through jealousy, for fear that in touching it they would become as gods. Nevertheless Adam sinned, and St. Paul says this as strongly as it can be said. His presumption consisted in this, that he, in his turn, wished to try out the effects of the fruit which Eve had eaten without dying.

Peter Lombard (*II Sent.*, d. 22, cc. 3 et 4) cites these texts and comments on them; after him all his commentators follow in his footsteps. Their repetition takes this form, more or less: The proper fault of Eve was to have believed the absurd insinuation of Satan about the jealousy of God. Adam did not believe this, nor that lying promise, "you shall be as gods," but, imitating his wife and eating the forbidden fruit through love for her (*quadam amicabili benevolentia*) that she might not be separated from him to die alone, he seems to have seen dimly the possibility of repentance and hope in the mercy of God, to have persuaded himself that the sin, far from being mortal, would be easily forgiven. The severity of the sentence quickly showed the gravity of his error, but he was not deceived to the point of lending credence to the promise of the devil—he was too enlightened to make such a mistake.

From this, continues the venerable master, it is clear that the woman sinned more gravely. She allowed herself to go further to presumption and pride. Adam sinned against God and himself, but Eve also brought about the spiritual ruin of Adam. Without doubt Adam and Eve were equally arrogant in the excuses by which they passed on the sin, Eve to Satan, and Adam to Eve, instead of admitting that they were guilty and disobedient. But Eve's peculiar pride was to have hoped to become, and to have wished to become, like unto God. And this is incontestably the greater sin.

And the author sets aside the different reasons, drawn from the texts of Augustine, which tend to bring out the sin of Adam as equally grave, or even graver than the sin of his wife.

* * *

With hardly discernible nuances the opinion of Peter Lombard was taken up by the greatest Doctors of the thirteenth century, Saint Bonaventure and Saint Thomas Aquinas.

Let us consider first Saint Bonaventure in his commentary on the *Sentences*. He begins by seeking the species of the woman's sin. By consenting to the suggestion of the devil, she committed a sin of pride: her ambitions looked, certainly not to an absolute equality with God, but to a dignity surpassing all human measure; by desiring an unbecoming knowledge of good and evil, to know what was not to be known, she committed a kind of spiritual avarice; finally, wishing to taste the sweetness of the fruit, she fell into gluttony and disobedience. Begun in pride, her sin continued through avarice, and was consummated in gluttony. Eve surrendered all her powers to disorder: her will, by impossibly high desires; her reason, by the appetite for knowledge of forbidden things; her sensible appetite, by savoring the sweetness of the forbidden fruit. And from this sin shot the roots of all others.

The saintly Doctor then asks if Adam desired the same exorbitant heights that were coveted by Eve. Not finding anything expressly on the point in Scripture, he discusses the various opinions and concludes in the negative. The texts of the saints which seem to contradict his conclusion are, in his eyes, susceptible of one or the other of the following three limited senses: Adam placed his will above the divine order which he scorned; he did not wish to submit to anyone, which is, after a fashion, to make oneself like God; Eve was sprung from him; therefore, he desired in her person what she desired so foolishly; he had the task of leading his wife and he did not correct her: the sin of Eve then was imputed to him.

Having made these indispensable clarifications, Saint Bonaventure proceeds, with the help of certain distinctions, to a direct solution of the problem of the comparative gravity of the sins of Adam and Eve. One sin can be graver than another, because of the greater ingratitude to which it gives witness, by the inordinate desire from which it proceeds, or by reason of the more disastrous effects that follow from it. From the point of

view of ingratitude, the man sinned more gravely than the woman, for he had received more abundant gifts; in forgetting them and scorning his benefactor, he was guilty of a blacker ingratitude. By reason of inordinate desire, the woman sinned more gravely; her will was more malicious and more eager for the sin, since she believed the promises of the devil and desired to be made like God. From the aspect of the effects of sin, it was the sin of Adam which resulted in the transmission of original sin, but Eve was the occasion and the instigator of that very sin of Adam.

The saintly Doctor adds that it could be said, which amounts to the same thing, that considering the condition of the sinners, the man sinned more than the woman, since, having received more gifts than she, he had the responsibility of guiding her and of assuring the supernatural future of their descendants. But from the more essential point of view, that of the character and the conditions of the sin, the woman was more culpable because it was she who dishonored God and brought about the fall of Adam. Absolutely speaking, therefore, her sin was greater; and so her punishment was more severe.

St. Thomas, even in the *Summa Theologica*, is not less faithful than the Seraphic Doctor to the suggestions of the Master of the Sentences. The common sin of Adam and Eve, he explains, is the gravest of all human sins, not in itself or by its very nature, but because the sinners were in a state of greater perfection. Both sinned by pride, but Eve believed the serpent accusing God of jealousy and desired a good *against* the will of God, while Adam, though not believing the serpent, did not expressly desire a good *against* the will of God, but hoped to obtain the good of himself; not content to have sinned on her own account, Eve caused her husband to fall; she did not have the excuse that he could call upon, of having consented to the sin through benevolence and love for another (cf. II-II, q. 163, a. 4).

It would be unjust to accuse the two great medieval Doctors of having committed the injustice of more readily excusing the same fault in Adam than in Eve. They discovered and openly

declared Adam to be ungrateful because, they thought, he had received more gifts of both nature and grace; his responsibility as head of humanity, and first of all of his own wife, made him more guilty of the same sin than she was. But they did not believe that Adam had committed the same internal sins of pride and infidelity as his wife. It is in this that they are more indulgent to Adam, relatively too indulgent, it seems to us, considering their severity towards Eve. The sobriety of the sacred text's mention of the sin of Adam as opposed to the detailed account of the temptation and fall of Eve, and the one text of St. Paul, which it will be necessary to examine in detail, led the Doctors to admit a difference between the man and the woman in their sins, to the exoneration of the man.

But this "tradition" is not the only authorized one; St. Ambrose, in his *De Institutione Virginis*, c. 4, inaugurated or defended another.

We cannot deny that the woman erred. But what is there astonishing in the fact that the weak sex fell when the strong also fell. The woman had an excuse for her sin. The man had none. She was deceived, the Scripture affirms, by a superior enemy. Thou, by an inferior: it was the woman who deceived thee. As for her, it was a fallen angel, but nonetheless an angel. If you could not resist an inferior creature, how could she resist a superior being? Thine own sin absolves her. . . . If Adam could not keep the commandment he had received from the Lord God, how could the woman keep the one she had heard from man? If the voice of God did not confirm man in good, how could the voice of man confirm Eve in it? Adam could offer no other excuse than that his wife had given him the fruit and he had eaten it. Eve said: "The serpent deceived me and I ate." Eve was the first to admit her fault. In saying that she had been misled, she recognized her error. . . .

St. Ambrose, no less than the others, affirms the inferiority of the "second sex," but he draws another conclusion from that inferiority as regards the gravity of the fall. Let us cite, from among those who took their inspiration on this point from Ambrose, in spite of what was perhaps the majority of the Scholastics, the great Catholic controversialist of the sixteenth century, Saint Robert Bellarmine.

We believe that opinion more probable which holds that the woman did not believe that God was jealous or had lied to her, but that she persuaded herself that she and her husband had misunderstood the divine precept; and thus we think, with St. Ambrose, that absolutely speaking the man sinned more gravely than the woman, although in some of her acts she was as guilty as her husband.

Bellarmino explains his position by distinguishing seven acts on the part of both the man and the woman in the fall. Those of the man were: pride, immoderate love and excessive kindness towards his wife, infidelity towards God and credulity towards the devil, curiosity, disobedience properly so called, idle excuses, wrong done to his neighbor. Those of the women were: pride, infidelity, evil desire, disobedience, leading her husband into sin, the wrong done to the whole human race.

Pride was the same in both parties; infidelity showed but a shadow of difference. The disobedience of both was identical. They both excused themselves, but with this difference: while Eve blamed the sin on the cunning of the devil and her own simplicity, Adam laid it to his wife and even to God. "The woman whom thou hast given me." Though both excuses are worthless, that of the man is much worse.⁸⁰ Both did injury to the human race, and in this regard again Adam sinned more gravely, for he was the true cause of the transmission of the sin. Eve was only its occasion. If Eve alone had sinned, there would have been no transmission of the sin.⁸¹ Adam gave way to his wife because of an excessive love. But it was also because of inordinate love that Eve wished to share with him the good that she believed she had found. Eve coveted the fruit: Adam wished to see if the forbidden fruit would cause death; he tempted God, which is much graver. Considered in them-

⁸⁰ Cf. Bossuet, *Elévations*, 6e semaine, 8e élév.: "It appears that God Himself is to blame. But had God given him the woman to be a companion of his disobedience? Did he not have to rule and correct her? It is the last word of the crime that, far from wishing to admit his fault, he wished to plead innocent and cast the blame upon his luckless companion and even upon God who had given her to him."

⁸¹ This is a common scholastic opinion. We leave aside here everything that touches upon the transmission of original sin.

selves, then, their evil acts condemn the man more than the woman.

And if we consider the persons and the other circumstances of their acts, it will be seen still more clearly that the sin of the man calls for a more severe judgment. Wiser and stronger than the woman, her master, he should have taught her, not listened to her. Indeed it was for this that God reproached him: "Because thou hast listened to the voice of thy wife. . . ." He faced an enemy weaker than himself; she faced one much stronger. He had received the command from God directly, she had it from him. She acknowledged her sin better, since she confessed her error. Adam does not seem to have recognized either his error or his sin. God reproved Adam much more severely, for it was to him that the terrible divine irony was addressed: "Behold, Adam has become as one of us." It is notable that assigning the particular punishments of the man and the woman, God pointed out to man alone the death that was to be common to both. . . .³²

Bossuet, usually so Augustinian, rather follows this "Ambrosian" tradition. He affirms clearly that, while Adam was not exactly deceived as was Eve, in the final summary he shared all the malice of the sin of his wife.

That Adam was not deceived must be understood in two senses. In the first place, he was not deceived because the seducer did not attack him first; secondly, he was not deceived because, as the holy Doctors interpret it, he yielded more through his feeling for Eve than through his personal conviction. These saintly interpreters, among them St. Augustine, expressly state that Adam did not wish to have his dear companion suffer solitary affliction: *sociali necessitudine paruisse*; nor to allow an eternal contradiction in his family and in the future mother of all his infants. In the end, nevertheless, he gave way to the seduction; impelled by his tenderness, he himself began to savor the reasons of the serpent and he conceived the same hopes as his wife, since it was only through him that these things could pass to his children, where they have caused the ravages that we still see in ourselves.

Adam believed, then, that he would know good and evil, and that his curiosity would be satisfied. He believed that he would become like God, the author by his own free will of the false happy-

³² Cf. Robert Bellarmine, *De Controversiis christiana fidei*, De ammissione gratiae et statu peccati, lib. III, q. IX. (Ed. of Naples, 1858), IV, pp. 132-133.

ness he desired, which would have satisfied his pride: from this followed the revolt of the senses, and he sought the means of flattering them with the exquisite taste of the forbidden fruit. . . .³²²

The Punishment of Eve.

We wish to limit ourselves to a consideration of the punishment reserved to the woman which was the object of a prophecy, and a special sentence addressed to her alone. Eve participates in the general chastisements of the sin, and even in that of burdensome, tiresome, dangerous toil announced by God to Adam alone, unless the first part of her condemnation alludes to all feminine tasks and not only to the inconveniences of gestation. By sin, Eve as well as Adam lost grace, the divine friendship, and all the gifts of integrity which were the overflow and reflection of supernatural grace in human nature: possibility of escaping physical suffering, decrepitude, death, although, as Saint Bellarmine points out, death, the threat of which had accompanied the intimation of the precept was expressly recalled only to the man after the sin. The fourfold injury: ignorance in the mind, evil in the will, weakness and concupiscence in the sensible potencies of struggle and desire, is patently common to both sexes.

The first couple could have avoided old age and death by eating the fruit of the tree of life however this fruit is to be understood. It is not stated by what means God would have preserved innocent humanity from all physical pain coming from within or without, and especially the woman from the travail of giving birth, which her very structure would ordinarily render more or less painful. The Creator did not lack the means, without it being necessary to suppose other ways of parturition. Whatever these foreseen means would have been, one of the most striking aspects of Eve's punishment is to have lost, before enjoying it even once, this privilege with which a delicate providence would have known how to enrich her child-births.

“To the woman he said: I will multiply thy groans and

³²² *Elévations*, 6e sem., 5e élév. Also 7e and 8e élév.

pains; in sorrow shalt thou bring forth children. Thy desire [is] towards thy husband, and he shall have dominion over thee."

So at least we have translated. The Hebrew text and received translations: Greek (Septuagint), Latin (Vulgate), etc., have diverse nuances: "I will multiply thy sufferings and thy conceptions," or: "the sorrows of thy conceptions," i. e., of thy pregnancies, or again: "thy sadnesses and thy groans." Certain translators even think that the moans and pains thus prophesied are those of domestic labor rather than the inconveniences of pregnancy. However this may be, they are in truth the pains of maternity and child-birth, and they alone are intended in the rest of the verse: "In pain shalt thou bring forth." The chastisement will not be personal to Eve, but will equally reach to all her daughters. It is not stated that it will be absolutely universal and equally hard for every woman. The pains of maternity vary much both in duration and intensity according to countries and climates; in one and the same country for different women who are more or less strong or well-built; in the life of one and the same woman, according to her age or condition. Frequent pregnancy facilitates child-bearing, or again may render it more and more perilous. Some very fertile women remain strong and healthy. Others are exhausted by their child-bearing and finally become victims to it, or, having both foreseen and accepted it, become its martyrs. A married woman is only completely exempted from these pains at the price of sterility, often considered by her (and by her husband) as something much more difficult to bear. Many suffer from conceptions and gestations which begin well but which are unsuccessful and whose involuntary check is itself a cause of new physical sufferings and afflictions. Only those women who know not man escape the law of the specific punishment of Eve, but, of these, there are many to whom the solitary life is a long-drawn-out torture.

The Vulgate says: "Thou shalt be under thy husband's power," which could also be rendered: "To thy husband (thou owest) obedience." But the Hebrew, the Septuagint, and the Targum have rather: "Towards thy husband (is inclined) thy

desire," or "thy impulse." "And he shall rule over thee." The sense would be then: in spite of the pains of child-birth, the woman will always have a yearning, an attraction towards her husband, she will thus be drawn on to new sufferings not included in her desire. The man will profit from it to bring her under subjection. "He shall rule over thee," signifies: Thou wast his companion and his help-mate. He will arrogate to himself the domination of a master over thee. Or, as St. Augustine said in substance: The submission of the wife to husband before the fall was a sweet subjection eagerly accepted by love; it will become a slavery imposed by violence and force. The text does not say that God gives man the right so to subject his wife to the humble condition of a servant or slave. It merely announces that it will be so, by the very fact that the man is little solicitous to remain within the limit of his rights, and is always prepared egotistically to abuse his power. The woman will be punished by the weight which the new faults of man will heap upon her. God *permits* it. We do not say He *wishes* it, for that would be offensive. From this aspect again, the chastisement will not necessarily be universal and uniform in space and in time. And God, in announcing it, does not say that His will is that such a chastisement should not be lessened or should never cease. Constant fidelity to the evangelical law of conjugal love would liberate from it the wives of all married Christians, since the husband ought to love his wife as Christ loves the Church, that is, ought to sacrifice himself for her who is subject to him as is the Church to Christ.

The entire history of feminine humanity and daily experience sadly bears out the prophetic sentence levelled by God against the woman after Eve's first sin. The divine will does not condemn the efforts that can be made—saving the holy laws of marriage and pregnancy—to alleviate the pains of child-bearing and to prevent the tragic accidents which culminate in the death of mothers. The will of God, to be expressly stated in the Apostolic writings, is to lighten the yoke which, as predicted at the dawn of history, the malice of men will press upon the shoulders of their companions.

These brief indications may suffice as explanation of Eve's punishment. Still, the orientation of this study demands,—since we cannot retrace the whole history of the theological interpretation of the text,—that one of the important phases of this history be recalled: the controversy of St. Augustine with Julian of Eclane, whose Pelagian exegesis of a rationalistic tinge, attempted to deprive the divine sentence of all meaning.

Julian of Eclane said (in substance): It is ridiculous to represent the pains of child-birth as the consequence and punishment of sin, as they are manifestly a natural effect of the feminine anatomy. Among animals, and no one will say they have committed sin, females suffer in bringing forth their young. The pains of motherhood are not therefore a stigma of sin. It is still more stupid to say: The woman who has been purified from sin by Baptism suffers because of the original sin of the infant she bears. Strange original fault which, instead of descending from mother to child, ascends from child to mother. Be it not said that before being purified from it, she herself had this sin, for, if she suffers in child-birth because of sin, she ought not suffer when purified from sin. One must admit, either that the Sacrament does not purify her, or that the pains are not the penalty of her sin, but the lot of her nature itself. The texts of Sacred Scripture bear clear witness that this is so. God foretelis to the woman that He will multiply her pains. She has then already been subject to sufferings, for one does not multiply nothing. There is no question in Genesis of the multiplication of human beings until after their creation. God had said: "Let us make man," then: "Let us make him a help like unto himself." Then only He said to them: "Increase and multiply." The punishment of the woman who bears a child consists then, not in the normal measure of sufferings resulting already from her physique, but in the excessive multiplication of these pains. It is this something extra, this augmentation, that God points out to her, and this penalty aims at the person of the sinner, not at the nature of woman. Moreover the sequence of God's words to Eve concerning her subjection and the domination of her husband does not express a

sentence of condemnation, but a precept. The woman, as St. Paul teaches, was created for the man and not he for her. It is not in punishment for her sin, but by nature, that she is and ought to be affectionately subject to her husband who is her "head."

This in general is the sense of Julian's remarks as transcribed by St. Augustine.³³ To this argument and to some other difficulties or imputations of his opponent, the Bishop of Hippo responds in effect: We are accused of pretending to say that women ought not to suffer in child-birth, unless they have inherited, along with the sin of Eve, *the anguish of her fecundity*. It is not the torture of fecundity which passes in them, but the torture of iniquity. Fecundity has become painful, but because of iniquity. The pains are the penalty of sin, fecundity is the fruit of the divine blessing, at least when one understands "the tortures of fecundity" in the sense that the tortures are not radically attached to it, but were added to it after the fault. That indeed is what we teach. Nor do we say that women would have suffered if they had borne children in Paradise, for Paradise excluded suffering, and sinful women subject to pain have no right to remain in paradise where there is no suffering. Julian is so blinded that he wishes to fill God's paradise with the disordered passions of men and with their torments. This is not surprising, for, with complete disregard for the Scriptures, he would like to introduce into Paradise death too, which seldom if ever occurs without suffering. The true Christian doctrine attested to by a great number of witnesses is that the beginning of sin came from the woman and death came from sin. We are accused of inventing this doctrine. This is impudent, for all the Doctors know that God established human nature in such conditions that, if man had not sinned, he would never have known death. Julian is not even the inventor of this doctrine which was sustained before him by Pelagius and Celestius. Would to heaven that he was no more their disciple than he is their master.

Now we said that the pains of child-bearing are the punish-

³³ *Op. imperf., Contra Julianum*, lib. VI, XXVI.

ment of the woman's sin, for God teaches this clearly. He said it to the mendacious Eve only because she had transgressed His order. Julian wishes to reduce this wrath of God to nothing and to deprive it of its effect. He pretends that the pains of pregnancy and of child-bearing are not the penalty of sin, since animals incapable of sin suffer in bearing. The animals have not confided to him the meaning of their cries. . . . If they do not suffer, his argument is worthless. If they do, it is punishment for the woman, image of God, to be reduced to their level.

We have never imagined what has been imputed to us: that the mother purified of sin suffers because of original sin transmitted to the infant. Death is the punishment of the sin, but it does not follow that, once sin is forgiven, death should disappear at once. We remain condemned to that after the remission of sin, to prove our faith in a future life, where death no more has a place. What would our faith be if we were to receive forthwith the prize of exemption from suffering and death? This simple explanation is enough to defeat the argument of Julian: "If the sacraments take away sin and pain remains, this is because pain is a mark of the nature, not of the fault."

But Julian invokes the words of Scripture itself: God did not say to Eve: "Pain shall commence for thee," but: "I will multiply thy pains." This argument seemed conclusive to him, for he says, no one multiplies what does not already exist. And the Scriptures never speak of multiplying, but of making what does not yet exist. Yet Julian knows that Eve, when God announced to her the multiplication of her pains as a mother, had not yet experienced it. The famous argument is only childish nonsense. "I will multiply" . . . signifies very well: "I will augment the number of pains which thou knowest already or which thou shouldst one day suffer naturally," or "I will impose on thee in great number pains which thou wouldst not have known if thou hadst not sinned." Abraham had not yet had a son when God promised to multiply his line as the stars of the heaven. Eve was created in a state in which her child-bearing would not have been painful. "Women would

have borne children painlessly and the child would have come as a ripe fruit from the womb of the mother without any effort on her part.³⁴ If anyone contradicts us on this point he introduces misery into the Paradise of God. He destroys the very notion of Paradise and renders void God's revelations concerning this place of delights where, for man, all pain and death were banished.

Useless to discuss with Julian the question whether the man's domination and the woman's subjection of which God speaks to Eve are a punishment for her sin or a precept based on the nature of man and woman. The controversy over pains and miseries which are punishment of sin in no way depends upon the solution of this point.

It is a known fact, verifiable by this example, that Augustine did not succeed in formulating with perfect clearness and precision the distinction between human nature taken in itself and nature considered in its original state of innocence, grace and integrity. He is inclined to attribute to nature what belongs only to the state in which it was constituted by God's gratuitous goodness. (To systematize and dogmatize further in this direction would lay the foundations for the errors and heresies of Baianists and Jansenists.) Pain and death are indeed natural to man in the sense that they would belong to the state of pure nature, and that man, emerged from the hands of God and established in Paradise, would only have been exempt from them by a privilege of grace, by reason of the "gift of integrity."

In Saint Thomas Aquinas the distinction is perfectly clear. According to his principles, we must say of the pains of childbirth what is said of the other pains in general and of death itself for the two sexes: natural to the human creature, they are in fact the penalty of sin since, had there been no sin, they would not have intervened; innocent humanity would have remained untouched by them, God preventing this by means which were at the disposal of His power and goodness.

³⁴ Ut enim ad pariendum non doloris gemitus, sed maturitatis impulsus feminea viscera relaxaret, sic ad foetandum et ad concipiendum non libidinis appetitus, sed voluntarius usus naturam utramque conjungeret. (*De Civ. Dei*, XIV, cap. XXVI.)

The first parents, he explains, as a punishment for their sin were deprived of the divine gift which conserved for them "the integrity" of human nature. The subtraction of this benefice permitted the nature to fall back upon itself and so submitted it to the defects which are found to be punishments. Adam and Eve were then doubly punished: they lost the right which belonged to their state of innocence of residing in Paradise where they could eat the fruit of the tree of life, and entry into Paradise was thenceforward denied them. They found themselves with a nature destitute of the helps of grace and the privileges of innocence: they were injured in both body and soul.

A special corporal punishment is assigned to each of the sexes. The woman found herself punished in the two aspects and the two ends of her union to the man; she will suffer in begetting children and in domestic life. As regards generation itself her punishment is twofold: it consists first in the nausea which overtakes her while carrying the child: "I will multiply thy hardships and conceptions"; next in the pains of parturition: "thou shalt bring forth in pain." But just as it pertains to the woman to be subject to her husband in the relations of domestic society, it pertains to the husband to procure for himself and family the necessities of life. In this aspect he is triply punished: by the unfruitfulness of the earth, by the sufferings of labor, by the exterior impediments he meets with in cultivating the soil.

In their soul, they are punished by the confusion which they experience in the rebellion of the flesh, by remorse for their sin, and by the thought that they are both doomed to future death.

Saint Thomas formulates the objection that no one can assign as a punishment for sin what would have existed without sin. Now the structure of a woman is such that a child cannot be born without causing her to suffer. In regard to the submission of the woman to her husband, is this not due to his perfection and to her imperfection?

He replies: in the state of innocence childbirth would have taken place without pain. Saint Augustine says that the thrust of the ripened fruit, not the groans of pain, would have dis-

tended the organs of the mother. This is the text of the *City of God* transcribed above and generally cited by the theologians.

In regard to the submission of the woman to man, we must distinguish between government voluntarily accepted and domination imposed upon a rebellious will. Even before or without sin, man is the head of the woman and would have governed her in his house. After sin, she must still, against her own will, obey the will of her husband. Innocent, she would voluntarily have accepted his loving rule; a sinner, she must accept, whatever she may think of it, the rule which in the hands of a sinful husband very often becomes an unjust and excessive domination. The husband has not acquired the right to govern his wife without love or according to his caprice and to satisfy his ego. But he often does, and his sin is an aspect of the woman's punishment. This is, I believe, the thought of Saint Thomas.⁸⁵

This is likewise, it seems, the opinion of Bossuet, who writes somberly:

Fecundity is woman's glory; it is there that God applies His punishment: she is (pregnant) only at the peril of her life. This punishment is not peculiar to woman. The human race is cursed, full of confusion and pains from the moment of conception and birth, surrounded on all sides by torment and death. The child cannot be born without endangering the life of his mother; nor can the husband become father without gambling with the most precious half of his life. Eve is unfortunate and cursed in her sex whose children are so often murderers; she was destined to be man's gentle companion, his consolation, and the sweetness of her own life lay in her pride in that destiny. But God mixed therein subjection, and He changed into bitter domination this sweet superiority which he had first given to man. He was superior in reason, he becomes a severe master by disposition: jealousy makes him a tyrant; woman is subject to this fury and over more than half the world women are held in a kind of slavery. This harsh empire of husbands and the yoke to which women are bound is an effect of sin. Marriages are as often a punishment as they are a happy union; each party is to the other a heavy cross and a tor-

⁸⁵ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 164: De poena primi peccati, especially art. 2: Utrum convenienter particulares poenae primorum parentum determinentur in Scriptura.

ment from which there is no delivery; united and separated mutually they torture one another.

The truth, too evident in many cases, of this sad picture shows the striking realization of the prophetic sentence pronounced by the Creator against sinful woman.

The chastisement appeared harsh to the culprit but, taken altogether, it is to the honor of the woman that she submitted gracefully to this punishment, which does not abrogate the first, most universal and irrevocable of all heavenly blessings, but which, ever since the first sin, follows her as her sometimes tragic shadow. Humanity owes its life, its being "multiplied," to Eve's submission to her punishment. Yet many women (in relation to the whole sex in space and time, they are few, but in itself the number is incalculable) have rejected and reject the glorious blessing of motherhood so as not to undergo its bitter penalties. They regard as a curse the blessing which the penalty accompanies. She, or her companion, or both of them, lacking courage (and in many circumstances today it is true that they would have need of heroic courage), the woman whose desire draws her to her husband or towards whom man's desires draw him, seeks to avoid the pains connected with fecundity by the fault of Eve. Often it is the man who does not wish that his companion (legitimate or not) become a mother or become one again, less perhaps to spare her the pains of pregnancy and parturition and the absorbing care demanded by infants, than to free himself from the duty of supporting the mother and child, or because, in spite of his good will, he has not the means to provide for them. People invent excuses,—often there are real ones, although without weight, but as often again also there are none; egoism and the unbridled appetite of carnal pleasure and of the conveniences of life for the two are the only consideration. Numberless couples, then, without refusing the union of bodies and its rapture, attempt by every possible means to prevent conception and the production of the fruit. They seek at any price to avoid the sufferings and dangers of gestation and birth, at the cost of all sorts of misery, of grave dangers and often death itself, for the

woman. It is perhaps the most frequent form of sin today, a double sin of anti-conception and abortion, a pagan and neopagan sin, very ancient and very modern in its woeful spread. Ancient peoples died out from it. Others today are threatened with death from it.

So for woman to refuse the penalty proper to the sin of the first woman is to continue and multiply sin. To God who said to her: Thou remainest blessed, but thou shalt suffer, the rebellious daughter of Eve says: I do not want any blessing, because I do not want any suffering. Senseless revolt. Woman does not escape the suffering which results from her sin, and she lays up for herself later on the worst kind of pains and the bitterest and most useless of regrets.

For the woman who accepts the pain along with the blessing, pain itself is the preparation for the purest kind of joy. Jesus has said: "A woman when she is in labor hath sorrow because her hour is come; but when she hath brought forth the child, she remembereth no more the anguish, for joy that a man is born into the world" (John, xvi, 21). Her sorrow is turned into joy. That is the naturally redeeming effect of this pain.

By the grace of the Redeemer the pain of child-bearing will have a supernatural fertility. Saint Paul says in the same phrase which recalls woman's seduction: "Yet she shall be saved through child-bearing, if she continue in faith and love and sanctification with sobriety" (*I Tim.*, ii, 15).

Bossuet remarks: "Her first punishment renders her fertility dangerous; but grace, as Paul says, saves her in the reproducing of children."^{35a} If her life is put into the balance, there her salvation is so assured, if she is faithful to the demands of her state. Thus Eve's punishment shall work for her redemption and eternal glory. But this changing of punishment into joy supposes for its full realization, as we have said, the coming of Him of whom Saint John speaks. The very first prophecy of the redemption and of the Redeemer is to be found, better than in etching, on the very page that bears the divine sentence striking the first sinners of earth and the diabolical

^{35a} *Elévations*, 6^e sem., 11^e élév.

seducer of Eve. The cursing of the demon tempter, symbolically represented by the characteristics of the base serpent so hateful to man,³⁶ foretells the victory of Eve, of the new Eve, of Mary, the Mother of the new Adam. Unanimous Catholic tradition bears witness to it, and Pius IX declares it in the Bull *Ineffabilis Deus* which defined the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin Mary. It is she, and her Son, it is their struggle and victory which are meant, not necessarily in the literal sense but in the spiritual sense, in the mysterious verse: "I put enmity between thee and the woman, between her seed and thy seed. He shall crush thy head, and thou shalt lie in wait for his heel."

Eve and Mary, the two Eves, with the two Adams, are the two poles of history and of the fate not only of woman but of all humanity. Mary and her daughters realize the divine idea whose first incarnation was itself deformed. The whole Christian theology of the Incarnation and the Redemption is only the explanation of the divine mercies of which Mary and Mary alone is the first created principle. The daughters of the new Eve will have said their last word only when history comes to an end.

We know, as Francis Thompson sings, what the daughter of the old Eve is capable of, but Eve redeemed has never stopped surprising her brothers, her husband and her children:

Daughter of the ancient Eve
 We know the gifts ye gave and give;
 Who knows the gifts which you shall give,
 Daughter of the newer Eve?

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³⁶ "As . . . the characteristics of the devil should be represented by those of the serpent, God, Who foresaw this, determined to make use of this beast to speak to Eve, so that, being the image of the devil by his wiles, he would have represented also the just punishment. In this way the character which we have just pointed out (to be loathsome, an execration etc.) parabolically applied to the serpent and in reality to the devil." (Bossuet, *Elévations*, 6e semaine, 10e élév.)

THE RÔLE OF SACRAMENTAL GRACE IN CHRISTIAN LIFE

THE immediate purpose of this study is to clarify the notion of the nature and operation of sacramental grace. It has, however, several more remote goals. As the study progressed, it became evident that here was material of vital importance for Catholic living. By completion of the study, then, and its presentation here, it is hoped that this vital material will be more deeply appreciated by the members of Christ's Mystical Body; that, in a word, it may be realized that sacramental grace is a channel by which the Passion of Christ flows into the very living of our everyday lives, that by it we carry Christ's cross almost literally, that the precious blood is dropping into every detail of our lives through the sacraments more truly than it dropped into the lives of that small group of faithful friends on Calvary.

The essential difference between the sacraments of the Old Law and those of the New is that the former did not actively cause grace, while the latter do. As the hammer or the chisel leave their distinctive marks on the statue, so each sacrament leaves its traces on sanctifying grace. These impressions are commonly called sacramental grace. Obviously if the sacraments of the Old Law did not cause grace, they did not touch grace itself, and consequently did not modify it. Strictly speaking, then, sacramental grace is found only in the New Law.

Our sacraments cause grace because they are directly under the influence of the Passion of Christ. Any attempt to study either the causality of the sacraments or the grace they produce, of necessity must consider the Passion of Christ also.

In the following pages the physical causality of the Passion and of the sacraments is presupposed. Our chief concern is sacramental grace itself. Here, too, the teaching of John of St. Thomas on the nature of this grace is accepted as being in harmony with the mind of St. Thomas. Attention is focused

principally upon the influence of the Passion on the grace of the sacraments. That is, we wish to discover what salutary effects the Passion has in our sacraments that was not found in the sacraments of the Old Law; and secondly, what does the Passion add to sanctifying grace now that was not added to grace given by reason of faith in the Redeemer to come? Stated declaratively the thesis is that *sacramental grace, insofar as it takes away the defects of sin, is the grace of the Passion that effects man's salvation after the manner of satisfaction.*

This conclusion may be established either by defining satisfaction and examining the effects of sacramental grace in order to determine whether this grace fulfills the requirements of that definition; or by comparing the effects of Christ's Passion with the effects of sacramental grace. We have chosen the latter method because the motive for the Passion is, according to the revelation given to man, to offer condign satisfaction to God for the sin of man, and the sacraments apply this satisfaction to man.

The work is divided into three parts.

I. The first part includes:

- (A) a consideration of the Sixty-second Question of the Third Part of the *Summa Theologica*.
- (B) a comparison of the sacraments of the Old Law with those of the New in relation to the Passion of Christ.
- (C) a study of the object of the Passion as satisfying for man's sin, and the object of sacramental grace.

II. The second part contains a general consideration of the perfection for which sacramental grace is given.

III. In the third part an attempt will be made to explain how sacramental grace is a principle for actual grace once the sacrament has ceased.

I

A. In the Sixty-second Question of the Third Part of the *Summa Theologica* St. Thomas studies the effects of the sacraments. The question contains six articles, namely: do the

sacraments cause grace; does sacramental grace add anything to the grace of the virtues and the gifts (sanctifying grace); do the sacraments of the New Law contain grace; is there some power within the sacraments that causes grace; do the sacraments of the New Law have power from the Passion of Christ; and finally, did the sacraments of the Old Law cause grace.

In the first article the Angelic Doctor teaches that the sacraments cause grace:

Because by the sacraments of the New Law man is incorporated in Christ, as the Apostle says of Baptism "for as many of you, as have been baptized in Christ have put on Christ";¹ and since man is made a member of Christ by grace, therefore it is necessary to say that the sacraments in some manner cause grace.²

In the last part of this article, the holy Doctor, moved by the authority of the saints saying that the sacraments of the New Law not only signify but also cause grace, says:

An efficient cause may be either a principal or an instrumental cause. The principal cause works by the power of its own form to which the effect is likened, just as fire heats by reason of its own heat. God is the only One who causes grace in this way because grace is a participated likeness of the divine nature, according to the words of St. Peter: 'He hath given us most great and precious promises, that by these you may be made partakers of the divine nature.'³

An instrumental cause does not work by the power of its own form but only by a motion coming from the principle cause; just as a couch is not likened to the axe, but to the art which is in the artist. This is the way in which the sacraments of the New Law cause grace.⁴

Having thus established that the sacraments are instrumental causes of grace, St. Thomas asks whether sacramental grace adds anything to sanctifying grace. He answers affirmatively after considering the effects of sanctifying grace itself and the effects of the sacraments.

Grace considered in itself perfects the essence of the soul inasmuch as it participates of the likeness of the divine nature. Just as the

¹ *Gal.*, iii, 27.

² *II Peter*, i, 4.

³ *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 62, a. 1.

⁴ *Summa Theol.*, loc. cit.

potencies flow from the essence of the soul, so perfections flow from grace into the potencies which are called virtues and gifts, which perfect these potencies in relation to their acts.

The sacraments are ordered to special effects necessary in the Christian life, just as Baptism is ordered to spiritual regeneration by which men die to vice and become members of Christ, which effect is something special beyond the potencies of the soul; and the same reasoning is true of the other sacraments. Therefore, just as the virtues and the gifts add to grace commonly so called (i. e., sanctifying grace) a perfection determinately ordered to the proper acts of the potencies, so sacramental grace adds to sanctifying grace and to the virtues and gifts a divine help to attain the end of the sacraments.⁵

In answering the objections, St. Thomas offers additional reasons for distinguishing sacramental grace from sanctifying grace, namely:

The grace of the virtues and the gifts sufficiently perfects the essence and the potencies of the soul as far as the general order of the acts of the soul are concerned; but for those special effects that are required in the Christian life sacramental grace is needed.⁶ Vices and sins are sufficiently excluded by the virtues and the gifts with regard to the present and the future insofar as man is prevented from sinning by the virtues and the gifts; but for past sins, the acts of which are transitory whereas their guilt remains (*transeunt actu et remanent reatu*), man is provided with a special remedy in the sacraments.⁷

The Commentators are divided in their attempts to determine the nature of this "divine help." Cajetan says that it is an act;⁸ Capreolus maintains that it is a habit distinct from all other habits;⁹ while John of St. Thomas and Billuart teach that it is a special mode or vigor of sanctifying grace.¹⁰ It seems to us that the fifth article indicates more clearly the mind of St. Thomas himself on the subject. The object of the second

⁵ *Ibid.*, a. 2.

⁷ *Ibid.*, ad 2um.

⁶ *Ibid.*, ad 1um.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ *IV Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 3; and q. 3, ad 4um.

¹⁰ *Cursus Theologicus in Summam Theologicam Divi Thomae*. Vol. IX: *De Sacramentis*, disp. 24, a. 2. Billuart., *Summa Sancti Thomae*, Vol. VI: *De Sacramentis in Communi*, disp. 3, a. 5.

article is to show that sacramental grace adds something to sanctifying grace. In other words it gives only the reasons for distinguishing sacramental grace from sanctifying grace. These reasons are founded on the different effects of the two graces; sanctifying grace perfects the essence of the soul and its potencies as far as the general order of the acts of the soul is concerned, and likens the soul to the divine nature. Sacramental grace, over and above this perfection and deification, christianizes the soul, furnishes it with help for the special effects necessary in the Christian life, and takes away the guilt (*reatus*) of past sins.

In the fifth article St. Thomas says:

The sacraments work to cause grace after the manner of an instrument. But there are two kinds of instruments, one which is separated, as a staff, the other which is conjoined, as the hand. The separated instrument is moved by the conjoined as the staff is moved by the hand. Now the principal and efficient cause of grace is God Himself, in comparison with Whom the Humanity of Christ is as a conjoined instrument, and the sacraments as separated instruments. And so it is necessary that the saving power be derived from the Divinity of Christ through His Humanity into the sacraments. Now sacramental grace seems to be ordered especially to two things: namely, to take away the defects of sin insofar as they are transitory in act and remain in guilt (*transeunt actu et remanent reatu*) and, secondly, to *perfect* the soul in those things that pertain to the worship of God according to the rite of the Christian life.

It is manifest that Christ freed us from our sins especially by His Passion, not only sufficiently and meritoriously but also satisfactorily. Likewise by His Passion He initiated the rite of the Christian religion 'offering Himself as an oblation and a sacrifice to God.'¹¹ Wherefore it is evident that the sacraments of the Church derive their power from the Passion of Christ Whose power in a manner is united to us by our reception of the sacraments.¹²

Here St. Thomas summarizes what he has said in the first and second articles. Then he points out how the defects of sin are taken away, namely, by the Passion of Christ. Finally, in saying that "Christ freed us from our sins not only sufficiently

¹¹ *Eph.*, v, 2.

¹² *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 62, a. 5.

and meritoriously but also satisfactorily," the holy Doctor touches, it seems, the very nature of sacramental grace in relation to the defects of sin. There is an indication in those words that sacramental grace is the grace of satisfaction of the Passion, and that this is the "divine help" that sacramental grace adds to sanctifying grace. Before we endeavor to establish this teaching, we must reconsider the entire sixty-second Question.

We have seen that in the first article St. Thomas proves theologically that the sacraments cause grace. In the second article he shows that sacramental grace adds something to sanctifying grace. These two articles treat primarily of the fact, or of the existence, of grace, and of its sacramental help. Having arrived at the existence of these graces, he penetrates into the sacraments themselves to determine the nature of the grace as it is in the sacraments. In the next three articles he shows that grace is in the sacraments incompletely;¹³ that there is in them an instrumental power which causes grace;¹⁴ that this power is derived from the Passion of Christ.¹⁵ Finally, he distinguishes the sacraments of the New Law from those of the Old Law. These latter sacraments, he says, did not cause grace because the motion or influx of the Passion as an efficient cause was not present in them.¹⁶

Passing from this consideration of grace in the sacraments, where it has only incomplete being, to the consideration of grace in the soul of man where it has complete being, we find that sacramental grace is a divine help added to sanctifying grace coming from the satisfying power of the Passion, which enables man to attain the end of the sacraments.

Now if the essential difference between the sacraments of the New Law and those of the Old consists in the motion derived from the Passion into the former, we must determine what salutary effect this influx has in our sacraments that was not present in those of the Old Law; and, secondly, what this motion gives to sanctifying grace now that was not added to sanctifying grace given by reason of faith in the Redeemer to come.

¹³ *Ibid.*, a. 3.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, a. 4.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, a. 5.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, a. 6.

B. St. Thomas says that the Passion of Christ effects our salvation by way of merit and satisfaction. His Passion is a sacrifice and a redemption; it is also the efficient cause of our salvation.¹⁷ The Passion freed us from sin and the power of the devil; by the Passion we are reconciled with God and the gates of heaven are opened to us.¹⁸

In the answers to the objections he says:

The Passion of Christ although it is corporeal has special power from the Divinity united to it, and therefore by spiritual contact it has efficacy, namely, through Faith and the sacrament of Faith.¹⁹

Christ by His Passion freed us from sin causally, by instituting the cause of our liberation by which any kind of sin and whenever committed either past, present or future can be remitted.²⁰

Because the Passion pre-exists as the universal cause of the remission of sin it is necessary that it be applied to individuals to take away their sins. This is done by Baptism, Penance and the other sacraments.²¹

Now of all these effects of the Passion, the satisfaction of Christ is the only one that was not in the Old Law. The satisfaction comes from the Passion and since the Passion did not actually exist in the Old Law neither did the satisfaction. Grace was given and sin remitted but only in virtue of the satisfaction that was to come by the Passion of Christ. Proof of this is found in the fact that the holy men of the Old Law who died in the state of grace were not ushered immediately into heaven but were retained in Limbo until Christ descended there and applied to them the satisfaction of His Passion. Therefore the special influx which the sacraments of the New Law have that the sacraments of the Old Law did not have is the physical influx of the Passion by way of satisfaction, and sacramental grace is the result of that influx. Sacramental grace therefore seems to be the grace of the Passion effecting our salvation by way of satisfaction.

C. We arrive at the same conclusion if we consider the object of sacramental grace and the object of satisfaction, as

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, q. 48, aa. 1-4, 6.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, q. 49, a. 1, ad 3um.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, q. 49, aa. 1-5.

²¹ *Ibid.*, ad 4um.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, q. 48, a. 6, ad 2um.

treated by St. Thomas. Of sacramental grace he says that it is given as a special remedy against sins, the acts of which are transitory whereas their debt remains.²² Concerning the satisfaction wrought by the Passion, he writes:

Since, then, Christ's Passion was a sufficient and superabundant atonement for the sin and the debt of the human race, it was as a price at the cost of which we were freed from both obligations. For the satisfaction whereby one satisfies for oneself or another is called the price by which he ransoms himself or some one else from sin and its penalty.²³

The Passion of Christ according as it is compared with His Divinity acts after the manner of an efficient cause; compared with the will of Christ's soul it acts in a meritorious manner; considered as being within the flesh of Christ, it acts by way of satisfaction, inasmuch as we are liberated by it from the debt of punishment; while inasmuch as we are freed from the servitude of guilt, it acts by way of redemption; but insofar as we are reconciled with God it acts by way of sacrifice.²⁴

By the Passion of Christ we have been freed from the debt of punishment in two ways. First, directly, inasmuch as the Passion of Christ was sufficient and superabundant satisfaction for the sins of the entire human race; but when sufficient satisfaction has been offered, the debt of punishment is taken away. Secondly, indirectly, insofar as the Passion is the cause of the remission of sins, upon which the debt of punishment rests.²⁵

In the reply to the first objection of this article he says that this satisfaction is applied to us by Faith operating through Charity and the sacraments of Faith. Finally, he teaches that the power of Christ works in the sacraments by healing and expiating.²⁶

From these citations it is clear that Christ's satisfaction takes away the debt of punishment due to sin. We have seen that sacramental grace also is ordered to the removal of this debt. We may conclude, then, that sacramental grace is the grace of the Passion that effects our salvation after the manner of satisfaction, and that this satisfaction wrought by the Pas-

²² *Ibid.*, q. 62, a. 2, ad 2um; Cf. a. 5, c.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, a. 6, ad 3um.

²³ *Ibid.*, q. 48, a. 4, c.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, q. 49, a. 3.

²⁶ "Virtus Christi operatur in sacramentis per modum sanationis et expiationis."

Ibid., q. 52, a. 8, ad 2um.

sion is the special divine help that sacramental grace adds to sanctifying grace in order to attain the end of the sacraments.

In speaking of man's guilt and of the debt of punishment St. Thomas uses the term *reatus*. The next question to be solved is what does he mean by this word? And further, does he use this term in the same way for the Passion and for sacramental grace?

In his *Commentary on the Second Book of the Sentences* he says:

reatus is that according to which one is guilty of penalty, and therefore it is nothing else than the obligation to penalty. And because this obligation is a mean between fault and penalty, from the fact that because of the fault one is obliged to the penalty, therefore the name of the mean is transferred to the extremes so that sometimes the fault itself or also the penalty is called *reatus*.²⁷

If therefore this word *reatus* means fault, then in the expression "sins which are transitory in act but remain in fault," the fault (*reatus*) is that of the stain of sin (i. e., the *macula*). If however it means the guilt of penalty, then there may be a two-fold guilt implied in the expression, "sins which are transitory in act but remain in guilt." First, that the stain of sin is still on the soul and therefore the person is obliged to the penalties of sin; secondly, the soul is in the state of grace and is only "obliged to suffer penalty to satisfy for the temporal punishment due to sin."²⁸ This is shown more clearly in the *Summa Theologica*:

In sin two things can be considered, namely, the act of the fault, and the stain that follows. It is plain that when the act of sin ceases there remains the guilt (*reatus*) in all actual sins. For the act of sin obligates a man to penalty (*reum poenae*) insofar as he transgressed the order of divine justice, to which he does not return except by a compensation of a penalty, which restores the equality of justice. So that he who indulged his will more than he should by acting against the command of God, must suffer according to the order of divine justice either spontaneously or unwillingly something contrary to what he wishes . . . ; whence it is evident that when the act of sin ceases there remains the debt of penalty.

²⁷ *II Sent.* d. 42, q. 1, a. 2.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, ad 5um.

But if we speak of the removal of sin insofar as the stain is concerned, it is manifest that the stain of sin cannot be removed unless the soul be united to God. . . . Now man is joined to God by his will. Whence the stain of sin cannot be taken away from him unless the will of man accepts the order of divine justice, so that, namely, he either spontaneously takes a penalty upon himself in recompense for the past sin, or that he patiently sustains what is imposed upon him by God. In both instances the penalty has the nature of satisfaction. Satisfactory penalty diminishes something of the nature of penalty, for it is of the very nature of penalty to be contrary to the will. Satisfactory punishment, however, although according to its absolute consideration it is contrary to the will, is not so any longer and by this it is voluntary. Whence it is voluntary simply, and involuntary in a certain respect. . . . Therefore, when the stain of sin has been removed there can remain the obligation (*reatus*) to penalty, not simply, but of satisfactory penalty.²⁹

We have, then, at least three possible meanings for the expression "sins which are transitory in act and remain in guilt (*remanent reatu*)": 1) the act of sin has passed but the guilt and the stain remains; 2) which follows upon the first, that with this guilt and stain of sin there remains the guilt or obligation to absolute penalty; 3) both the stain and the guilt to absolute penalty have been removed, leaving the obligation to satisfactory penalties. We may add a fourth also, the wounds of sin, because these wounds are penalties for the sin of Adam. Now there are penalties for original sin and for actual sin. Before we consider these, however, we must say something of punishment itself.

Punishment can be absolutely penal; satisfactory; and medicinal. Penal punishment is that which is inflicted on someone contrary to his will and in no wise accepted by him. Such is the punishment of the souls in Hell because of mortal sin.³⁰ Satisfactory punishment is that which one willingly sustains or accepts in order to restore the equality of justice.³¹ Medicinal punishment is that which is inflicted to prevent evil. It may be imposed by one's self, as the undergoing of privations in order to curb the passions of the soul; or it may be inflicted on

²⁹ *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 87, a. 6.

³⁰ *Loc. cit.*

³¹ *Ibid.*

an individual to prevent others from like crimes, as is capital punishment.³²

Now the obligation to the punishment or to the penalties that follow upon original sin is best understood by considering the order that prevailed in Adam, because it is by reason of the disruption of this order that human nature is punished. Adam was created in the state of Original Justice.³³ By reason of this state he possessed the supernatural gifts of sanctifying grace, and the virtues and the gifts which subjected his will to God. Added to this grace was the preternatural gift of integrity which kept the inferior powers of his soul perfectly subordinated to his reason,³⁴ and his body to his soul.³⁵ When he sinned he disrupted the order between his will and God, thereby incurring the penalty of eternal separation from God. At the same time he also lost the gift of integrity, upsetting the perfect subordination of the inferior powers to reason, and of the body to the soul.³⁶ The penalties incurred from this loss are the wounds of nature, hunger, sickness, and death.³⁷ Human nature is thenceforward guilty of the sin of Adam (*reatus culpae*); and obliged to, or guilty of, the penalties (*reatus poenae*) that follow therefrom, which are eternal and natural. It must be remembered that, excluding Adam, original sin is a sin of nature not of person.³⁸ Consequently the sin affects the person through the nature; and the penalties are inflicted upon the person, not because of any personal sin, but because the nature itself is guilty of these penalties. For personal sin the obligation (*reatus*) is to suffer eternal punishment in Hell, together with those penalties that are inflicted by society and reason.

God demanded that the punishment due to sin be paid; moreover He required condign satisfaction, which a pure creature was incapable of rendering.³⁹ The Passion of Christ united to the Person of the Word rendered not only adequate but superabundant satisfaction. His Passion was not penal, be-

³¹ *Loc. cit.*

³⁶ *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 81; q. 85, a. 1, 3, 5.

³² *Ibid.*, I, q. 95, a. 1.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, q. 85, a. 5.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, a. 2.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, q. 81, a. 5, c.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, q. 97, a. 1.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, III, q. 1, a. 2, ad 2um.

cause He was deserving of no punishment, since He could not sin. He accepted the Passion to satisfy not for His own sins but for the sins of the entire human race. His Passion, then, is satisfactory.⁴⁰ Likewise it is medicinal not for Himself, but for the human race which needed the medicine of the Passion to heal the wounds of sin. The Passion, therefore, took away the guilt of original and actual sin (*reatus culpae*), and the punishment attached to these sins (*reatus poenae*).⁴¹ The Passion also took away the penalties of the present life, in which effect we shall participate when our nature suffers the final penalty of sin, which is death.⁴² The effect of the Passion, therefore, is the reparation of human nature. This reparation restores not only the justice of God by appeasing His wrath, but also heals the very nature of man. In other words, Christ restored both the order of man's will to God, and the order of the inferior powers to reason, and of the body to the soul, in which complete reparation human nature will participate in the Resurrection.

Since, then, the Passion took away all the guilt of sin, its punishments, and defects, we should find similar effects in the sacraments. Baptism takes away the guilt of original sin and satisfies for the punishment due to it.⁴³ The natural penalties, however, remain.⁴⁴ The important thing to note here is that the nature of the baptized person is no longer guilty of these penalties as it was before Baptism. The person must suffer them, however, because of his state. Consequently, the sacramental grace of Baptism satisfies for the guilt of sin and its penalties. Human nature still needs the satisfaction of Christ, not to satisfy for these penalties, but to restore their order to reason. Again, if we consider the term *reatus* as meaning the wounds of nature, or as the defects of sin, the satisfaction of the Passion is needed to take them away.

The question to be solved next is: what meaning does St. Thomas assign to the expression, "sins which are transitory in

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, q. 48, a. 2.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, q. 48 & 49.

⁴² *Loc. cit.*

⁴³ *Ibid.*, q. 59, aa. 1-2.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, a. 3.

act but remain in *reatu*" in the second and fifth articles of the Sixty-second Question? Does he mean guilt of fault (*reatus culpae*); guilt of penalty (*reatus poenae*); or simply defect? It seems that he can mean all three. The expression can refer to the guilt of sin or the fault, because before Baptism the nature is guilty of the fault of original sin. It may also mean guilt of penalty, because as long as original sin is present the nature is guilty of penalty. Finally, *reatus* can mean defect, because these defects remain after original sin and its guilt of punishment have been taken away. There can be no doubt that he means the guilt of sin and its penalty; but does he intend that it should mean defect? It seems that he does, because he says:

Vices and sins are sufficiently excluded by the virtues and gifts as far as the present and the future are concerned, insofar as man is impeded from sinning by the virtues and gifts; but with regard to past sins which are transitory in act but remain in guilt (*reatu*), there is given a remedy to man especially through sacraments.⁴⁵

As can be seen from the first part of this answer, the stain of sin has been taken away and also the penalties due to sin; the virtues have supplanted the vices, yet there remains the *reatus* of those past sins. This *reatus* cannot be the guilt of absolute punishment, but it may be the penalties of original sin, or the obligation to satisfactory punishment for personal sin. It seems then that *reatus* here means the defects of sin. This conclusion is in harmony with what St. Thomas teaches in the Sentences: "Sacramental grace is opposed to sin insofar as sin wounded the natural goodness of the soul."⁴⁶ Consequently, sacramental grace is necessary to take away sin, the guilt of its penalty (Baptism and Penance); and sacramental grace is needed to take away the defects of sin (all the other sacraments); the grace that performs this work is the grace of the Passion that effects our salvation after the manner of satisfaction—strictly, the grace of Baptism and Penance; in a wide sense, or as a medicine, the other sacramental graces. Therefore giving sacramental grace the name of its cause,

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, q. 62, a. 2, ad 2um.

⁴⁶ *IV Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, qt. 5, ad 2um.

sacramental grace seems to be the grace of the Passion that effects our salvation after the manner of satisfaction.

If it is objected that satisfaction implies a voluntary suffering of some pain or injury, which is accepted by God as adequate to restore the balance of His justice, and that in the sacraments there is no voluntary undergoing of pain or suffering, we reply by distinguishing the three-fold satisfaction due to sin, namely, eternal, natural and temporal. The Passion of Christ satisfies for the eternal and natural punishment due to original and mortal sin whereas our works of mortification satisfy for the temporal punishment due to sin. We accept the Passion of Christ in the following way. The sacraments are in the genus of a sign and signify our sanctification in which three things can be considered: first, the cause of our sanctification, which is the Passion; secondly, the form of our sanctification, which consists in sanctifying grace and the virtues; thirdly, the ultimate end of our sanctification, which is eternal life—all these are signified by the sacraments.⁴⁷

Moreover, the sacraments pertain to divine worship according to the rite of the Christian religion.⁴⁸ Now the Passion of Christ was more than adequate payment of the debt owed to God, and it is evident that His Passion was, is, and always will be most acceptable to God. Because, therefore, the sacraments signify the Passion and belong to the cult of the Christian religion, which consists in the use of external things—and the use of external things has the notion of giving—anyone who voluntarily submits to the reception of any sacrament offers to God no less a suffering than the very Passion of Christ Himself, more or less, according to the degree in which each sacrament signifies the Passion. That is why St. Thomas says of Baptism, the most perfect configuration of Christ's Passion: "He who is baptized is freed from the punishment due to sin as if he himself had satisfied for all his sins."⁴⁹ Consequently, we share in the suffering of Christ and offer that to God. However, it must be noted that the signification of the Passion, of itself,

⁴⁷ *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 60, a. 3.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, q. 62, a. 5; q. 63, a. 1.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, q. 69, a. 2.

is not sufficient to produce sacramental grace; there must also be the influx of the Passion after the manner of an efficient cause. So much so that if the influx is absent the sacramental grace is also absent. For St. Thomas says that the sacraments of the Old Law (which also signified the Passion) did not cause grace, nor did they derive any efficacy from the Passion because "that which does not exist in reality does not move according to the use of external things; whence an efficient cause cannot be posterior to that which it moves, as a final cause can be."⁵⁰ In other words, the efficient cause must precede that which it moves. Therefore the signification of the Passion together with the influx of the Passion causes sacramental grace, or the grace of satisfaction.

From this it can be seen why the period of the Old Law is called that of fallen nature, whereas after Christ we are in a state of repaired nature. For in the Old Law where the sacraments did not give grace because the influence of the Passion was not present, but where sanctifying grace was given by Faith in the Redeemer to come, the order of the soul to God was restored by that grace although the gates of Heaven were not yet opened. The order of the inferior powers to the soul, or the order of nature, was only *per accidens* restored, because "sanctifying grace takes away the stain and restores the order of the soul to God. But although the wound of sin as far as the will is concerned is healed, there are required penalties for the healing of the other powers of the soul which were disordered by sin."⁵¹ And because "sacramental grace is opposed to sin insofar as sin wounded the natural goodness of the soul,"⁵² this healing power the sacraments of the Old Law did not have; therefore, human nature was not repaired in the strict sense in the Old Law.

In the New Law the sacraments under the influence of the Passion give both sanctifying grace and sacramental grace, restoring the order of the will to God, and of the inferior powers to reason. St. Thomas goes so far as to say that Baptism can

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, q. 62, a. 6.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 87, a. 3, ad 3um.

⁵² *IV Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, qt. 5, ad 2um.

take away all the penalties of the present life (note he also said this of the Passion) even to that of giving the body impassibility and immortality. These effects, however, are withheld but they will come to us in the Resurrection by the power of Baptismal grace.⁵³ Consequently, our nature is repaired and moving towards complete reparation.

Again, one might object that the grace of Baptism takes away entirely original sin and its guilt or obligation to punishment (*reatus poenae*), therefore only the grace of Baptism is a satisfying grace. To this we answer, that original sin and the guilt of punishment are taken away completely insofar as the soul receives sanctifying grace and sacramental grace whereby all the guilt is cancelled. The wounds of sin, however, which are penalties of original sin, remain. These wounds must be healed, and by the Passion, which acts as a medicine upon them, gradually destroying them. This medicine is applied to us through the other sacraments; then insofar as these graces are medicines taking away the penalties, they can be called satisfying graces, because they bring the inferior powers of the soul more and more under the control of reason and restore the order which Adam disrupted. However, the grace of Penance, like that of Baptism, is strictly satisfying, because it takes away the eternal punishment due to mortal sin, and gives the soul the principles to satisfy for the temporal punishment due to sin. This sacramental grace unites the individual to the satisfaction of Christ and makes his works of mortification efficacious in securing the remission of the temporal punishment due to sin. Here again we see the superiority of the New Law over the Old. In the Old Law, works of mortification, etc., helped to take away the temporal punishment due to sin but always in virtue of the Passion to come. Our state is much more felicitous, because the Passion is always united to us by sacramental grace producing satisfying and healing effects.

From this two-fold effect of sacramental grace, namely, satisfying and repairing, sacramental grace seems to be analogous to the gift of integrity possessed by Adam, at least as far as

⁵³ *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 69, a. 3.

the inferior powers are concerned. In Adam the perfect order between the sensitive appetites and reason was something preternatural.⁵⁴ It was an added power given to sanctifying grace which kept these appetites perfectly subordinated to reason. Virtue was easy for Adam because he did not have to suppress the inordinate cravings of his sensible nature before he acted. Grace and reason were the dominating principles of his actions. This perfect domination did not belong to human nature as such, for if it did we would possess it today, since nothing that belongs to human nature was lost by original sin. Likewise, integrity does not pertain of itself to sanctifying grace or to the supernatural order, for only those things that totally exceed the powers and the needs of all creatures belong to the supernatural. That it does not belong to grace of itself is manifest from the fact that God could create a man with integrity and without grace, who would be in the natural order. Integrity, therefore, holds a place midway between the natural and the supernatural and is called the preternatural. It is the complete perfection of a nature within its state, including not only those things which pertain to the very essence of nature, but also those things that round off all the perfection possible to that nature and within the bounds of nature.

Human nature of itself has no right to this integrity, but because Adam had it in the beginning, and because of the supernatural end of man which requires complete perfection, it seems fitting that God return it to human nature even in the present life—though only imperfectly. Christ, therefore, gave us back the principle of this redintegration, namely, sanctifying grace and sacramental grace. Sanctifying grace, being the seed of glory, would be a sufficient title to this redintegration but because in the state of original justice a special help was added to sanctifying grace which maintained this integrity, God deigned to give this extra help back to sanctifying grace and He did so by means of sacramental grace. Sacramental grace, then, could also be called sacramental integrity, not absolutely but imperfectly. However, we must bear in mind that never

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, I, q. 95, aa. 1-2; q. 97, a. 1.

in this life will reason perfectly dominate these powers as was the case with Adam (unless God should confirm us in grace). But our control over them should increase both by a constant reception of the sacraments and the practice of virtue. With such powerful helps for overcoming these defects, the practice of virtue should become facile, and a well-balanced control should be gained over the inordinate motions of the sensible appetites.

An interesting corollary which could be developed, but which is out of place here, concerns the relation of sacramental grace to the risen body. For St. Thomas says that the grace of Baptism has the power to give the body its pristine impassibility and immortality, and although these effects are withheld in the present life they will come to us by reason of the grace of Baptism.⁵⁵ It would seem from this that no new gift would be added to sanctifying grace to maintain the corporal impassibility and immortality, but that these effects will be the result of sacramental grace. Then the power of reintegration of sacramental grace will be complete, i. e., as to its corporal effects and the rectitude of the inferior powers.

II

Up to this point we have seen that sacramental grace, considered from the *reatus* and the defects to which it is ordained, is a satisfying and repairing power added to sanctifying grace. It resides in the soul with sanctifying grace, not as a distinct habit but as an added power or formality of sanctifying grace. Consequently, it is only modally distinct from it. This modality seems to be permanent because the defects to which it is ordered are permanent. Therefore, the opinion of Cajetan, that sacramental grace is an act, does not seem to be true. For if the defects are within the nature and permanent, then they should be counteracted by a like force. Likewise, the opinion of Capreolus is rejected because we can find no subject for a distinct habit. For it would reside either in the soul itself, as a

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, III, q. 69, a. 3.

habit entitatively distinct from sanctifying grace, which is contrary to the teaching of St. Thomas that grace as it resides in the soul is a single entity;⁵⁶ or it is an operative habit, which seems to be a superfluous multiplication of operative habits, because the various infused virtues are sufficient for our virtuous operations. The teaching of John of St. Thomas seems, therefore, to be more in harmony with that of St. Thomas himself, namely, that sacramental grace is a vigor added to sanctifying grace. This modality does not contract the power of sanctifying grace, but rather perfects it so that effects to which sanctifying grace of itself does not extend are attained by this added power.

There remains to be considered in a general way the perfection which sacramental grace leaves in the soul. This perfection has already been mentioned as a reparation or redintegration. If sacramental grace satisfies and repairs the order of justice and if it heals, then it leaves a perfection within the soul. But this reparation and redintegration is always caused and perfected by Christ. So that just as the defects demand the Passion in order to be healed, so also the perfection resulting from this healing must be from the Passion of Christ. We must always be under the influence of Christ and His Passion, whether we are being cured or perfected. Sacramental grace is considered as perfecting the soul in those things that pertain to the Christian life. The Christian life is the life of virtue, not only in imitation of Christ but more especially influenced by Him, and according to the different ways in which we can imitate Christ we must also be influenced by Him.

Christ had such a plenitude of grace that it reached to all the effects of grace.⁵⁷ Our only possible means of attaining to any degree of the perfection of Christ must be a gradual approach to our own fullness. This is effected by living the Christian life in as perfect a manner as possible. The means that are given to us are ritualistic worship of God and the life of virtue. Christ Himself gave us the rite of the Christian life by instituting the sacraments, and He inaugurated that rite by offering

⁵⁶ *Q. D. de Vir.*, 27, a. 5.

⁵⁷ *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 7, a. 8.

Himself to His Eternal Father on the Cross.⁵⁸ Throughout His life He told His disciples that He was the way and that no one could come to the Father except through Him;⁵⁹ that this approach to God is through the sacraments: "unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost he cannot enter the kingdom of Heaven."⁶⁰ Baptism, then, is the gateway to eternal life. It is also the initiation into His Mystical Body over which He exercises power. It is through Baptism that the soul comes under the direct influence of the Head in all those things that pertain to the life of virtue. Immediately, there is set up a subjection to Christ by which as Head of the Body He moves all His members, and the instruments through which He moves them are the sacraments, whereas the principle by which He moves them is grace. For the reception of the sacraments He gives the sacramental character which not only singles out its possessor as a member of His Body, but also gives him the power to come into contact with the effects of His priesthood.⁶¹ It is a quasi-elevation, analogous to the elevation given by sanctifying grace:

And just as the life from grace begets in us a "divine soul" and makes God present in the world in a special way, so the life from Christ, the life from the character, begets in us a Christian soul, and realizes the image of Christ, the priest . . . and makes Him present in the world supplying in the just and through them "those things that are wanting to His passion" not as far as its merits and power are concerned but as far as its application and realization in His members are concerned.⁶²

The Christian soul, therefore, is made subject to the effects of Christ's priesthood through the character. This character is another principle of action. The first principles, grace and the virtues, are ordered to perform virtuous actions; the second principle, the character, being a potency, rather than a habit, is ordered to those things that pertain to ritualistic or sacra-

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, q. 62, a. 5.

⁶⁰ *John* iii, 6.

⁵⁹ *John* xiv, 6.

⁶¹ *Summa Theol.* III, q. 63, aa. 1, 3.

⁶² Alexander Horvath, O.P., "Influxus Christi in Evolutione Imaginis Dei," *Angelicum*, VI (1929), 125.

mental worship of God. This worship should always be virtuous, yet it is not the character that makes it so, but the presence of grace. Since, however, the sacraments are infallible sources of grace, the character and grace should mutually help the individual. The character, by giving him the power and right to receive the sacraments, thereby bringing him into contact with the Passion; and grace, by giving him the power and right to live virtuously under the influence of Christ the Head. Therefore, Christian life consists in the life of virtue drawn from the sacraments, and, consequently, the Christian soul must not only be born sacramentally but all the major crises of his life should be sacramental, hence there is for each crisis a particular sacrament.

Immediately following the period of adolescence in the spiritual life is, like that of the natural life, maturity. The sacrament of Confirmation provides for this critical period and furthermore it impresses upon the soul a character of its own, testifying that this soul has attained spiritual manhood, and gives it the power to defend the faith into which it has been born. The graces of this sacrament are in accord with the requirements of manhood which are the fullness of life and a special strengthening to overcome the weakness left in the soul by sin enabling man to confess the Faith in the face of death.

The next major requirement of the spiritual life is nourishment. The sacramental Christian has for this need no less a food than the sacramental Body and Blood of Christ Himself. From this most holy banquet the charity of Christ is poured into the will of the individual drawing him into an ineffable union with his Head. This union includes not only the habit of charity but is so intense that it incites the soul to perform acts of love, thereby uniting the soul to Christ in an actual union of love. Consequent upon this act venial sins are remitted, the spiritual energy is restored and the defects of sin repaired. Thus nourished and strengthened the individual is prepared to continue the practice of virtue and to overcome the evils that would impede his approach to God.

But if the Christian should fall into mortal sin the sacrament

of Penance provides him with sacramental restoration. In this sacrament the satisfying grace of the Passion takes away his sin and the eternal punishment due to it. He is restored to the spiritual life, and his sacramental grace destroys the defects left by sin and makes efficacious his own works of penance and mortification that satisfy for the temporal punishment due to his sin.

The sacrament of Matrimony unites the Christian man and woman in such a way that they become sacramental spouses representing the union of Christ with His Church. The graces flowing from this sacrament are many because this sacrament places those whom it unites in a new state of life. Consequently all the graces necessary to perform the duties of this state are drawn from the sacrament. The proneness of either spouse towards self love is diminished and concupiscence of the flesh is made to obey right reason.

Extreme Unction provides the soul with a soothing grace during grave illness. This grace removes the remains of sin and sometimes restores bodily health. At the hour of death it is one of the soul's greatest helps, because, "these remnants are not the dispositions left from sin, which are certain imperfect habits, but the spiritual debility existing in the mind itself, which taken away, yet with those dispositions or habits remaining, the mind is not so inclined to sin."⁶³ Therefore the soul is free to turn to God, and the virtue of hope begets a confidence in Him that puts down despair and gives the expectation of eternal life.

Ruling and dispensing all these sacraments is that of Orders, which sets the individual apart from the other members of Christ's Body, and gives him the official power to sacrifice for and administer to those members. The graces flowing from this sacrament are also multiple because this sacrament makes the individual directly subordinate to Christ as His minister for His Body which requires many graces.

The sacramental life is now complete. The life of virtue, however, has yet to be perfected. Christian perfection consists

⁶³ *IV Sent.*, d. XXIII, q. 1, a. 2, qt. 1, ad 2um.

in the life of virtue and particularly that of faith, hope and charity. In Baptism sanctifying grace and all the virtues both theological and moral are infused into the soul, and the other sacraments increase them or restore them. The sacrament of Penance, although a sacrament of the dead, also gives an increase of grace when received by a living member. But it takes away primarily mortal sin and thereby restores grace to the soul.

Now, because the chief impediments to virtue are the wounds of sin left in our nature by original and actual sin, the satisfying and medicinal grace of the Passion is especially necessary for the Christian. Here sacramental grace makes an invaluable contribution to virtue, for by healing these wounds it restores the control of reason over the inferior powers—by strengthening the weakness, tempering concupiscence and removing the remnants of sin, thereby facilitating the act of virtue. The redintegration of human nature is begun and slowly moves toward completion. And although human reason aided by these graces cannot hope for absolute or despotic control over these powers, it can hope for and should acquire a well-balanced political control. Man should no longer be swayed from the path of virtue by the inordinate cravings of his appetites, but by works of mortification under the influence of the sacramental graces he should bring these appetites under the control of reason. He will regain absolute control after his nature has paid the final penalty for sin, which is death, and in the general resurrection of the body his redintegration will be complete and absolute.

III

We have seen in the first part that sacramental grace, which takes away the defects of sin, is the grace of the Passion that effects our salvation by satisfying for these defects. In the second part we considered in a general way the perfection of the Christian life, as it is sacramental and virtuous. There remains to be settled the question of how sacramental grace actually works once the sacrament itself has ceased.

To answer this we must recall what has been said above, namely, that sacramental grace is a power added to sanctifying grace, and having the same permanence as sanctifying grace, which power cannot help but modify the virtues that flow from sanctifying grace. Sanctifying grace and the virtues, of themselves, are sufficient titles to actual grace, but now that they are modified by sacramental grace the actual grace that is required for any virtuous act will be received into the soul according to the condition of that soul and its state of life. The actual grace, for example, given to a married man and to a priest to put down the rising of concupiscence, while substantially the same, is given to one by reason of the sacramental grace of Matrimony, to the other by reason of the sacrament of Orders. The operation of the virtue of chastity is thereby assisted by Christ through the sacramental grace of the respective sacrament. This influx of Christ's Passion, considered as the principal instrumental cause of this grace, is one and the same, but as the grace enters the soul it takes on the modality of the grace that it finds there and moves to virtue accordingly.

When, however, a priest performs a sacramental action such as offering the sacrifice of the Mass or absolving in the sacrament of Penance, the titles or the principle of this act would be his sacerdotal character and sacramental grace, so that the motion of Christ would be received into his soul by reason of the character and sacramental grace. But if the priest were in mortal sin with an habitual affection for that sin, such a priest has only the sacramental character by which he is a minister of Christ. Lacking both sanctifying and sacramental grace, he would not be conformed at all to Christ.⁶⁴ Because the character is a power rather than a habit, his act would not be ordered to his sanctification but purely and solely to his ministerial action.

Sacramental grace then has been presented, first, as the grace of the Passion. St. Thomas himself says: "Sacramental graces are different participations in the power of the Passion."⁶⁵ The

⁶⁴ *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 64, a. 5, ad 2um.

⁶⁵ *Q. D. de Vir.*, 27, a. 5, ad 12um.

division of the Sixty-second Question therefore is not purely arbitrary, because by considering the fifth article, rather than the second, as the article wherein St. Thomas treated of the nature of sacramental grace, we have shown sacramental grace to be "a Passion grace."

Secondly, because sacramental grace is the grace of the Passion its effects will be similar to those of the Passion, namely, the remission of sins and the reparation of human nature; the reparation concerns not only man's relations to his Creator, but also human nature itself. For the first reparation the satisfaction due to sin is rendered to God by Baptism and Penance; for human nature itself the other sacraments contribute to the repairing of integrity.

By reason of this intimate union of sacramental grace to the Passion the Christian brings under the influence of the Passion every act of his daily life no matter how trivial or menial it may be. His perfection is constantly wrought by the Passion of Christ, thereby fulfilling Christ's prophecy: "And I, if I shall be lifted up from the earth, will draw all things to myself."⁶⁶ The Christian soul imitates Christ in a special way, for as Christ consummated all His actions in His Passion, so also every act of virtue is united and consummated in that same Passion. Such intimate union with Christ makes real and personal the individual's redemption by Him. And as Christ bears in His Body the glorious Wounds of His Passion, so every Christian bears in his soul a conformity to that Passion by sacramental grace.

Furthermore, the restoration of the order of the inferior powers of the soul to reason by sacramental grace manifests the Wisdom and the Goodness of God, Who placed order in all creation and in man. Although the order of his soul to God, and the order of the inferior powers to reason was destroyed by the hand of man, it has been restored by the Hand of God. Thus it is that the gift of integrity which was lost by the first Adam has been restored by the second, germinally, at least;

⁶⁶ *John*, xii, 32.

and it grows steadily until the Resurrection when it will blossom forth in all its perfection and grandeur.

Flowing from the fact of the permanent modification of sanctifying grace by sacramental grace are a few interesting corollaries, which have been hinted at but not developed:

1) A possible method of showing how all grace whether actual or habitual comes from the Passion of Christ, because "whatever is received is received according to the nature of the recipient," and since sanctifying grace is modified by sacramental grace every actual grace will be received according to that modification.

2) As an example of how the above corollary could be applied to the sacraments, we make mention of the Eucharist. Because sacramental grace is a permanent union with the Passion of Christ, it seems that long after the sacramental species have produced the habit and act of charity, any act of charity performed throughout the day would be by reason of the sacramental grace of the Eucharist. The reason for this is that the habit of charity in the soul is modified by the grace derived from the Eucharist. Consequently, it is by the sacramental grace of the Eucharist that the soul performs the act of charity here and now. The same reasoning seems to follow for the other sacraments. .

3) It can be seen why a person in mortal sin needs the sacrament of Penance. Attrition alone is not sufficient for the remission of this sin, because the soul must come in contact with the Passion of Christ which is brought about by the sacrament of Penance.

4) Since any sacramental grace is a grace of the Passion, and since it is only the Passion that remits sin, we have a possible explanation of how any sacrament of the living can remit *per accidens* those mortal sins of which a person may be unconscious at that time when he receives these sacraments.

These then are some of the possibilities of the power of sacramental grace. The object of the paper was to show that sacra-

mental grace by reason of the defects which it takes away is the grace of the Passion that works our salvation after the manner of satisfaction. And it seems that by comparing the defects which were taken away by the Passion and those that are taken away by sacramental grace, we can safely conclude that the graces of Baptism and Penance are satisfying graces in the strict meaning of the word. However, by extending the notion of satisfaction to include the restoration of any order, it seems that because the other sacraments restore the order of the inferior powers of the soul to reason, the graces of these sacraments can also be called graces of satisfaction.

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THE THOMISTIC CONCEPT OF DEVOTION

[Second Installment]

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III. SAINT THOMAS' CONCEPT OF DEVOTION AS DEVELOPED IN THE *SUMMA THEOLOGICA*

1. *The definition of Devotion.* In his *Commentary on the Sentences*, Saint Thomas, because he was commenting on the works of another, followed an order of treatment that was not of his own choosing. In the *Summa*, however, the order is entirely his own and thus solely by reason of the place in which he treats devotion he resolves a question, the solution of which offered no little difficulty in his early treatment of devotion in the *Sentences*. The *Secunda Secundae* of the *Summa* is given over to the consideration of the particular means by which man is to attain his ultimate end—treating mainly the means that are at the disposal of every man. These the Angelic Doctor determines to be the three theological and the four cardinal virtues. The second cardinal virtue of which he treats is justice. As the first potential part of justice he assigns the virtue of religion, and his Question on Devotion is the first of a series of questions dealing with the acts of that virtue. Thus he indicates immediately his solution of the question regarding the connection of devotion with the virtue of religion. And by reason of the fact that devotion heads a group of questions on the *acts of religion*, it is evident that the Angelic Doctor has definitely determined its status in the realm of being.

In his prologue to the question on devotion Saint Thomas says: "The acts of religion are now to be considered—first the interior acts, for these are the principal ones—then the exterior acts, which are secondary. The interior acts of the virtue of religion are devotion and prayer, and devotion is to be considered first."¹³² He answers four general questions about devotion: What is it; To what virtue does it belong; What are its causes; What are its effects.

His answer to the first question is different not only from his own doctrine in other works, where he considered it to be a disposi-

¹³² Deinde considerandum est de actibus religionis. Et primo, de actibus interioribus, qui, secundum praedicta, sunt principaliores; secundo, de actibus exterioribus, qui sunt secundarii. Interiores autem actus religionis videntur esse devotio et oratio. Primo ergo de devotione agendum est (*Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 82, prol.).

tion of the soul, but also from the doctrine of anyone who preceded him. His answer is original and of immense importance. He shows that it is by acts that man merits and he argues that by reason of the fact that there is a special title of merit in devotion, devotion must be a special act.¹³³ He shows from what is meant by devotion that it must be a special act.

Devotion comes from the idea of dedication and those were called devout or devoted who in some way dedicated themselves to God so as to be utterly His. Therefore devotion is nothing other than promptitude of will in those things that concern the worship of God. Since it is evident that this is a special act it follows that devotion is a special act of the will.¹³⁴ Hence devotion is neither a quality nor merely a mode of acts of religion. It is itself a special act.

The Angelic Doctor clearly determines the object of this special act. "Devotion is the act of the will by which man offers himself to God to serve Him and this is the ultimate end."¹³⁵ It is, as shall be seen, certainly the ultimate end of all other acts of religion. And it is the end of all human actions, as Saint Thomas seems to indicate here,¹³⁶ in the measure that religion can command the acts of the other virtues.

The all important question of what exactly this act of promptitude implies and includes will be left to a later section where the principal commentators on the *Summa* will contribute to its better understanding. The remainder of this section will be devoted to a consideration of devotion in its relation to the virtue of religion, to the other acts of religion, and to other virtues and their acts.

2. Devotion and the Virtue of Religion. Saint Thomas concludes that devotion is an act of the virtue of religion and he proves it first by showing that devotion comes from the word that means "vow," for a vow is certainly an act of religion.¹³⁷ He proves it

¹³³ Actibus meremur. Sed devotio habet specialem rationem merendi. Ergo devotio est specialis actus (*Ibid.*, a. 1, *Sed Contra*).

¹³⁴ Devotio dicitur a devovendo: unde devoti dicuntur qui seipso quodammodo Deo devovent, ut ei se totaliter subdant . . . unde devotio nihil aliud esse videtur quam voluntas quaedam prompte tradendi se ad ea quae pertinent ad Dei famulatum. . . . Manifestum est autem quod voluntas prompte faciendi quod ad Dei servitium pertinet est quidam specialis actus. Unde devotio est specialis actus voluntatis (*Ibid.*, a. 1, c.).

¹³⁵ Et ideo, cum devotio sit actus voluntatis hominis offerentis seipsum Deo ad ei servendum qui est ultimus finis . . . (*Ibid.*, ad 1um).

¹³⁶ Consequens est quod devotio imponat modum humanis actibus, sive sint ipsius voluntatis circa ea quae sunt ad finem, sive etiam sint aliarum potentiarum quae a voluntate moventur (*Ibid.*).

¹³⁷ Devotio dicitur a devovendo . . . , sed votum est actus religionis. Ergo et devotio (*Ibid.*, a. 2, *Sed Contra*).

again by saying that it certainly pertains to the virtue of religion to will those things that concern divine worship and, since *to will* those things and *to have a prompt will* in those things pertain to the same virtue, it follows that devotion must be an act of religion.¹³⁸ His argument depends upon the fact that both acts have the same formal object and therefore must pertain to the same virtue. To use the example which Saint Thomas himself uses: man does not require two different habits in order to intend just things and to act justly. One and the same habit of justice takes care of both operations.¹³⁹

Saint Thomas gives the reason why he treats of devotion first among the acts of religion. "After devotion, which regards the will itself, prayer, which concerns the mind of man, is the principal act of religion."¹⁴⁰ Devotion, therefore, is the first and most important act of religion. The truth of this statement will become more and more evident when the relation of devotion to other acts of man is considered. He says again: "[Obedience] in the measure that it proceeds from reverence for God is contained in the virtue of religion. And it concerns devotion which is the principal act of religion."¹⁴¹

In considering the relation of devotion to the other acts of religion, a threefold division should be made. There are acts which pertain to religion by reason of the natural law and there are those which pertain to that virtue by reason of positive divine law. The former are prayer, adoration, sacrifice, vows, adjuration, and invocation or praise. Positive divine law has determined two different codes of ceremonial law. These correspond to the Old Law before Christ and to the New Law, which He instituted.

Saint Thomas says of the worship of God in the Old Law that it was not distinguished from the worship of Him according to the law of nature as something altogether different, but rather as adding

¹³⁸ Ad eandem virtutem pertinet velle facere aliiquid, et promptam voluntatem habere ad illud faciendum: quia utriusque actus est idem objectum. . . . Manifestum est autem quod operari ea quae pertinent ad divinum cultum seu famulatum pertinet proprie ad religionem. . . . unde etiam ad eam pertinet habere promptam voluntatem ad hujusmodi exequenda, quod est esse devotum (*Ibid.*, a. 2, c.).

¹³⁹ Justitia est qua volunt homines et operantur justa (*Ibid.*, Cf. Aristotle, *V Ethic.*).

¹⁴⁰ Et ideo post devotionem, quae pertinet ad ipsam voluntatem, oratio, quae pertinet ad partem intellectivam, est praecipua inter actus religionis, per quam religio intellectum hominis movet in Deum (*Ibid.*, q. 83, a. 3, ad 1um).

¹⁴¹ In quantum vero procedit ex reverentia Dei, continetur sub religione: et pertinet ad devotionem, quae est principalis actus religionis (*Ibid.*, q. 104, a. 3, ad 1um).

something over and above what the natural law demanded.¹⁴² He says also of the worship of the Old Law that it was prefigurative of Christ.¹⁴³ And again he says that the sacrifice of the Old Law prefigured the immolation of Christ; the sacraments and sacred things of the Old Law prefigured those of the New; and the observances of the Old Law prefigured the life of those under the New Law.¹⁴⁴

The acts of worship proper to the Old Law are the ceremonial precepts of the Old Testament. The acts of worship proper to the New Law are the Mass, the Sacraments, and the liturgy as it exists in the Church today.

The question that naturally arises when devotion is said to be a special act, namely, the question regarding the reason why devotion is so often spoken of as though it were a mode of other acts of religion, is best treated here before beginning the consideration of the relation of devotion to other acts of religion. Why is man said to pray devoutly, genuflect devoutly, receive Holy Communion devoutly, and so on? It would seem that these are the acts, and devotion only their mode. The Angelic Doctor answers this question by saying that a mover always stamps with its own individuality the motion by which it moves anything.¹⁴⁵ Thus an expert critic can determine the authorship of a painting of one of the Masters simply by examining the characteristics of the work itself. For the painter has put into his work the defects or perfections that are peculiarly his own. He has, so to speak, painted himself into whatever subject he has chosen for his picture. Now the motor in man, that from which every movement of whatever faculty must come, is his will. Hence if the will is wholly given to God by the act of devotion, it necessarily follows that any movement which the will inaugurates must be devout.¹⁴⁶ Devotion is the first, the interior, and the principal act of religion and must, therefore, be in every act of religion, or the act is not a true act of religion at all, but has only the external appearance of one. Perhaps a comparison

¹⁴² *Lex vetus distinguitur a lege naturae, non tamquam ab ea omnino aliena sed tamquam ei aliqua superaddens* (*Ibid.*, I-II, q. 99, a. 2, ad 1um).

¹⁴³ *Et ideo oportebat exteriorem cultum veteris legis non solum esse figurativum futurae veritatis manifestandae in patria, sed etiam esse figurativum Christi . . .* (*Ibid.*, q. 101, a. 2, c.).

¹⁴⁴ *Unde sicut per sacrificia significatur Christus immolatus, ita etiam per sacramenta, et sacra illorum figurabantur sacramenta et sacra novae legis; et per eorum observantias figurabatur conversatio populi novae legis . . .* (*Ibid.*, a. 4, ad 1um).

¹⁴⁵ *Movens imponit modum motui mobilis* (*Ibid.*, II-II, q. 82, a. 1, ad 1um).

¹⁴⁶ *Voluntas autem movet alias vires animae ad suos actus: . . . et ideo, cum devotio sit actus voluntatis hominis offerentis seipsum Deo ad ei serviendum, . . . consequens est quod devotio imponat modum humanis actibus* (*Ibid.*).

between devotion and the first act of the virtue of charity will clear up this point. They may be compared in the following way:

HABIT	PRIMARY ACT	SECONDARY ACT	OBJECT
Charity	Love	Almsgiving	Union with God.
Religion	Devotion	Sacrifice	Subjection to God

Every secondary act of charity must proceed through the primary act of the virtue so that it is just as impossible to have a true act of almsgiving without the love of charity as it is to have a true act of sacrifice without devotion. And devout sacrifice or devout prayer is spoken of in exactly the same sense as men speak of the charitable giving of an alms. Devotion is not merely a mode of the act of religion any more than love is the mode of the act of almsgiving. Hence, far from relegating devotion to a mere modality, the use of the word to modify other acts of religion indicates its profound importance and absolute necessity.

3. *Devotion and Prayer.* Saint Thomas has determined before that prayer is an act of the reason,¹⁴⁷ and he repeats that doctrine here in the *Summa*.¹⁴⁸ How, therefore, can it come under the influence of devotion which is in the will, or how, for that matter, can it even be an act of the virtue of religion, for religion is subjected in the will. Saint Thomas answers that this is due to the power of the will to move the other faculties of the soul and to ordain them to its own end. Hence, because religion is in the will, it can ordain the intellect to the worship of God.¹⁴⁹ Billuart adds that prayer is not only an act of religion but an elicited act of that virtue. And he argues that to be an elicited act of religion prayer need not be an act of the same potency as that in which the virtue is subjected, that is, the will. It is sufficient that it be ordained to the end of the virtue of religion without the intervention of any other virtue. He gives as an example an exterior act of confession of faith which, although it is elicited by the virtue of faith, is certainly in a different potency. "It is thus," Billuart says, "that the will informed by the virtue of religion moves the intellect to the worship of God by prayer, and thus religion directs this act of reason to its own end without the intervention of any other habit. So prayer is an elicited act of religion."¹⁵⁰ Billuart says here that

¹⁴⁷ Cf. p. 437, *supra*.

¹⁴⁸ Sic ergo patet quod oratio . . . est rationis actus (*Ibid.*, q. 83, a. 1, c.).

¹⁴⁹ Et ideo ex hac parte voluntas movet alias potentias animae ad suos actus (*Ibid.*, I-II, q. 9, a. 1, c.).

¹⁵⁰ Etenim ut actus dicatur ab aliqua virtute elicitus, non est necesse quod sit in eadem potentia in qua est virtus, sed sufficit quod per hanc virtutem dirigatur in

many pray without intending thereby to worship God,¹⁵¹ and it is important to note that this is precisely the work of actual devotion in prayer, to bring to man the realization that in prayer he offers to God his noblest faculty as an act of reverence and worship.

Father Mennessier, O.P., in a note to his French translation of the *Summa*, brings out the essential connection between devotion and prayer:

With regard to the value of prayer as an act of religion, its close psychological connection with the act of devotion should be noted. These two acts are complementary. Devotion turns our will toward God by an efficacious intention which delivers over to Him the whole man. In this consists its essential worth as an act of homage. But because it is an act of homage of a creature it cannot help being accompanied by that appeal to God which is called prayer. How is it possible to conceive of that efficacious intention of subtracting nothing from that which pertains to the honor of God without an appeal to His grace? The totality of that gift demands such an appeal. Prayer is contained in germ in devotion. Prayer and devotion in a complementary manner bear witness to our dependence upon God.¹⁵²

They are the two interior acts of religion by which the will and the intellect are given to God. It is important to note in this regard that, in the system of Saint Thomas, the other acts of religion are ordained not directly to God but directly to these interior acts. For it is his doctrine that men are subjected to God by the subjection of man's noblest faculties. Man's body is subjected to God through his soul. And the external acts of worship are ordained not directly to God Who has no need of them but directly to man who needs them to help the interior acts of devo-

suum finem, nulla alia mediante virtute. . . . Sic est autem in praesenti casu; voluntas enim, ut est informata religione, movet intellectum ad cultum Deo exhibendum per orationem, sique religio autem rationis dirigit in suum finem, nullo alio habitu mediante; quod est elici a religione (Billuart, *Cursus Theologiae Sancti Thomae*, t. 7, tract. De Religione, dissert. 2, art. 2).

¹⁵¹ Multi orant absque eo quod intendant Dei cultum, aut cogitent de illa subjectione et reverentia illi exhibenda (*Ibid.*).

¹⁵² Notons à propos de cette valeur religieuse de la prière son étroite connexion psychologique avec l'acte de dévotion. Ces deux actes s'appellent mutuellement. La dévotion oriente notre vouloir vers Dieu en une intention efficace qui lui livre tout l'homme. C'est sa valeur essentielle d'hommage. Mais parce qu'il est hommage de la creature, cet acte ne peut manquer de s'accompagner de cet appel à Dieu qu'est la prière. Comment concevoir cette intention efficace de ne nous point dérober aux exigences de l'honneur de Dieu, sans un appel à sa grâce. La totalité de ce dont l'exige. La prière est contenue en germe dans la dévotion. L'une et l'autre témoignent de notre dépendance à l'égard de Dieu d'une façon complémentaire (I. Mennessier, O.P., *S. Thomas d'Aquin, Somme Theologique, La Religion*, tome 1^{er}, page 259-260).

tion and prayer.¹⁵³ This is a much more logical, because more orderly, doctrine than that of modern theologians who seek to justify external acts of religion by ordaining them directly to God.¹⁵⁴

4. *Devotion and Adoration.* Saint Thomas considers first among the external acts of religion, adoration, by which man ordains the acts of his own body to the worship of God. And the importance of devotion to adoration becomes evident when the Angelic Doctor divides adoration, to conform to man's nature, into the spiritual and the corporal. The spiritual he makes identical with devotion, and the external exists only on account of the internal. "In all the acts of latria," he says, "that which is external is ordained to the internal as to the principal. So it is that external adoration is on account of interior adoration, in order that, through the signs of humility corporally manifested, the interior affection to subject one's self to God may be excited. For it is connatural to man to go to the spiritual by means of the sensible."¹⁵⁵ He says again that external adoration must proceed from the spiritual and be ordained to it.¹⁵⁶ Hence devotion is necessary to adoration to the extent that without devotion there would be no external adoration but only empty formulae. Devotion is both the beginning and the end of adoration. Adoration proceeds from devotion and is ordained to it.

Because of the similarity of the act of praise with that of prayer and of adoration, it will be convenient to treat that act here. Saint Thomas describes praise of God as the employment of the divine name as a means of praying to God or of glorifying Him. The act of prayer, because it is internal and second in importance only to devotion, has already been considered. In the praise of God, as in the adoration of God, Saint Thomas insists upon the necessity of interior affection of heart. "Vocal praise of God is necessary," he says, "not on God's account but for the sake of the one who is praising, whose affection toward God is excited by vocal praise of

¹⁵³ Deo reverentiam et honorem exhibemus non propter ipsum, qui in seipso est gloria plenus cui nihil a creatura adjici potest, sed propter nos: quia videlicet per hoc quod Deum reveremur et honoramus, mens nostra ei subjicitur, et in hoc eius perfectio consistit (*Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 81, a. 7, c.).

¹⁵⁴ Cf., e. g., Ad. Tanquerey, *Synopsis Theologiae Dogmaticae*. Vol. I, n. 173, p. 107.

¹⁵⁵ In omnibus actibus latriae, id quod est exterius refertur ad id quod interius sicut ad principalius, ideo ipsa exterior adoratio fit propter interiorem; ut videlicet per signa humilitatis quae corporaliter exhibemus, excitetur noster affectus ad subiiciendum se Deo; quia connaturale est nobis ut per sensibilia ad intelligibilia procedamus (*Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 84, a. 2, c.).

¹⁵⁶ Adoratio corporalis in spiritu fit in quantum ex spirituali devotione procedit, et ad eam ordinatur (*Ibid.*, ad 1um).

Him.”¹⁵⁷ He says that vocal praise is also useful to excite the devotion of others.¹⁵⁸ It will be remembered that in the *Commentary on the Sentences* Saint Thomas spoke of the utility of vocal prayer to excite the devotion of others. Interesting here is the distinction Saint Thomas makes between adoration and praise. “Adoration,” he says, “is owed to God as He is in Himself, incomprehensible, ineffable, and above all praise. Praise is due to God in His effects as they are ordained to man’s utility.”¹⁵⁹ Saint Thomas says again, in speaking of the reason for chant in the liturgy of the Church, that vocal praise is necessary in order that man’s affection toward God be aroused. Hence the institution of chant in the Church was most commendable, for by this means the souls of those less strong are excited to devotion.¹⁶⁰ In this regard he quotes from Saint Augustine a passage that identifies “the affection of piety with ‘devotion.’”¹⁶¹ It has been seen that Saint Thomas has used piety and devotion very frequently in intimate connection. The Angelic Doctor teaches that chant in the Church has for its end the arousing of devotion. Insofar as it attains this end it is most excellent. If it does not, it is to be condemned.¹⁶²

5. *Devotion and Sacrifice.* In many ways sacrifice is the most important of the external acts of the virtue of religion. A statement of the Angelic Doctor is indicative of this. “Because,” he says, “those things which are external are signs of interior reverence, certain external things pertaining to reverence may be used to acknowledge the excellence of creatures . . . ; but there is something

¹⁵⁷ *Necessaria est laus oris, non quidem propter Deum, sed propter ipsum laudantem, cuius affectus excitatur in Deum ex laude ipsius* (*Ibid.*, q. 91, a. 1, c.).

¹⁵⁸ *Profitit etiam laus oris ad hoc quod aliorum affectus provocetur in Deum* (*Ibid.*).

¹⁵⁹ *De Deo dupliciter possumus loqui. Uno modo, quantum ad eius essentiam. Et sic, cum sit incomprehensibilis et ineffabilis, major est omni laude. Debetur autem ei secundum hanc comparationem reverentia, et latiae honor. . . . Alio modo, secundum effectus ipsius, qui in nostram utilitatem ordinantur. Et secundum hoc debetur Deo laus* (*Ibid.*, ad 1um).

¹⁶⁰ *Et ideo quaecumque ad hoc utilia esse possunt in divinas laudes congruerter assumuntur. Manifestum est autem quod secundum diversas melodias sonorum animi hominum diversimode disponuntur. . . . Et ideo salubriter fuit institutum ut in divinas laudes cantus assumerentur, ut animi infirmorum magis provocarentur ad devotionem* (*Ibid.*, a. 2, c.).

¹⁶¹ *Adducor cantaudi consuetudinem approbare in Ecclesia, ut per oblectamenta aurium infirmorum animus in affectum pietatis assurgat* (Saint Augustine, *Confess.* Lib. X, cap. 33).

¹⁶² *Hieronymus . . . reprehendit eos qui in ecclesia cantant more theatrico, non propter devotionem excitandam, sed propter ostentationem vel delectationem provocandam* (*Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 91, a. 2, ad 2um).

in worship that belongs to God alone and that is sacrifice.”¹⁶³ Sacrifice, then, in the strict sense of the word, is proper to the worship of God. It is the necessary act of religion. Saint Thomas declares that it is commanded by the natural law.¹⁶⁴ And because of this it will not be surprising to find an especially close connection between devotion and sacrifice. “Exterior sacrifice,” says the Angelic Doctor, “signifies the interior spiritual sacrifice by which the soul offers herself to God, for the exterior acts of religion are ordained to the interior. . . . And just as interior sacrifice is offered to God alone, so also exterior sacrifice is offered only to Him.”¹⁶⁵ This spiritual sacrifice he identifies with devotion when he says: “Sacrifice is twofold: the first and principal sacrifice is interior and all are held to this, for all are held to offer to God a devout mind. The other sacrifice is exterior.”¹⁶⁶ The interior sacrifice, then, is devotion by which man offers himself to God. All are held to do so. As was seen in the *Commentaries on the Epistles*, habitual neglect of this interior sacrifice is a mortal sin; actual neglect, a venial sin. It would seem from this that the Angelic Doctor intended the distinction between virtual and actual devotion. Saint Thomas distinguishes three classes of goods that can be sacrificed to God: first, those of the soul, sacrificed by devotion and prayer, the principal sacrifice; secondly, the goods of the body which are sacrificed by martyrdom, abstinence, or continence; finally, there are external goods which can be sacrificed to God either directly when they are immediately offered to God, or indirectly by giving them to others.¹⁶⁷ This passage indicates the scope of this act of sacrifice and therefore the universality of devotion, which is the interior and

¹⁶³ Et quia ea quae exteri aguntur signa sunt interioris reverentiae, quaedam exterioria ad reverentiam pertinentia exhibentur excellentibus creaturis, inter quae maximum est adoratio: sed aliquid est quod soli Deo exhibetur, sc., sacrificium (*Ibid.*, q. 84, a. 1, c.).

¹⁶⁴ Et ideo oblatio sacrificii pertinet ad ius naturale (*Ibid.*, q. 85, a. 1, c.).

¹⁶⁵ Significat autem sacrificium quod offertur exteri, interioris spirituale sacrificium, quo anima seipsam offert Deo . . . : exteri actus religionis ad interioris ordinantur. . . . Et ideo sicut soli Deo summo debemus sacrificium spirituale offerre exteriora sacrificia (*Ibid.*, a. 2, c.).

¹⁶⁶ Quorum primum et principale est sacrificium interioris, ad quod omnes tenentur: omnes enim tenentur Deo devoutam mentem offerre.—Aliud autem est sacrificium exteri (*Ibid.*, a. 4, c.).

¹⁶⁷ Triplic est hominis bonum. Primum quidem est bonum animae: quod Deo offertur interiori quodam sacrificio per devotionem et orationem et alios hujusmodi interioris actus. Et hoc est principale sacrificium.—Secundum est bonum corporis: quod Deo quodammodo offertur per martyrium, et abstinentiam seu continentiam.—Tertium est bonum exteriorum rerum: de quo sacrificium offertur Deo, directe quidem, quando immediate res nostras Deo offerimus; mediate autem, quando eas communicamus proximis propter Deum (*Ibid.*, a. 4, ad 2um).

principal sacrifice. The exact nature of this interior act of sacrifice, what it includes and what it implies, must be left to the next section where the exact significance of what is meant by the promptitude of devotion is to be determined. Saint Thomas here expresses the doctrine that he has expressed before concerning the imperation of other virtues by the virtue of religion. "It sometimes happens," he says, "that those things which pertain to other virtues are ordained to the reverence due to God. Thus someone may give an alms or perform an act of penance and do so to honor God. And in this sense the acts of other virtues can also be called sacrifice."¹⁶⁸

The Angelic Doctor sums up in a few words the immense importance of the relation of all the sacrifices of the Old Law to the sacrifice of Christ. "Sacrifice," he says, "is ordained to the worship of God so that by sacrifice the subordination of man's mind to God is represented. And it is a part of this subordination that man recognize all that he has as coming from God. . . . But the greatest gift that God has ever given to sinful men is His Son. Hence the greatest sacrifice is that by which Christ offered Himself to God. And it is on this account that all the sacrifices of the Old Law prefigured this great and singular sacrifice of Christ as the imperfect in comparison to the perfect."¹⁶⁹ It can be seen therefore that sacrifice is the central act of the virtue of religion and, consequently, of man's moral life. For religion is the highest moral virtue, holding a middle place between the other moral virtues and the theological virtues, having for its object not God, as have the theological virtues, but the next highest thing, the worship of God.

6. *Devotion and the Sacraments.* a) It has already been seen how Saint Thomas placed the sacraments among the things that pertain to the worship of God. In opening the question to his tract on the Sacraments in the *Summa*, he says: "In the use of the sacraments two things can be considered—the divine worship and

¹⁶⁸ Contingit autem etiam ea quae secundum alias virtutes fiunt in divinam reverentiam ordinari: puta cum aliquis eleemosynam facit de rebus propriis propter Deum, vel cum aliquis proprium corpus alicui afflictioni subjicit propter divinam reverentiam. Et secundum hoc etiam actus aliarum virtutum sacrificia dici possunt (*Ibid.*, a. 4, c.).

¹⁶⁹ Per sacrificia repreäsentabatur ordinatio mentis in Deum ad quam excitatatur sacrificium offerens. Ad rectam autem ordinatiōnem mentis in Deum pertinet quod omnia quae homo habet, recognoscat a Deo tanquam a primo principio . . . Inter omnia autem dona quae Deus humano generi iam per peccatum lapsu dedit, praecipuum est quod dedit Filium suum. . . . Et ideo potissimum sacrificium est, quo ipse Christus seipsum obtulit Deo in odorem suavitatis, ut dicitur ad *Ephes.*, v, 2; et propter hoc omnia alia sacrificia offerebantur in veteri lege, ut per unum singulare et praecipuum sacrificium figuraretur, tanquam perfectum per imperfecta (*Ibid.*, I-II, q. 102, a. 3, c.).

the sanctification of man.”¹⁷⁰ It has also been seen how in the *Sentences* he considered devotion to have a special connection with Baptism and the Holy Eucharist. In speaking in the *Summa* of the reason for deferring the Baptism of adults, he says: “This delay in conferring the sacrament is necessary from the point of view of reverence for the sacrament, for if men are admitted to Baptism on the greater feasts such as Easter and Pentecost, they receive the Sacrament more devoutly.”¹⁷¹

b) With regard to the Holy Eucharist Saint Thomas says that devotion in the reception of this sacrament will remit mortal sin of which the recipient is not conscious.”¹⁷² He distinguishes between the Eucharist as it is a sacrifice and as it is a sacrament, and speaks of the necessity of devotion for both. As a sacrament he says that it has two effects: one direct—to nourish the soul by uniting it with Christ; the other indirect—the remission of sin. “For,” he says, “this union with Christ is brought about by charity, whose fervor remits not only sin but the punishment due to sin. Hence a consequence of this sacrament is remission of the punishment due to sin, but not always a total remission, for this depends upon the devotion and fervor of the recipient.”¹⁷³ The fervor Saint Thomas mentions is, of course, the fervor of charity. Devotion is necessary because even in the consideration of the Eucharist as a sacrament, its power to remit sin must come in some

¹⁷⁰ sacramenta novae legis ad duo ordinantur, videlicet—ad remedium contra peccata,—et ad perficiendum animam in his quae pertinent ad cultum Dei secundum ritum christianaee vitae (*Summa Theol.*, III, q. 68, a. 1, c.).

¹⁷¹ hoc est necessarium ad quamdam reverentiam sacramenti, dum in solemnitatibus praecipuis, scilicet Paschae et Pentecostes, homines ad baptismum admittuntur, et ita devotius sacramentum suscipiunt (*Ibid.*, q. 68, a. 3, c.).

¹⁷² in eo qui ipsum percipit in conscientia peccati mortalis, non operatur remissionem peccati. Potest tamen hoc sacramentum operari remissionem peccati . . . alio modo etiam perceptum ab eo qui est in peccato mortali, cuius conscientiam et affectum non habet: forte enim primo non fuit sufficienter contritus, sed devote et reverenter accedens consequentur per hoc sacramentum gratiam charitatis, quae contritionem perficiet, et remissionem peccati (*Ibid.*, q. 79, a. 3, c.).

¹⁷³ hoc sacramentum simul est sacrificium et sacramentum; sed rationem sacrificii habet, in quantum offertur; rationem autem sacramenti, in quantum sumitur. . . Si igitur consideretur ut sacramentum, habet effectum dupliciter: uno modo directe ex vi sacramenti; alio modo quasi ex quadam concomitantia, sicut et circa continentiam sacramenti. Ex vi quidem sacramenti directe habet illum effectum ad quem est institutum. Non est autem institutum ad satisfaciendum, sed ad spiritualiter nutriendum per unionem ad Christum, et ad membra eius, sicut et nutrimentum unitur nutritio. Sed quia haec unitas fit per charitatem, ex cuius fervore aliquis consequitur remissionem non solum culpae, sed etiam poenae, inde est quod ex consequenti per quamdam concomitantiam ad principalem effectum homo consequitur remissionem poenae, non quidem totius sed secundum modum suae devotionis et fervoris (*Ibid.*, q. 79, a. 5, c.).

way from the sacrifice offered to God and the devotion of the recipient supplies the perfect sacrifice. The Angelic Doctor goes on to say that as a sacrifice the Holy Eucharist has the power to satisfy for sin. "But," he says, "in satisfaction the important thing to be considered is the affection of the one offering rather than the size of what is offered."¹⁷⁴ By this, as is evident, he means that devotion, the internal sacrifice, is the important thing, and in proof of this he gives the same example that he gave in the *Commentary on the Sentences*, the widow's mite, which was greater than the offerings of others because of her devotion. "Therefore," he concludes, "although the sacrifice of the Eucharist is sufficient in itself to remit all the punishment due to sin, actually in each case it will remit this punishment only in proportion to the devotion of the one offering it, or the devotion of those for whom it is offered."¹⁷⁵

He emphasizes the same doctrine in saying that the fact that the Eucharist takes away only a part of the punishment due to sin is the result not of a defect of power in Christ, but of a defect of devotion on the part of man.¹⁷⁶ It is a corollary of this doctrine that the Angelic Doctor expresses in a following question. He makes the answer to the question regarding those who are to receive this sacrament entirely dependent upon their ability or lack of ability to conceive devotion for it. If they are totally without use of reason at all times, it follows that they are incapable of the act of devotion, and hence are not to receive the Eucharist. If, even though their powers of reasoning are weak, they can produce some act of devotion, then they are not to be denied the Holy Eucharist.¹⁷⁷ Even those who at the present may be incapable of an act of devotion, but have had such devotion in the past are not to be forbidden access to the sacrament.¹⁷⁸ Saint Thomas allows here for

¹⁷⁴ In quantum vero est sacrificium, habet vim satisfactivam. Sed in satisfactione magis attenditur affectus offerentis quam quantitas oblationis (*Ibid.*).

¹⁷⁵ Unde et Dominus dicit *Luc* xxi, de vidua quae obtulit duo aera, quod plus omnibus misit. Quamvis ergo haec oblatio ex sui quantitate sufficiat ad satisfacendum pro omni poena, tamen fit satisfactoria illis pro quibus offertur, vel etiam offerentibus secundum quantitatem suae devotionis, et non pro tota poena (*Ibid.*).

¹⁷⁶ hoc quod tollitur pars poenae, et non tota poena per hoc sacramentum, non contingit ex defectu virtutis Christi, sed ex defectu devotionis humanae (*Ibid.*, ad Sum.).

¹⁷⁷ Aliqui dicuntur non habere usum rationis dupliciter: uno modo quia habent debilem usum rationis, sicut dicitur non videns, qui male videt; et quia tales possunt aliquam devotionem huius sacramenti concipere, non est eis hoc sacramentum denegandum. Alio modo dicuntur aliqui non habere totaliter usum rationis. Aut igitur nunquam habuerunt usum rationis, sed sic a nativitate permanerunt; et sic talibus non est hoc sacramentum exhibendum, quia in eis nullo modo praecessit huius sacramenti devotio (*Ibid.*, q. 80, a. 9, c.).

¹⁷⁸ Aut non semper caruerunt usu rationis; et tunc, si prius, quando erant

habitual devotion which is sufficient for the salutary reception of the sacrament. But he implies the doctrine of the *Sentences* and the *Commentaries on the Epistles*, that for the reception of the full effect of the sacrament actual devotion is necessary.

c) In speaking of the Sacrament of Extreme Unction, Saint Thomas says that the *res and the sacrament* in this sacrament is not a character but a certain interior devotion which is a spiritual unction.¹⁷⁹ To understand what Saint Thomas meant by this, it will be necessary to bear in mind that in the sacraments he distinguished three things. He distinguished first *the sacrament itself* by which he meant the external matter and form, and whose whole duty it was to signify something else, something interior. Secondly he spoke of the *res and the sacrament*, that which is interior, which is signified by the sacrament itself, yet signifies something else, which is the third thing Saint Thomas distinguished, namely the *res alone*, which is wholly signified and does not signify something else. There are then in every sacrament, *the sacrament alone* signifying and in no way signified, the *res and the sacrament* both signified and signifying, and the *res alone* signified and in no way signifying. In all the sacraments, the *sacrament alone* is the matter and form of each sacrament; the *res alone* is the special grace which each sacrament confers; but the *res and sacrament* is different in the different kinds of sacraments. In the sacraments which imprint a character it is always this character and hence in those sacraments which do not imprint a character, the *res and sacrament* should be something which stands in the place of the character.

Now, devotion, as has been seen, is the act of the will by which man is prompt to worship God and the implication of this act, as has been indicated and as will be clearly seen in the following section, is that the whole man is dedicated to the service of God. Thus, in a certain sense, this act of the will is a sign of dedication or deputation to something that pertains to the worship of God, which is precisely what the character of the sacrament is in those sacraments which imprint a character. To be noted in this regard is the fact that Saint Thomas describes this devotion as a spiritual unction or anointing, that which is signified by the external anointing of the sacrament. In the forty-fourth Psalm are the words: "God, thy God, hath anointed thee with the oil of gladness above thy

compotes suae mentis, apparuit in eis devotio huius sacramenti, debet eis in articulo mortis hoc sacramentum exhiberi (*Ibid.*).

¹⁷⁹ in hoc sacramento res et sacramentum, non est character, sed quaedam interior devotio, quae est spiritualis unctione (*Ibid.*, Suppl., q. 31, a. 3, ad 3um. Cf. *IV Sent.*, d. xxiii, q. 1, a. 2, qt. 3, *Solutio*, ad 3um).

fellows.”¹⁸⁰ In his commentary on this verse Saint Thomas says: “In the Old Testament priests and kings were anointed. . . . It was likewise for the priest who offered himself to God for a sacrifice.”¹⁸¹ This priest was Christ. And this offering of one’s self as a sacrifice is precisely what devotion does. To be noted too is the effect of devotion. As shall be seen later the effect of devotion is spiritual joy and thus it may appropriately be spoken of, in connection with Extreme Unction, as the oil of gladness. The Angelic Doctor speaks again of devotion in the reception of Extreme Unction when he says that the personal devotion of the recipient has a great deal to do with obtaining the effect of the sacrament; which fact is confirmed by the deprecatory form used in Extreme Unction.¹⁸² He expresses the same doctrine that he taught in speaking of the Eucharist, that the sacrament is not to be conferred upon those who are incapable of devotion.¹⁸³ When he says that a movement of the will is necessary in the reception of this sacrament and that those who do not produce this movement of devotion are not to receive the sacrament,¹⁸⁴ it is evident that he is speaking of the necessity of habitual devotion and not that of actual devotion, for this sacrament is often conferred on those who are unconscious and therefore physically incapable of an act of devotion.

7. *Devotion and the Virtues.* a) The power of the virtue of religion to command the acts of other virtues has been spoken of before. It is based upon the principle which Saint Thomas expresses in the *Prima Secundae*, namely, that a potency extends its operation to include everything in which it can find anything that in any way touches its object.¹⁸⁵ The virtue of religion is so powerful

¹⁸⁰ *Ps.* xliv, 8.

¹⁸¹ In veteri testamento ungebantur sacerdotes et reges. . . . Item fuit sacerdos qui seipsum obtulit Deo sacrificium (*Eph.* v, 2. S. Thomas, *Commentarium in Ps.*, xliv, 5).

¹⁸² Ad effectum huius sacramenti percipiendum plurimum valet devotio suscipientis, et personale meritum conferentium, et generale totius Ecclesiae: quod patet ex hoc quod per modum deprecationis forma hujus sacramenti conferatur (*Summa Theol.*, Suppl., q. 32, a. 3, c. Cf. *IV Sent.*, d. 23, q. 2, a. 2, qt. 3, *Solutio*).

¹⁸³ Et ideo illis qui non possunt recognoscere, et cum devotione suscipere hoc sacramentum, dari non debet, et praecipue furiosis et amentibus; qui possent irreverentiam sacramento per aliquam immunditiam facere; nisi haberent lucida intervalla in quibus sacramentum recognoscerent: et sic eis conferri in statu illo posset (*Ibid.* Cf. *IV Sent.*, loc. cit.).

¹⁸⁴ Sed in hoc sacramento requiritur motus liberi arbitrii (*Ibid.* ad 3um. Cf. *IV Sent.*, loc. cit., qt. 4, *Solutio*).

¹⁸⁵ Ad ea enim se extendit unaquaeque potentia in quibus inveniri potest quo-cumque modo ratio sui objecti (*Ibid.*, I-II, q. 8, a. 2, c.).

in commanding the acts of the other virtues because it is in the will, and the will moves all the other potencies to their acts.¹⁸⁶

So important is the work of religion in commanding the acts of the other virtues that it has under this particular aspect a special name. Religion in its office of offering to God not only those things which specially pertain to divine worship such as sacrifice and oblation, but also the acts of other virtues, is called sanctity.¹⁸⁷ Billuart observes that this is not the sanctity which is had by the infusion of sanctifying grace but the sanctity that is a virtue.¹⁸⁸ Saint Thomas himself gives the reason for this special name and takes it from the meaning of the word sanctity. Sanctity etymologically implies both purity and stability and these two qualities pertain especially to the worship of God. For in order that the soul apply itself to the worship of God it is necessary that it withdraw itself from lower things. And since it is to apply itself to God Who is the first principle and the ultimate end, it follows that it must do so with the greatest stability.¹⁸⁹ It is to be noted that sanctity is not really a different virtue than religion. Sanctity is religion as it commands the acts of the other virtues, ordaining them to the worship of God.¹⁹⁰ John of Saint Thomas calls attention to the fact that sanctity has the same substance and the same specific act as religion, that is, to serve God and to ordain the soul to Him, not indeed by exhibiting something as a protestation of servitude but by ordaining other virtuous works so that they become like the works of a servant for his master.¹⁹¹ Therefore as having the same

¹⁸⁶ Et hoc modo voluntas movet intellectum, et omnes animae vires (*Ibid.*, I, q. 82, a. 4).

¹⁸⁷ Nam religio dicitur, secundum quod exhibet Deo debitum famulatum in his quae pertinent specialiter ad cultum divinum, sicut in sacrificiis, oblationibus et aliis hujusmodi; sanctitas autem dicitur, secundum quod homo non solum haec, sed aliarum virtutum opera refert in Deum, vel secundum quod homo se disponit per bona quaedam opera ad cultum divinum (*Ibid.*, II-II, q. 82, a. 8, c.).

¹⁸⁸ Non est quaestio de sanctitate quae habetur per infusionem gratiae justificantis, sed de sanctitate prout est virtus (Billuart, *op. cit.*, t. 7, dissert. I, a. 4).

¹⁸⁹ Nomen sanctitatis duo videtur importare: uno quidem modo munditiam; . . . alio modo importat firmitatem . . . Munditia enim necessaria est ad hoc quod mens Deo applicetur, quia mens humana inquinatur ex hoc quod inferioribus rebus conjungitur. . . . Oportet autem quod mens ab inferioribus rebus abstrahatur, ad hoc quod supremae rei possit conjungi. Et ideo mens sine munditio Deo applicari non potest. . . . Firmitas etiam exigitur ad hoc quod mens Deo applicetur; applicatur enim ei sicut ultimo fini et primo principio; hujusmodi autem oportet maxime immobilia esse (*Ibid.*, q. 82, a. 8, c.).

¹⁹⁰ Sic ergo sanctitas dicitur per quam mens hominis seipsam et suos actus applicat Deo; unde non differt a religione secundum essentiam, sed solum ratione (*Ibid.*).

¹⁹¹ Sanctitas habet eamdem substantiam, et speciem actus (ac religio) sc. servire Deo et ordinare mentem ad ipsum non quidem exhibendo aliquid in protestationem

substance and the same act, as being, in short, the same virtue, its first and principal act, affecting every other act and necessarily imposing its mode on every other act, is the act of devotion.

b) That devotion has an intimate connection with the virtue of obedience is readily apparent from the fact that obedience, like religion, is a potential part of justice. Saint Thomas speaks of this intimate connection between devotion and obedience when he says:

Obedience proceeds from reverence . . . and from this point of view obedience is to be found in different virtues . . . insofar as it proceeds from reverence of God, obedience is contained under the virtue of religion: and it pertains to devotion which is the principal act of the virtue of religion. This is the sense in which it is more praiseworthy to obey God than to offer sacrifice. And also it is more praiseworthy because "in sacrifice external goods are offered to God, while by obedience one's own will is offered," as Gregory says.¹⁹²

Hence the only way in which obedience, which is a less exalted virtue than religion, can supercede an act of the virtue of religion is by coming under the imperation of religion, that is, of sanctity, and being ordained to the latter's end. Cajetan says on this point:

Obedience is preferred to sacrifice only insofar as obedience is taken causatively, as contained under religion and pertaining to the principal act of religion, which is devotion. And so it is not to be wondered at that obedience in this sense is to be preferred to a lesser act of religion. It is as though one were to say: Devotion is better than sacrifice; interior sacrifice of the will is better than exterior sacrifice, which is evident. And this is the meaning of the words of Gregory when he says that the will is sacrificed. Without doubt they refer to sacrifice made to God.¹⁹³

servitutis, sed ordinando alia opera virtuosa, ut illa fiant quasi opera servi ad Dominum (John of Saint Thomas, *Cursus Theol.*, t. 7, disp. 19, a. 8, n. 14).

¹⁹² obedientia procedit ex reverentia, quae exhibet cultum et honorem superiori: et quantum ad hoc sub diversis virtutibus continetur; . . . in quantum vero procedit ex reverentia Dei, sub religione, et pertinet ad devotionem, quae est principalis actus religionis. Unde secundum hoc laudabilius est obedire Deo quam sacrificium offerre: et etiam quia in sacrificio immolatur aliena caro, per obedientiam autem propria voluntas, ut Gregorius dicit (*Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 104, a. 3, ad 1um).

¹⁹³ Obedientia duplíciter sumitur: causaliter, et formaliter. Si formaliter, sic una est species: si causaliter, in multis reponitur speciebus. Et laus ejus qua anteponitur religionis actui qui est victimas offerre, convenit ei causaliter sumptae, prout continetur sub religione, et spectat ad potiorem religionis actum, qui est devotio. Et ideo non est mirum si hoc modo p̄aeponitur minori actui religionis: tanquam si diceretur: Melior est devotio quam victima: melius est sacrificium interioris voluntatis quam exterioris victimae; quod est per se notum. Et hanc rationem reddunt verba Gregorii, dicendo quod mactatur voluntas: procul dubio in sacrificium divinum (Cajetan, *Commentarium in II-II Summae Theol.*, q. 104, a. 4).

This doctrine of Saint Thomas and of Cajetan is clear. The words of Gregory, very often loosely applied to signify that obedience in itself is to be preferred to sacrifice, are not to be so applied. For true sacrifice, and it must be assumed that Saint Gregory spoke of true sacrifice, presupposes the interior sacrifice, the act of devotion than which there is no greater act except on the plane of the theological virtues. Hence it is only when commanded by religion and therefore when it, itself, presupposes the act of devotion that obedience becomes greater than sacrifice.

c) The Angelic Doctor outlines the place of devotion in the virtue of justice when he places all that may be made matter for sacrifice in three general categories. First there are the goods of the soul, offered to God by devotion and prayer, secondly the goods of the body, thirdly external goods, which last may be offered to God immediately, or meditately when they are given to one's neighbor.¹⁹⁴ Giving to one's neighbor that which is his due is the proper object of the virtue of justice and hence can become matter for sacrifice only by reason of the imperation of the virtue of religion. When such is the case, devotion holds the same important place as it was seen to hold in the question on sacrifice properly speaking.

d) Saint Thomas connects fortitude and devotion in speaking of the virtue of magnificence, a part of fortitude. He says that magnificence is the virtue that strengthens man to undertake works that by their very nature demand a certain splendor or grandeur.¹⁹⁵

But the works of man are always ordained to some end. And since there is no end of human works as great as that of honoring God, it follows that magnificence especially operates in great works which are ordained to the honor of God. Thus magnificence is connected with the virtue of sanctity because its principal effect is ordained to religion or sanctity.¹⁹⁶

¹⁹⁴ *Triplex est hominis bonum:—primum quidem est bonum animae quod Deo offertur interiori quodam sacrificio per devotionem, et orationem, et alios hujusmodi interiores actus; et hoc est principale sacrificium. Secundum est bonum corporis, quod Deo quodammodo offertur per martyrium et abstinentiam, seu continentiam.—Tertium est bonum exteriorum rerum, de quo sacrificium offertur Deo; directe quidem, quando immediate res nostras Deo offerimus; mediate autem quando eas communicamus proximis propter Deum* (*Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 85, a. 3, ad 2um).

¹⁹⁵ *Ad magnificentiam pertinet facere aliquid magnum, sicut ex ipso nomine apparel* (*Ibid.*, q. 134, a. 2, c.).

¹⁹⁶ *Magnificentia intendit opus magnum facere. Opera autem ab hominibus facta ad aliquem finem ordinantur. Nullus autem finis humanorum operum est adeo magnus, sicut honor Dei; et ideo magnificentia praecipue magnum opus facit in ordine ad honorem Dei. . . . Et ideo magnificentia conjungitur sanctitati, quia praecipuus ejus effectus ad religionem sive ad sanctitatem ordinatur* (*Ibid.*, ad 3um).

e) The Angelic Doctor says that while temperance itself effects purity of soul, it does not have the nature of holiness unless it is referred to God.¹⁹⁷ In speaking of vows, Saint Thomas shows how the matter of temperance is readily ordainable to the end of religion. "That which is matter for a vow," he says, "is sometimes the act of another virtue, as fasting and chastity."¹⁹⁸

f) Saint Thomas has determined that religion is able to command the acts of all the virtues.¹⁹⁹ With regard to the other moral virtues there is no difficulty. Religion as the highest and noblest of the moral virtues can ordain the others to a higher end. But the theological virtues which have for their object God Himself, offer a special difficulty. Religion is inferior to the theological virtues and hence the conception of religion commanding their acts seems to be opposed to the very nature of imperation, by which one commands another to do something,²⁰⁰ that is, ordains the manner in which something is to be done for it by others.²⁰¹ This requires a subjection of the one commanded to the one commanding. The former must be inferior to the latter in some way at least. But it seems impossible to say that the theological virtues are in any way inferior to religion. On the contrary religion seems to be in every way inferior to them.

John of St. Thomas answers this difficulty directly:

The true answer to this problem is that the word "formal" resolves it completely: for it is to be conceded that an inferior habit is never able formally to command its superior. But it is easily able to do so materially, that is, it can command the thing that is otherwise its superior but which under some particular aspect in which it is commanded is its inferior.²⁰²

This answer seems to dispose of all the external acts of the theological virtues. For by reason of the fact that they are external they are

¹⁹⁷ Temperantia munditiam quidem operatur, non tamen ita quod habeat rationem sanctitatis, nisi referatur in Deum (*Ibid.*, q. 82, a. 7, ad 2um).

¹⁹⁸ Illud quod cadit sub voto, quandoque quidem est actus alterius virtutis, sicut jejunare et continentiam servare (*Ibid.*, q. 88, a. 5, ad 1um).

¹⁹⁹ Omne opus virtutis ad religionem seu latram pertinet per modum imperii, secundum quod ad divinam reverentiam ordinatur, quod est proprius finis latiae (*Ibid.*, q. 88, a. 5, c.).

²⁰⁰ Imperans enim ordinat eum qui imperat, ad aliquid agendum (*Ibid.*, I-II, q. 17, a. 1, c.).

²⁰¹ Sicut enim homo imperando, vel deprecando, ordinat quodammodo quid sibi ab aliis fiat (*Ibid.*, II-II, q. 88, a. 1, c.).

²⁰² Vera resolutio hujus difficultatis est, quod sermo formalis omnia solvit. Concedendum quippe est nunquam posse aliquam habitudinem, seu habitum inferiorem imperare superiori formaliter; bene tamen superiori materialiter, i. e., rei, quae alias superior est, secundum rationem qua imperatur, est illi inferior (John of Saint Thomas, *Cursus Theologicus*, t. vii, disp. 19, art. 8, n. 19).

under this one aspect inferior to the internal act of religion ordaining them to its end. Thus an external act of charity such as fraternal correction, or an external profession of faith are easily ordainable by the virtue of religion. But what of the interior acts of the theological virtues? John of Saint Thomas says again:

It can happen that some virtue is from its own part completely incapable or ordination to another or a higher end but it is so ordainable by reason of some circumstance which the inferior virtue adds to it; and then it is not formally or absolutely imperated by the inferior virtue. It is only that the material act of the superior virtue according to the circumstance added to it is imperated or ordained by the inferior virtue from which it participates that circumstance, because from this particular point of view the virtue that is otherwise wholly superior is inferior. Thus acts of faith or acts of the other theological virtues in themselves are entirely above the imperation of religion because they attain in the highest way the ultimate end, so that there is no higher end for them. Yet some circumstances can be added to such an act, for example, that it be made the matter of a vow, since I can add an obligation to such liberty, and as such, that is, as free, the act is considered materially, as it were, and thus it is directed by the virtue of religion, and its omission becomes a sin against the virtue of religion.²⁰³

Billuart has the same doctrine and calls such imperation of acts of the theological virtues accidental imperation. He speaks of an act of charity being so imperated²⁰⁴ and thus it is clear that even the

²⁰³ Aliquando vero contingit aliquam virtutem non posse ordinari ad ulteriorem, et altiorem finem secundum omnem suam formalitatem, et secundum ultimum, quod habet, bene tamen secundum aliquam circumstantiam, vel formalitatem, quae sibi addi potest a virtute inferiori; et tunc non imperatur simpliciter, et formaliter a virtute inferiori, potest tamen ille materialis actus virtutis superioris, secundum illam circumstantiam vel formalitatem, quae sibi additur, imperari, et ordinari ab ea virtute, a qua talem circumstantiam, vel formalitatem participat, quia sub hac consideratione est illi inferior, v. g., actus fidei vel aliarum virtutum theologicarum, secundum se formalissime consideratus non potest imperari a religione quia secundum suam ultimam formalitatem attingit supremo modo finem ultimum, nec habet ulteriorem finem, ad quem ordinetur. Caeterum potest addi illi aliqua circumstantia, sc., quod fiat ex voto, quia possum ego tali libertati addere obligationem, et pro hac parte, pro qua ille actus liber est, quasi materialiter consideratur, et habere potest circumstantiam aliquam in qua dirigatur a religione; ita quod si omittat illum actum exercere, peccet contra religionem (*Ibid.*, n. 21).

²⁰⁴ Virtutem quae secundum se est aliis inferior, posse per accidens et secundum quid fieri eius superiore ratione alicuius circumstantiae quam eis superaddit . . . actus charitatis est secundum se superior omnibus virtutibus moralibus nec ad nobiliorem finem potest imperari seu ordinari, cum supremo modo attingat ultimum finem; per accidens tamen, puta, si fiat ex voto, subditur secundum hanc circumstantiam religioni et per eam ad suum finem dirigitur (Billuart, t. 7, dissert. 1, tract. de Relig., art. 2).

highest act of which man is capable in this life can become by imperation an act of the virtue of religion.

It has been said before that religion is the connecting link between the moral and the theological virtues. Cajetan says on this point:

Just as in nature things are so connected and ordered that the inferior in its highest operation attains to the condition of the superior (as, for example, the mind of man in its supreme act understands without discursive reasoning), so the supreme moral virtues, that is, religion, participates the nature of the theological virtues. On this account religion which is moral does not attain God as its object or the matter in which it operates . . . but because it participates in the nature of the theological virtues, it attains to God not in Himself, but as the One to Whom worship is due.²⁰⁵

Saint Thomas explains the precise difference between the union with God effected by charity and that effected by devotion: "It pertains to charity," he says, "that man give himself to God by adhering to Him through a union of the spirit; but that man give himself to God by the works of worship of God immediately pertains to religion."²⁰⁶ Cajetan observes that by the union of the spirit is meant union of the will.²⁰⁷ The Angelic Doctor continues:

Just as the natural oil of the body on the one hand is generated by bodily heat and on the other conserves bodily heat, so devotion is caused by charity and also nourishes charity. For love of another makes one more prompt to serve him and on the other hand love is conserved and increased by the performance of loving actions and by meditations.²⁰⁸

²⁰⁵ *Sicut in universo naturae rerum sic sunt connexae et ordinatae ut inferior in sui supremo attingat naturae superioris conditionem (in cuius signum, natura elementaris in suo supremo movetur motu caelesti, et anima in sui supremo intelligens absque discurso); ita in virtutibus moralibus supraea earum, quae est religio, participat naturam theologalium virtutum. Propter quod religio, quia moralis est, actibus suis non attingit Deum ut objectum seu materiam circa quam operatur, sed circa humanam mentem, humana opera, resque exteriore, quas offert Deo orando, adorando, sacrificando, offerendo: quia vero theologales participat, Deum habet pro objecto non simpliciter, sed cui debitum cultum affert (Op. cit., II-II, q. 81, a. 5).*

²⁰⁶ *Ad charitatem pertinet immediate quod homo tradat seipsum Deo, et haerendo ei per quamdam spiritus unionem; sed quod homo tradat seipsum Deo ad aliqua opera divini cultus, hoc immediate pertinet ad religionem (Summa Theol., II-II, q. 82, a. 2, ad 1um).*

²⁰⁷ *Charitas per seipsum unit mentem Deo per unionem spiritus, hoc est voluntas (Cajetan, loc. cit., ibid.).*

²⁰⁸ *Pinguedo corporalis et generatur per calorem naturalem digerentem; et ipse naturalis calor habet pinguedinem quasi ejus nutrimentem: et similiter charitas et devotionem causat, in quantum ex amore aliquis redditur promptus ad serviendum amico, et etiam per devotionem charitas nutritur; sicut et quaelibet amicitia conservatur et augetur per amicabilium operum exercitium et meditationem (Summa Theol., II-II, q. 82, a. 2).*

8. *The Causes of Devotion.* Saint Thomas in *Q. D. de Malo* said that God is the cause of devotion. Here in the *Summa* he distinguishes two kinds of causes—extrinsic and intrinsic. “The extrinsic and principal cause of devotion is,” he says, “God.”²⁰⁹ And he quotes the Commentary of Saint Ambrose on the Gospel according to Saint Luke:²¹⁰ “Thus it is that Ambrose says, those whom God makes worthy He calls, and whom He calls He makes holy: and if He wished He might have changed the indevotion of the Samaritans to devotion.”²¹¹ “The intrinsic cause of devotion,” says the Angelic Doctor, “which comes from man himself, is meditation or contemplation.”²¹² The argument which he gives for this conclusion is completely convincing. Since devotion is a movement of the will by which man is prompt to worship God, it necessarily presupposes an act of the intellect, for the good conceived by the intellect is the object of the will. Hence meditation is the cause of devotion by reason of the fact that it produces in man the conviction that he must give himself to divine worship.²¹³ Saint Thomas shows that there is a twofold consideration in meditation which will cause devotion. There is first the consideration of the goodness and beneficence of God. This causes love and love is the proximate cause of devotion.²¹⁴ It has already been seen how charity causes devotion and how the union it effects with God is different from that of devotion. The second consideration which causes devotion is that of man’s defects by reason of which he must constantly rely upon the help of God. This consideration is rather a negative than a positive cause of devotion for it excludes presumption, thus removing the impediment to devotion. It is evident that if a man by presumption refuses to subject himself to God, he cannot offer himself to God until that vice is removed.²¹⁵ The Angelic Doctor

²⁰⁹ Causa devotionis extrinseca et principalis Deus est (*Ibid.*, a. 3, c.).

²¹⁰ *Luke*, ix, 52-53.

²¹¹ Et conversus increpavit Deus quod dignatur vocat: et quem vult religiosum facit; et si voluisset, Samaritanos ex indevotis devotos fecisset (Saint Ambrose, *Supra Lucam*, ix).

²¹² Causa autem intrinseca ex parte nostra oportet quod sit meditatio, seu contemplatio (*Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 82, a. 3, c.).

²¹³ Devotio est quidam voluntatis actus ad hoc quod homo prompte se tradat ad divinum obsequium. Omnis autem actus voluntatis ex aliqua consideratione procedit, eo quod bonum intellectum est objectum voluntatis, . . . et ideo necesse est quod meditatio sit devotionis causa, in quantum scilicet homo per meditationem concipit quod se tradat divino obsequio (*Ibid.*).

²¹⁴ Ad quod quidem inducit duplex consideratio:—una quidem quae est ex parte divinae bonitatis et beneficiorum ipsius . . . et haec consideratio excitat dilectionem, quae est proxima causa devotionis (*Ibid.*).

²¹⁵ Alia vero est ex parte hominis considerantis suos defectus, ex quibus indiget ut Deo innitatur . . . et haec consideratio excludit praesumptionem, per quam aliquis impeditur ne Deo se subjiciat, dum suae virtuti innititur (*Ibid.*).

observes that meditation upon God is in itself more powerful to cause love and consequently devotion, for God is lovable above all things. But because the mind of man is weak, it needs to be drawn both to knowledge and love of the divine through knowledge and love of the sensible. Hence those things which pertain to the humanity of Christ are usually more powerful to excite devotion; nevertheless devotion principally concerns the Divinity.²¹⁶

9. *The effects of Devotion.* Saint Thomas determines that there is a twofold effect of devotion to correspond to the twofold consideration or meditation that causes devotion.²¹⁷ It is interesting to note that the Angelic Doctor turns for an argument to show that the principal effect of devotion is joy, to the use of the word devotion in the liturgy of the Church: "One of the Collects of the Mass," he says, "has the following petition, 'Grant, we beseech Thee, O Almighty God, that we whom these hallowed fasts chasten, may gladden our very devotion.'" ²¹⁸ He goes on to say that the principal effect of devotion is joy, for the principal consideration from which devotion arises is that of God's goodness and this consideration primarily causes joy. However, because we do not in this life fully possess God, this consideration can cause secondarily, sadness. The second consideration is that of man's defects and its effects with regard to devotion are just the reverse of the first consideration. For meditation on one's defect primarily causes sadness, secondarily, joy on account of hope in the divine aid. This sadness, however, is not harmful but good, for it is according to God.²¹⁹

²¹⁶ quod ea quae sunt Divinitatis, sunt secundum se maxime excitantia dilectionem, et per consequens devotionem, quia Deus est super omnia diligendus; sed ea debilitate mentis humanae est quod sicut indiget manductione ad cognitionem divinorum, ita ad dilectionem per aliqua sensibilia nobis nota; inter quae praecipuum est humanitas Christi (*Ibid.*, a. 3, ad 2um).

²¹⁷ Devotio per se quidem et principaliter spiritualem laetitiam mentis causat; ex consequenti autem, et per accidentis causat tristitiam (*Ibid.*, a. 4, c.).

²¹⁸ Quos jejunia votiva castigant, ipsa quoque devotio sancta laetificet (Collect. Feria V post Dominic. IV Quadrag.).

²¹⁹ Devotio ex duplice consideratione procedit: principaliter quidem ex consideratione divinae bonitatis, quia ista consideratio pertinet quasi ad terminum motus voluntatis tradentis se Deo, et ex ista consideratione per se quidem sequitur delectatio . . . , sed per accidentis haec consideratio tristitiam quamdam causat in his qui nondum plene Deo fruuntur. . . . Secundario vero causatur devotio ex consideratione propriorum defectuum; nam haec consideratio pertinet ad terminum, a quo homo per motum voluntatis votivae recedit, ut scilicet non in se existat, sed Deo se subdat. Haec autem consideratio e converso se habet ad primam; nam per se quidem nata est tristitiam causare, recognitando proprios defectus, per accidentem laetitiam, scilicet propter spem divinae subventionis. Et sic patet quod ad devotionem primo et per se consequitur delectatio; secundario autem et per accidentem tristitia, quae est secundum Deum (*Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 82, a. 4, c.).

"Even," says Saint Thomas, "in the consideration of the passion of Christ, there is something that causes sadness—the sins of man, on account of which Christ suffered—and something that causes joy—the goodness of God toward man in providing for his redemption."²²⁰ Cajetan makes an important observation with regard to this effect of devotion when he says:

Note that they are not devout persons who are ordinarily sad and sorrowful and are not able to have dealings with others without being disturbed and distracted. The devout person is the happy person, joy floods his soul not only from a consideration of God's goodness but also from the consideration of his own defects, for his sorrow is according to God and is accompanied by joy.²²¹

The word that Cajetan uses to describe the condition of those who are truly devout, "hilares," is indicative of a special kind of joy. It is a gaiety, a hilarity that is different as has been seen from the joy caused by charity.

10. *Conclusion.* Devotion presented to Saint Thomas the kind of problem in whose solution the Angelic Doctor was without peer. It was the problem of sifting, of refining, of synthesizing the great mass of doctrine which he had inherited from his predecessors.

The word devotion had occurred in Sacred Scripture in a context which suggested worship of God.²²² Pagan authors, too, had certainly used it in this connection.²²³

Among the Doctors of the Church Saints Hilary,²²⁴ Ambrose²²⁵

²²⁰ In consideratione passionis Christi est aliud quod contristet, scilicet defectus humanus, propter quem tollendum, Christum pati oportuit, et est aliquid quod laetificet, scilicet Dei erga nos benignitas; quae nobis tali liberatione providit (*Ibid.*, ad 1um).

²²¹ Hinc habes quod non sunt votae personae quae, communiter tristes ac sylvestres, nesciunt conversari cum aliis, nisi perturbentur aut dissolvantur. Nam votae personae sunt hilares, laetae in animo suo non solum ex principali causa, ut in litera dicitur, sed ex secundaria, scilicet consideratione proprietum defectuum. Nam tristitia earum est secundum Deum, et eam comitatur gaudium. Propter quod de sanctis legimus quod laeti hilaeresque erant, et merito, utpote inchoantes in terris caelestem conversationem (Cajetan, *op. cit.*, II-II, q. 82, a. 4).

²²² *Exod.* xxxv, 21, 22, 29; *II Paralip.* xxix, 31; *Num.* vi, 21; *Acts* xxxiii, 12, 14, 21.

²²³ Cicero, *III De Natura Deorum*, 6; *ibid.*, II, 3 ad fin.; *Epist. ad Quirit.*, 1; *Epist. ad Dom.*, 57; *Lib. III Officiorum*, 25; Caesar, *III B. G.*, 22; *ibid.*, VI B. G., 16; Nepos, *Alcibiades*, 6; Ovid, *Lib. XII Heroicum*, 45; Virgil, *Lib. I Aeneid.*, 716; Horatius, *Lib. III Odum*, 4; *Lib. XVI Epodum*, 9; *ibid.*, Lib. III, 23, 10; *ibid.*, Lib. IV, 14, 18; Livy, *Lib. VIII Annalium*, 9; *ibid.*, XVIII, 18 ad fin; Seneca, *Lib. III Beneficiorum*, 5; Petronius, *Satyræ*, 103; Juvenal *IX Satyræ*, 71; Tacitus *Lib. IV Annalium*, 52; *ibid.*, Lib. III, 13; *ibid.*, Lib. XII, 65.

²²⁴ *Commentarius in Matt.* Cap. XXIII, n. 2 (*PL IX*, 1045); *Ibid.*, Cap. XXXI, n. 1 (*PL IX*, 1066); *Tractatus in Ps. CXLI*, n. 2 (*PL IX*, 834).

²²⁵ *Epistolæ Primæ Classis*, *Epist. XVII*, n. 2 (*PL XVI*, 1002); *Comment. in*

and Augustine²²⁶ had been unanimous in linking devotion with worship of God and with prayer. They had insisted on its fundamental meaning, that of "complete oblation." Saint Ambrose had called it a virtue and the most important virtue. Saint Gregory the Great and Saint Bernard of Clairvaux had echoed the doctrine of these earlier Fathers.²²⁷

The Pre-Scholastics had followed in general the tradition of the Fathers and Doctors of the Church. Hugh of Saint Victor had said of devotion that it is the result of meditation, of knowledge, and of compunction; that it is a pious and humble affection for God, which includes the virtues of faith, hope, and charity; that in some sense it is synonymous with prayer.²²⁸ Richard of Saint Victor seems to identify devotion with charity.²²⁹ Peter Lombard had followed completely the doctrine of Hugh of Saint Victor.²³⁰

Of the Scholastics who preceded or were contemporary with the Angelic Doctor, Alexander of Hales had insisted on the necessity of devotion to sacrifice and prayer.²³¹ Saint Bonaventure had collected most of the doctrine on devotion of those who preceded him and, in an effort to unify it, had proposed the curious doctrine that the interior acts of worship of God pertain to the theological virtues while the external ones are elicited by the virtue of justice.²³² Saint Albert the Great, in apparent despair of ever reaching complete clarity in simplicity, had distinguished between the devotion of compunction and the devotion of charity, and had called them habits.²³³ And Ulrich of Strasbourg, the pupil of the Universal Doctor, followed his teacher in every important regard.²³⁴

It is to this vast quantity of matter, ponderous, unwieldy,

Epist. ad Rom., Cap. I, v. 22 (PL XVII, 61); *Comment. in Epist. ad Philipp.*, Cap. II, vv. 11-14 (PL XVII, 485); *Liber de Virginitate*, Cap. II, n. 9 (PL XVI, 282); *Comment. in Epist. I ad Tim.*, Cap. II, vv. 1-4 (PL XVII, 492-493).

²²⁶ E. g., *Sermo CCCLI*, Cap. IV, n. 9 (PL XXXIX, 1545); *De Sancta Virginitate*, Cap. VIII (PL XL, 400); *De Catechizandis Rudibus*, Cap. I, n. 2 (PL XL, 311).

²²⁷ E. g., for Gregory: *Hom. in Ezechielem*, Lib. II, Hom. IX, n. 2 (PL LXXVI, 1043); *In Primum Regum Expositionis*, Lib. IV, Cap. IV, n. 37 (PL LXXIX, 257). For Bernard: *Sermones in Cantica*, Sermo XVIII, n. 5 (PL CLXXXIII, 816); *ibid.*, Sermo XI, n. 1 (PL 824); *Sermones de diversis*, Sermo XC, n. 3 (PL CLXXXIII, 709).

²²⁸ *De Modo Orandi*, Cap. I (PL CLXXVI, 978, 979).

²²⁹ *De Eruditione Hominis Interioris*, Lib. II, Cap. IX (PL CXCVI, 1308).

²³⁰ *Lib. Sententiarum*, Lib. III, Dist. XXV, Cap. I.

²³¹ E. g., *Summa Theologica*, Vol. IV, pars 4, q. 26, memb. 1, a. 1.; *ibid.*, ad lumen; *ibid.*, q. 2, memb. 3, a. 2.

²³² *Comment. in III Sent.*, d. 9, a. 2, q. 3.

²³³ *Comment. in IV Sent.*, d. 4, a. 2, q. 1; *ibid.*, d. 4, a. 2, ad quaest. 1.

²³⁴ *Summa de Bono*, lib. VI, tract. 4, cap. 7 (Paris Bibl. Nat. lat. 15901).

uncrystallized, that the Angelic Doctor has given form and perfect order. Saint Thomas was like an artist who sat before a painting of a human face. The picture seemed to be complete. The pigment was there. The outlines were all there. It was a human face. Yet somehow it was incomplete. Some one thing was wanting—some small shadow it may have been to give proportion to the parts, some slightest touch to give significance and depth, a high light perhaps to make it lifelike. And Thomas with a master's hand supplied the touch of light or shadow. Under his hand the picture was at last complete. Now there is proportion. There is meaning. There is depth. The picture comes to life.

The doctrine of the Angelic Doctor makes of devotion one thing, yet in that one thing is included everything that has relation to devotion. Devotion is an act. It is the first and principal act of the virtue of religion. It must, therefore, precede and modify not only every elicited act of the virtue of religion but every imperated act as well—every act, that is to say, which is ordered to the worship of God. Immediately every virtue or act which can become matter of worship assumes its proper perspective with regard to devotion. Clarified, too, is the insistence of the predecessors of Saint Thomas on the connection between devotion and prayer, adoration, sacrifice, merit, the sacraments, the moral virtues and, especially, the theological virtues, which last seemed to offer special difficulties. By determining the effects of devotion Saint Thomas precludes the apparent need of division in the act of devotion itself—division which Albert the Great, Bonaventure and Ulrich of Strasbourg, and even Saint Thomas in his earlier works had made.

There remains the very important question of the exact significance of the promptitude in the service of God which is called devotion by Saint Thomas. Then since the importance of devotion to the Christian has been mentioned so frequently a few conclusions on this point will be indicated.

IV. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ACT OF DEVOTION AND THE RELATION OF DEVOTION TO PERFECTION

1. *The significance of the Act of Devotion.* From the Angelic Doctor's teaching on devotion in the *Summa* three things are perfectly clear: devotion is an act; it is a special act; and it is an act of religion. Difficulties arise on each of these points and in order to solve them and to understand fully all that is contained in the act of devotion, recourse will be had to the commentaries of

Cajetan and John of Saint Thomas on the teaching of the Angelic Doctor.

Cajetan proposes the first difficulty thus:

The name of any thing does not signify several things but only the one thing which is contained in its meaning. Hence either devotion signifies the act of the will or it signifies the quality of promptitude. It seems that it cannot signify both. For if it signifies the act, since no act of the will (unless perhaps a natural act, which devotion certainly is not) is prompt except by reason of a habit infused or acquired or by reason of some particular natural inclination, it follows that devotion does not signify a prompt will. If, on the other hand, it signifies promptitude, since promptitude is not an act but a quality or mode of action, it follows that devotion is not a special act of the will.²³⁵

John of Saint Thomas proposes the same difficulty, perhaps more clearly:

Since devotion implies a certain formality, the question arises as to just what this thing is that devotion formally signifies. Is it formally an act or formally a mode? And in either case is it general or special? Hence Saint Thomas asks: "Is devotion a special act?" With regard to the word 'special' does it pertain or is it reducible to one of the acts of the will or is it something general in them?²³⁶

To give Cajetan's answer first:

Just as the curve of the nose does not signify curvedness in general but a curvedness in a well-determined place, namely, in the nose, so devotion formally signifies promptitude, not in general, nor in every act of every potency whatever it may be, but in the act and only the act of the will, and even in the will, not in any manner whatever but only in that act by which the will offers itself and all its actions as an act of worship of God.

²³⁵ *Dubium occurrit pro conclusione et ratione, pro quanto dicitur quod devotio est specialis actus voluntatis, et quod prompta voluntas etc. Nam cum omne nomen unum significet, ut dicitur in XI *Metaphys.*, aut devotio significat ipsum actum voluntatis: aut qualitatem eius, puta promptitudinem. Si significat actum, cum nullus actus voluntatis (nisi forte naturalis, quem constat non esse devotionem) sit promptus, sed sit ex habitu infuso vel acquisito vel inclinatione aliqua particulari promptus; sequitur quod devotio non significat promptam voluntatem.—Si vero significat promptitudinem, cum promptitudo non sit actus sed qualitas seu modus actus, sequitur quod devotio non sit actus sed qualitas seu modus actus, sequitur quod devotio non sit specialis actus voluntatis* (Cajetan. *Op. cit.*, II-II, q. 82, a. 1).

²³⁶ *Cum devotio importat formalitatem quamdam, de qua dubitari potest, an sit actus, vel modus actus; et an sit generalis, vel specialis ideo Sanctus Thomas inquirit in hoc articulo, an devotio sit specialis actus; et quantum ad ly actus, utrum distinguatur a modo, et importat substantialiter actum et quantum ad ly specialis, an pertineat vel reducatur ad aliquem ex nominatis actibus voluntatis, vel sit aliquid generale in illis* (John of Saint Thomas. *Op. cit.*, t. 7, disp. 20, art. 1, n. 1).

So devotion signifies both the act and the quality and there is no opposition, for they are differently understood. It signifies the quality in this special and particular act, just as the curvedness signifies the form in a determined material. Just as the virtue of religion is the quality of a potency, so its proper act is the quality of an act of that potency. And the same thing is seen to be true of other acts to which special names are not given but which are designated by adverbial circumlocutions describing goodness or rectitude such as, well advised, rightly commanded or moderately desired. And the same thing is to be said of the act of devotion.²³⁷

An observation of John of Saint Thomas adds clarity to one of the arguments of the Angelic Doctor. "If," he says, "devotion were only a mode residing in all acts, it would not give to them a special title for merit but only a special mode of merit. Therefore devotion implies a special act."²³⁸

Cajetan clearly determined the relation of the act itself to the promptitude of the act in devotion but the resolution of two most important questions was left for John of Saint Thomas. First, does devotion consist formally in the act or in the promptitude which it adds over and above the act? For, if it consists only in the act, how is it different from the will to worship God which is common to every act of religion? Secondly, precisely what is the nature of the promptitude of devotion? Does it signify the ease and joy of action which is had in the operation of every habit? Or is it a special promptitude proper to this act of devotion? If the answer to the question be affirmative, why should devotion have a special

²³⁷ *Sicut simitas significat curvitatem non absolute, sed in certa materia, scilicet naso; ita devotio formaliter significat promptitudinem, non absolute, nec in quocumque actu cuiuscumque potentiae, sed in actu voluntatis non quocumque, sed illo quo voluntas se suaque omnia opera in divino cultu offert Deo. Et sic utrumque verum est, et neutrum alteri adversatur, diversimode intellectum: quod scilicet et qualitatem et actum importat, dum significat qualitatem in tali actu speciali, sicut simitas curvitatem in tali speciali materia. Ratio autem quae me movet ad hoc est quia devotio, ut in sequenti patet articulo, est actus religionis. Constat autem quod sicut religio est qualitas potentiae, ita actus proprius religionis est qualitas actus potentiae. Sic enim in aliis virtutibus videmus; ut patet de scire in intellectu speculativo et providere in intellectu pratico, iustificatione in voluntate, et aliis hujusmodi propriis actibus virtutum, quibus nomina non sunt imposita propria, sed circumloquimur eos cum nomine vel adverbio bonitatis aut rectitudinis, ut bona consiliatio, recte praecipere, moderate appetere, etc. Est enim videre actus proprios virtutum qualitatem seu modum substantialiae actus potentiae significare. Et propterea sic est in proposito dicendum de devotione (Loc. cit.).*

²³⁸ *Si enim devotio solum esset modus transcendentis per omnes actus non adderet illis specialem rationem meriti, sed specialem modificationem meriti. Ergo debet importare specialem actum in quod substantialiter consistat devotio (John of Saint Thomas. Loc. cit.. n. 3).*

promptitude other than that which comes from the habit of religion? ²³⁹

In answer to these questions John of Saint Thomas says that promptitude may be taken in two senses: first, as it signifies a quality in the operation of the subject; secondly, as it signifies something in the object to which the subject is moved and disposes itself. The first meaning of promptitude is that of a disposition of the subject by which it is given ease and readiness of action and by which impediments are removed. This promptitude is ordinarily given by habits or even by a natural disposition and has no place in this explanation. The other promptitude which has regard to the ordination of the subject to some object is difficult to explain and different explanations have been given of it.²⁴⁰

John of Saint Thomas goes on to give various opinions concerning this promptitude:

Some consider this promptitude to be a willingness or an act of the will having for its object a prompt worship of God or in other words a will to give themselves to the worship of God promptly and easily. Others have thought that the promptitude of devotion was nothing more than the affection itself or the love by which someone is moved to performing acts of worship of God.²⁴¹

Suarez in attempting to explain this promptitude had recourse to the idea of deliberation before the act. John of Saint Thomas in explaining his opinion says that he considered devotion "to be nothing more than a deliberate affection for the worship of God,

²³⁹ Tota difficultas circa hanc rationem . . . reducitur ad duo. Primum, an *devotio* formaliter consistat in *actu*, vel in *promptitudine*, quam addit super *actum*, nam si consistat solum in *actu*, non est aliud quam *velle obsequium Dei*, seu *tradere se obsequio Dei*: et hoc est *actus communis religionis*; et sic *devotio* substantialiter accepta pro ipso *velle*, non est *specialis actus religionis*: secundum, quid sit illa *promptitudo*, an sc. sit *agere faciliter*, et *delectabiliter*, quid non est aliud quam *operari ex habitu*; non vero *importat actum speciale*; an vero sit *aliquid additum ipsis actui*, et hoc non *apparet quid sit, ratione cuius sit ponendum specialis actus* (*Ibid.*, n. 4).

²⁴⁰ *Promptitudo* potest accipi vel ex parte *subjecti* in *ordine ad agendum*, vel ex parte *subjecti* in *ordine ad aliquod objectum*, cui *afficitur*, et *ordinat se*. Primo modo *importat dispositionem subjecti*, seu *potentiae agentis*, qua *redditur facilis*, et *expedita ad agendum* *sublati impedimentis*, et hoc fit *communiter per habitum*, vel per *aliquam naturalem vim* *qualis est solertia . . . et de hac promptitudine non est sermo hic*. *Promptitudo autem subjecti in ordine ad aliquod objectum difficilis valde est ad explicandum et miror quantum recentiorum ingenia torserit* (*Ibid.*, n. 5).

²⁴¹ *Quidam enim censent esse volitionem, seu actum voluntatis, habentem pro objecto promptum famulatum Dei, seu velle exequi et exercere ipsum obsequium Dei prompte et facile . . . alii censent promptitudinem hac nihil aliud esse quam affectum ipsum, et morem, quo quis in exercitio afficitur ad cultum* (*Ibid.*).

because as long as one does not deliberate either way, he will not have a prompt will to do a thing. But after deliberation his will is made prompt. Hence devotion consists in that promptitude which is a deliberate act and may be called the promptitude of deliberation.”²⁴² The words of Suarez himself are:

The will as long as it does not deliberate on a thing and is not affected by it is not prompt in operation. But as soon as it makes its decree and offers itself to some work, it is by reason of that very act rendered prompt if the act or its force endures and is not changed. Hence this is the sense in which devotion is to be said to consist in promptitude in divine worship.²⁴³

John of Saint Thomas describes lastly an opinion by which the promptitude of devotion is called an objective promptitude and which is explained as a will to serve God not in any way whatever but in a perfect and heroic degree.²⁴⁴

The Spanish Commentator rejects all those opinions as not being in accord with the mind of the Angelic Doctor. Devotion must differ from a mere affection for the worship of God. Otherwise it would not be a special act. Likewise with regard to the opinion of Suarez, a deliberated act does not make a difference which constitutes devotion as a special act of religion. Every act of that virtue is voluntary and has its morality. Therefore every act must be deliberate. Furthermore, as Saint Thomas himself said, devotion is from the word signifying dedicated not from deliberated.²⁴⁵ As for the opinion that devotion is the will to serve God in a perfect and heroic degree, it need only be said that devotion is to be found in those who are imperfect in virtue and religion. It is not found only

²⁴² *Et ut tandem explicetur, nihil est aliud quam affectus deliberatus circa obsequium divinum, quia, quandiu quis in neutram partem deliberat, nondum habet promptam voluntatem ad aliquid praestandum: postquam vero decrevit et deliberavit redditum voluntas prompta ad faciendum aliquid. Et ita devotio consistit in promptitudine, quae sit actus deliberatus, et vocatur promptitudo deliberationis* (*Ibid.*, n. 6).

²⁴³ *Voluntas enim quamdiu in neutram partem deliberat, vel afficitur, non est prompta ad aliquod munus praestandum, at postquam decrevit et se offert ad aliquod munus, ex vi illius actus prompta est, si actus, vel virtus ejus duret, et non mutetur. Unde in hoc sensu fatemur devotionem consistere in promptitudine ad divinum obsequium* (*Suarez, Commentarium in Summa Theol.*, t. 2, de Religione, lib. 2, chap. 6, n. 7).

²⁴⁴ *Quidam tenent, promptitudinem objectivam . . . et explicant per hoc quod est velle non . . . quomodo cumque sed in gradu perfecto et heroico* (John of Saint Thomas. *Op. cit.*, t. 7, disp. 20, art. 1, n. 10).

²⁴⁵ *Sed haec omnia minus attingunt mentem Sancti Doctoris, actum enim esse deliberatum, non est differentia constituens specialem actum religionis. Omnes enim actus illius voluntarii, et morales sunt . . . Itaque devotio a devovendo dicitur, non a deliberando* (*Ibid.*, n. 7).

in those who are perfect or who have progressed some way in perfection. It is also to be found in those who are just beginning.²⁴⁶ And, while devotion is the first and principal act of religion, it is nevertheless to be found in all the acts of religion and so is not heroic any more than the principal act of prudence, which is the act of commanding, is heroic.²⁴⁷

John of Saint Thomas then goes on to give his own explanation of the promptitude of devotion.

The promptitude which devotion implies, is an act which follows the deliberate will to serve, that is, the offering of a ready will prepared to serve another. Thus that act has for its object the worship of God. But just as in the worship of God different things are offered to God, as, for example, the intellect by prayer, the body by adoration, external goods by sacrifice, so by devotion the will itself is offered and because it is the first thing offered in the proffering of anything, it is placed by Saint Thomas as the first act of religion. Therefore that act which has for the matter to be offered in the worship of God man's own will, is called devotion.²⁴⁸

The Spanish Commentator then goes on to explain the reason for a special promptitude in devotion—the reason why the ordinary promptitude of the habit is not sufficient. He says that the will is not able to be offered in the service of another unless it has readiness, that is, unless the impediments by which it might be retarded are removed. Hence the act by which the will is offered ought to be modified and perfected by a certain promptitude, that is an ease and readiness to serve. This promptitude is to be found both in the object which is offered—a ready will to serve—and in the act by which it is offered which has readiness and promptitude.²⁴⁹ The

²⁴⁶ Similiter *devotio* non est *actus heroicus*, cum constet inveniri *devotionem*, etiam in his, qui sunt imperfectae virtutis, et religionis; invenitur enim non solum in perfectis, et proficiensibus sed etiam in incipientibus (*ibid.*, n. 8).

²⁴⁷ Etsi *devotio* sit *principalis actus* et *primus inter actus religionis*, est tamen *communis omnibus*, et ideo non est *heroicus*, sicut *principalis actus prudentiae* est *praecipere* non tamen est *actus heroicus* (*Ibid.*).

²⁴⁸ Quare promptitudo, quam importat *devotio* in ordine ad *objectum*, cui aliquis se *devovet*. . . . est *actus* qui *consequitur* ad *deliberationem serviendi*, i. e., *oblatio voluntatis expeditae*, et *praeparatae* ad *deserviendum alteri*. Itaque ille *actus* *habet pro objecto cultum Dei*; sed sicut ad *istum cultum offerimus Deo* *diversas materias*; ut per *orationem offerimus*, et *subjecimus intellectum Deo*, per *adorationem corpus*, per *sacrificium bona externa*; sic per *devotionem offerimus voluntatem*, *quaer* *quia est primum quod offertur in obsequium alicujus*, ideo ponitur a D. Thomas *actus religionis*. Igitur *actus*, qui *habet pro materia oblata in ordine ad cultum, et obsequium Dei, voluntatem propriam*, dicitur *devotio*, quasi *applicatio quaedam voluntatis ad obsequium* (*Ibid.*, n. 9).

²⁴⁹ Et quia *voluntas offeri* non potest ad *serviendum alteri* nisi sit *expedita*, i. e., *sint oblata impedimenta*, *quibus retardari potest ab eo*, cui se *tradit ad serviendum*; ideo *actus offerens voluntatem* *debet esse modificatus*, et *perfectus quadam prompti-*

reason, therefore, why there is a special promptitude in the act of devotion is because by that act the will itself is offered to God. And since it is impossible to conceive of sluggishness in such an offering, a special promptitude is to be found in devotion. Sluggishness might be found in the acts leading up to the act of devotion, but devotion itself must be prompt.

The important point upon which John of Saint Thomas insists is that everything concerning devotion comes from the virtue of religion. The act, the mode of the offering, and the promptitude—all come from religion; it is not to be thought that the mode of the act comes from religion and the substance of the act from the potency behind religion, that is, the will. The act of devotion is wholly an act of the virtue of religion.²⁵⁰ And lest Cajetan be misinterpreted on this point, the Spanish Commentator explains his meaning:

When Cajetan spoke of adverbial circumlocutions describing the quality of an act,²⁵¹ he did not understand by this mode or quality of the act something coming to the act from the habit but he understood the relation of the act to a modified object, just, for example, as the expression "well-advised" does not signify the idea of being advised with a mode coming to it from the habit. It rather signifies the act with relation to a modified object. And this modification in the case of devotion is promptitude accepted in relation to the object. It does not need the reflexive act of the will any more than does the act of prayer which offers and raises the intellect to God.²⁵²

He says in further explanation:

This offering in devotion is substantially an act and it is to be understood as an act and not as a mode, just as the act which offers the intellect to God or any other act which offers other matter to God. Nevertheless, devotion implies the mode of promptitude, not indeed as something accidentally attached to it, but as that which is included in the very relation

tudine, seu facilitate, et praeparatione ad serviendum, quae promptitudo, et reluet ex parte objecti, seu materiae oblatae, quia offertur voluntas expedita ad serviendum; et reluet ex parte actus, quia est oblatio cum expeditione, et promptitudine (*Ibid.*, n. 10).

²⁵⁰ Totum hoc sc., actus, et modus oblatio, et promptitudo procedit a religione, non autem modus a religione, et substantia actus a potentia (*Ibid.*, n. 11).

²⁵¹ Cf. p. 239.

²⁵² Cajetanus non intellexerit per modum, seu qualitatem actus aliquid proveniens ab habitu in ipsum actum, et ei affixum, sed intellexit habitudinem actus ad objectum modificatum . . . Sicut recte consiliari, non est consilium cum modo superveniente ipsi ab habitu, sed actus cum habitudine ad objectum modificatum. Et haec est promptitudo intrinseca et in ordine ad objectum sumpta, ad quam non magis requiritur actus reflexus cadens super voluntatem, quam ad actum orationis quae offert, et elevat mentem Deo (John of St. Thomas. *Loc. cit.*, n. 12).

of the act to the object, for the matter offered is itself prompt, the will; and the act regards the matter under the aspect of promptitude.²⁵³

He insists again upon the speciality of this promptitude in the act of devotion, saying that this promptitude or readiness to serve is rather to be found in the will, which moves the other potencies, than in the intellect or anything else that is offered to God.²⁵⁴

There remains to be considered the difficulty with regard to devotion being an act of religion. It seems that this cannot be true because of the fact that devotion is so often spoken of as though it were connected with other virtues. John of Saint Thomas thus expresses the general principle that solves this difficulty: "Many more acts follow from the act of devotion and it impresses its mode of devout service on them, than follow from any of the other acts of religion." ²⁵⁵ He says in particular:

Oblation is an act of servitude and subjection to the one to whom it is offered. Devotion therefore as an act pertains only to the virtue of servitude or of oblation to God, that is, to the virtue of religion. Therefore, it pertains to charity in the measure that it is imperated by charity—just as the acts of other virtues pertain to charity. With regard to obedience, this virtue as it is a special virtue is not concerned with offering a ready will as an oblation to God, but only with observance of the precepts of a superior, that is, it is concerned with honoring and revering the precepts of a superior. And thus it has nothing to do with the worship of God. When one is said to obey devoutly or to perform devoutly the act of any virtue, devotion is to be understood either as the mode of promptitude common to every habit and virtue or as the effect of devotion insofar as it is the act of religion commanding and therefore modifying other virtues, for devotion is not any prompt act whatever. It is the oblation and offering of a prompt will to worship God.²⁵⁶

²⁵³ Et talis oblatio (devotio) substantialiter est actus, et supponit pro actu, et non pro modo sicut oratio offerens mentem, vel quicumque aliis actus offerens aliam materiam: importat tamen modum promptitudinis, non qui accidentaliter sibi adveniat, sed qui in ipsa habitudine ad objectum includitur, quia fertur ad meritam promptam et secundum promptitudinem respicit illam (*Ibid.*, n. 13).

²⁵⁴ Sicut etiam promptitudo, vel expeditio ad serviendum magis inventur in voluntate, quae movet caeteras potentias, quam in intellectu, vel aliis rebus, quae Deo offeruntur (*Ibid.*).

²⁵⁵ Et similiter magis ex isto actu sequuntur alii, et imprimuntur illis modus devote serviendi, quam per alios actus religionis (*Ibid.*, n. 14).

²⁵⁶ Oblatio autem est actus servitutis, et obsequii respectu ejus, cui offeritur; devotion ergo pro actu, solum pertinet ad virtutem servientem, seu offerentem, quae respectu Dei est religio; ad charitatem autem solum potest pertinere imperative, sicut et actus aliarum virtutum; ad obedientiam vero prout est specialis virtus non pertinet ad offerre voluntatem expeditam ad obsequium, sed tantum habere obseruantiam ad praecepta superioris, quae est honorare, et revereri praecepta; et ita non respicit cultum, et reverentiam Dei, et obsequium ejus. Quod autem dicantur

2. *Devotion and Perfection.* From what has been said of devotion both in itself and in its relationship to other acts and to the virtues, it is quite clear that this act of religion has a very intimate connection with Christian perfection. A brief consideration of all that the act of devotion implies will make this fact even more evident.

John of Saint Thomas, it will be remembered, defined the act of devotion as the offering of the will itself. Because devotion is an act of the virtue of religion, its offering is formally not that of a friend of God but that of one of His creatures. It is the oblation of the whole will—the will in its entirety. It is the perfect holocaust of the intellectual creature. Devotion is pure willing. It has no other material than the will to offer.

But morally speaking the will is the whole man, for when the will is inclined toward God, the whole man is so inclined; the opposite is true when the will embraces evil. Devotion, then, this centering of the will wholly on honoring God, is the concentration of the whole man on the act which is most appropriate to the intelligent creature.

Because it is the act of a moral virtue, devotion is concerned, relative to the acts of the theological virtues, with means rather than with end. Thus it is essentially a choice. It is the willing and eager, yet deliberate subjection of a free created being.

Devotion is not a mere intention to worship God. It is important to understand this. Neither is it like a vow which promises something to God. The greatest worship of which man is capable is realized in the very act of devotion. Devotion is the offering.

Devotion has been defined as promptitude. It is, of course, a promptitude which is rather psychological than temporal. And it is this psychological readiness and completeness of offering with which devotion stamps all the acts which the virtue of religion commands. Devotion supplies the impulse to all the other acts of religion. They all exist for the sake of devotion. They are means of expressing interior homage—that is to say, means of realizing devotion.

From this purpose of all other acts of religion it follows that they have no valid existence except as ministers to devotion. Devotion is their criterion and their standard. Those acts of worship which further true devotion, true holocaust of the will, should be guarded

aliqui devote obedire aut devote facere opera virtutum; vel accipitur devotio pro modo promptitudinis communi omni habitui, et virtuti, vel pro effectu devotionis, quatenus est actus religionis imperans et imprimens caeteris virtutibus . . . devotio non dicit actum promptum quomodocumque, sed oblationem, et exhibitionem promptae voluntatis (*Ibid.*, a. 2, n. 8).

jealously. Others should not be tolerated. That devotion is the criterion and standard of all other acts of religion means more than merely tearing out by the roots sentimental and shallow practices in worship. It means teaching an appreciation for the solid liturgy of the Church. It means the encouragement of truly liturgical devotions.

That devotion is the criterion and standard of all other acts of religion means also that the frequency and the duration of other acts of religion are to be measured by their success or failure to contribute to true devotion. Even prayer must be regulated by this first and principal act of religion. St. Thomas called devotion the "yardstick of prayer." Devotion then is not the principal act of religion because it is spiritual while others are corporeal but rather because of the impulse that it gives to them. Thus devotion is principal even with regard to prayer which is also a spiritual act.

The tendency to consider devotion all-important to perfection led some of the predecessors of Saint Thomas to identify devotion and charity. Two truths must be borne in mind in this matter. First, devotion is in no sense identical with charity. Devotion belongs not to a theological virtue but to a moral one. Secondly, it must be insisted upon that Christian perfection consists formally in charity. What then is the place of the virtue of religion and the act of devotion in perfection? Is devotion any more important than the principal act of any other virtue?

These questions may best be answered by recalling the place of charity in the plan of Christian perfection. Christian perfection is a participation of the perfection of God. The more a creature participates the divine life the more perfect that creature is. Since God is pure act, the creature is more like to God when he is in act than when he is only in potency to act. For this reason it is in the act of charity rather than in the habit that perfection formally consists. Perfection is said to consist formally in the act of charity because in that one act all that pertains to Christian perfection is summed up and contained.

Now devotion has the same important place in a restricted field of operation that the act of charity has in the whole scope of the Christian life. Christian perfection consists formally in the act of charity. By an almost perfect parallel it must be said that moral perfection consists formally in the act of devotion. Devotion does for the moral virtues what charity does for all the virtues. In the province of moral perfection, that is, in the perfect operation of the moral virtues, religion and devotion are supreme. Religion is the highest moral virtue and devotion is religion in its pure state, just as the act of charity is total perfection in its pure state. Just

as charity sums up and contains Christian perfection as a whole, so devotion sums up and contains moral perfection—the perfect operation of the moral virtues.

Saint Thomas has assigned a name to this perfection in the moral virtues. He has called it *sanctitas*. And he defines *sanctitas*—insofar as it differs from the virtue of religion at all—as the virtue of religion ordaining all the acts of all the virtues to the worship of God.²⁵⁷ Devotion is the seed of which moral perfection is the flower. It is interesting to note a statement of Cajetan in this regard. He says that there are three acts of the will with regard to the end—volition, enjoyment and intention. Devotion corresponds to volition—not just any volition but that which has for an end God and which has for means and for object itself and all its possessions to be offered in worshiping God, for volition is sometimes concerned with more than the end considered in itself. It includes the end as it is to be found in the means to the end. And this is the kind of act devotion is. It concerns the end and includes the means to the end, namely the thing offered—man himself, and that in which he offers himself—in the worship of God.²⁵⁸

It must be remembered that the imperating power of religion is not restricted to the acts of the moral virtues but transcends these to embrace and employ the acts of the lofty theological virtues themselves. In formalizing, therefore, in essentially including within itself, Christian perfection, devotion is second only to charity. The true relation of perfection to charity and to devotion can best be explained by a figure that is as old almost as Christianity itself. Devotion belongs to the handmaid; charity to the spouse. This is not true in the sense that the handmaid is without charity or that the spouse can neglect devotion. But it is true in the sense that devotion is emphasized in a special way in one and charity in the other. Both are necessary. The handmaid in the Christian dispensation is already a spouse. And the spouse cannot cease to be a handmaid in the service of her lord, for her lord is God. To return to the words of Cajetan:

The inferior in its highest operation attains to the condition of its superior. As the mind of man in its supreme act understands without discursive reasoning, so the supreme moral virtue, religion, participates the nature of the theological virtues. It attains to God not as He is in Himself but as the one to Whom worship is due.²⁵⁹

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²⁵⁷ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 81, a. 8, c.

²⁵⁸ Cajetan, *op. cit.*, II-II, q. 82, a. 1, n. 3.

²⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, q. 81, a. 5.

BOOK REVIEWS

The Successful Error. By RUDOLF ALLERS, M. D., PH. D., Professor of Psychology in the Catholic University of America, School of Philosophy. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1940. Pp. ix + 266. \$3.00.

I

Modern scientific psychology is a medley of systems. Each system boasts of its own special investigative technique, each is employed upon what it regards as the proper subject matter of psychological research. The behaviorist, for example, is objective in method, and preoccupied with man's reflex movements. The gestaltist is moderately introspective, and his goal is the analysis of man's perceptual patterns. The structuralist is immoderately introspective, and his main interests are in atoms of consciousness. Each system, moreover, proclaims its independence of other systems, so that no one system is recognized in all quarters. Psychoanalysis, too, has its vested interests; yet it is something of an exception to the rule. It has the appearance, at any rate, of attempting to study the whole man, instead of concentrating exclusively on his reflexes, or the configurations of his perceptual consciousness, or the atomized contents of his consciousness. The official psychologists have not taken to it kindly. Perhaps this is because it was born and nurtured, not on the shining surfaces of a laboratory table, but in the dark depths of a clinical couch. Certainly, psychoanalysis cannot lay claim to being an experimental science. Nevertheless, its range of observation is wide enough to give the impression of being a whole-making or syncretistic approach to the study of man. Forasmuch, therefore, as it has done well, it must be commended.

The chief merit of Sigmund Freud and his school is that of having shown the real importance of unconscious mental processes, and their influence in orientating the individual towards a normal goal of life. Of course, other psychologists, notably the doctors of the Salpêtrière in Paris, had demonstrated the existence of such hidden forces. Charcot, for example, and his pupils, Janet and Ribot, contributed several valuable papers on the significance of hysterias, obsessions, and other psychoneurotic conditions. But Freud was the first to show the intrinsic meaning of unconscious functions for the psychological pattern of individual life. In order to get at the secret chambers of mind, it was necessary to study a wide range of pathological data. The abnormal, in mental life, had been decidedly neglected by the systematists. Freud found it a fertile area of investigation, the exotic fruits of which provided him with a point of departure for many of his equally exotic theories. On a basis of certain

observed facts, he built a psychological system of his own which, at bottom, is simply a rehash of Hume's phenomenism and the associational doctrines of Reid, Bain, James Mill, and Spencer.

II

But Freudianism is not merely a theory of unconscious psychological processes, or a branch of psychiatry, or a method of healing the diseases of mind. More seriously, it is proposed by its author as a philosophy of life, and a philosophy of the grossest materialism. Its main propositions are an admixture of a few valuable scientific formulae and a vast deal of metaphysical nonsense—to say nothing of its vicious moral heresies. Far from abating the ills of humanity, psychoanalysis has served to plunge its patients deeper and deeper into the abyss of despair. Perhaps Freud never intended that such should be the effect of his work. He died in exile, his own soul filled with the bitterness of the inhumanities heaped on his race. We have no right to question his private life or his personal integrity. We cannot doubt the truth of many of his diagnostic observations. We cannot deny the fertility of his imaginative powers, his skill in formulating theories, the lure of his pen, the signature of genius which is set upon many of his writings. But all this is as nothing when put in the balance against the untoward moral effects which psychoanalysis, in the main, has had on its followers. The very existence of so much masked good and evil in Freudianism makes it impossible for the average scholar, much less for the average reader, to set a proper value on its contents. Here the expert must be called in to do the appraising. The author of *The Successful Error* is such a specialist. For years, Dr. Allers has labored in the clinics of Vienna, Munich, and Washington. He is thoroughly acquainted with the subject matter of psychoanalysis. He also knows the methodology which it employs. And what is the verdict of a lifetime of study? "I hold," says Dr. Allers, "that psychoanalysis is an enormous and a dangerous error. I desire to prevent as many people as possible—and primarily of course as many Christians as possible—from falling a prey to this error." The verdict is the reason of the present book.

III

Dr. Allers' critique is made up of three well-balanced parts. The first section examines the nature of psychoanalysis, its presuppositions, and the philosophy on which it rests. The second section deals with the special problems which the psychoanalytic theory raises, and the relations of the theory to other fields of knowledge. The third section studies the historical roots of the system and attempts to give an idea of the reasons why it has had such an astounding success. A concluding chapter summarizes the whole discussion and formulates definite questions which every psychoanalyst is called upon to answer. Dr. Allers' statement of the Freudian

doctrines is clear and impartial. It is a better exposition, in fact, than most professional psychoanalysts could make. To understand Freud it is not sufficient merely to expound the clinical elements of his theory. One must also understand how these elements are integrated with the Freudian concepts of ethnology, religion, and education, because Freudianism is made out of one whole cloth. No part of the system is neglected by Dr. Allers. Every basic principle is examined from half a dozen angles, turned over and over dispassionately, measured by the rules of cold logic, analyzed in relation to the system as a whole. It is an indictment from which the Freudian will not easily recover.

IV

Only too few adequate criticisms have been made of psychoanalysis. Many scholars have rejected it on the general grounds that any system which lays so much emphasis on sex must by its nature be condemned. Many, too, have judged it without discerning the background of the theory. To evaluate it correctly one must grasp the philosophy on which Freudianism is founded. The favorable things which men like Jacques Maritain and Mortimer Adler have said about psychoanalysis obviously deserve serious consideration. But, on due reflection, Dr. Allers is constrained to oppose the opinion of these eminent scholars. At the very outset he states his thesis: that the method and the philosophy of the psychoanalytic school are inseparable, that rejection of the latter implicitly includes a rejection of the former. Dr. Allers, of course, does not mean to impugn the ancient distinction between the *objectum quod* and the *objectum quo* of any branch of science; but he does hold that, in the case of psychoanalysis, the particular knowledge studied and the particular technique by which this knowledge is acquired and used, stand or fall together. Thus, it is the firm contention of the Freudian school that the methodological principle by which we investigate man's psychological processes is essentially the same as the methodological principle by which we investigate his physiological processes. The reason they are the same, of course, is that there is no essential difference between the physiological and the psychological, or, more ultimately, between matter and spirit and the operations of each. The Freudian, on this basis, must be an out-and-out positivist if he is consistent with his methodological assumptions. For him there can be no such thing as a philosophy of human nature, not only because he can elaborate no philosophic concepts, but also because there can be no human nature about which to philosophize — since man and beast share the same level of existence.

V

One very important matter which Dr. Allers has abundantly clarified is the Freudian concept of libido. This is really a capital point in under-

standing the psychoanalytic theory. In the first place, libido is not conterminous with sex urge, in the popular sense of the term "sex." Again, libido is not a synonym for reproductive impulses. Specifically, it signifies the combined energies of *all* instinctive tendencies. Further, the goal of libidinal impulses is any object outside the organism. This special resolution of the concept of libido, however, is not intended to weaken its sex implications. On the contrary, it is designed to underscore the essentially *sexual* nature of *all* human strivings, urges, and interests, where objects are concerned. To libidinal energy, therefore, man owes every effort that he puts forth; and the amount of affective charge connected with any desirable object has its origin in the activity of sexual inclinations. Moreover, it would be a misreading of the literature of psychoanalysis to think that the satisfaction realized in the attainment of an object not immediately related to sex, is like the satisfaction that the reproductive instinct supplies.

VI

The philosophy behind psychoanalysis represents a total lack of appreciation of the higher values of human life. Its most basic error, of course, is its failure to grasp the true nature of man. For, man is no longer a man after the Freudian analysis, but merely an animal, "comparable to senseless beasts and made like unto them." With the loss of reason, the light of freedom is extinguished, and nothing remains except passion and ignorance and the wages of sin. It is small wonder that the philosophy of Freud, like that of Nietzsche, is a philosophy of darkness and despair, of hopeless conflicts and the sheerest materialism, a philosophy in which there is no room for the operation of divine grace. Freudianism saps at the very root and being of the Christian life. It laughs at the idea of aid from a Creator, of supernatural gifts that move us to rectify our wills and to moderate our passions. No Christian teacher has ever denied the existence of evil impulses within the sanctuary of the human soul. Let the Freudian read the Fathers of the Church! Let him scan the words of St. Paul's sixth chapter to the Romans! Let him examine the splendid commentary which Thomas Aquinas wrote on that chapter to the Romans! The struggle of the spirit against the flesh, of the law of mind against the law of matter, of reason against passion, was only too well known to these great men, even as it is only too well known and too easily forgotten by lesser mortals. The point is, of course, not that man is a passionate creature (because this is so utterly obvious) but that the impulses of his animal nature need not always triumph over the impulses of his rational nature.

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L'Humanisme Politique de Saint Thomas. By LOUIS LACHANCE, O.P.
Ottawa: Éditions du Lévrier, 1939. 2 Vols. Pp. 746.

I

If the title of this work is understood, as it was meant to be understood, as a politic which protects and furthers the humanity of man, then the reason for making such a study becomes self-evident. Today there can be no question of the need of such a defense; and that defense is thought of in terms of ships, planes and guns. What our modern world is only beginning to realize is that this external, physical defense of humanity is only a logical necessity of a previous and much more devastating intellectual and moral attack on the nature of men.

Perhaps the most serious modern danger to a human politic is blindness to the fact that the intellectual and moral threats sired by the over-emphasis of individuality are no less serious than those that spring from the over-emphasis of the collective elements in human political organization. Obviously there are two extremes possible in the realm of politics: one makes the state supreme to the point of destruction of the individual; the other exalts the individual to the point of anarchy, reducing the state to the rôle of policeman or economic messenger boy. What should be just as obvious is that both these extremes are wrong, with not a hairline of difference in their results of destroying both the human individual and the human state.

The one, in the guise of a champion of order and unified strength destroys the human state by a direct attack on the sovereignty of the parts of the state, the citizens. It does away with the very reason for the existence of the state, the only means by which a state is possible, and the only subject who can enjoy the fruits of political communal life. The other, waving the flag and beating the drum in the name of liberty and individuality, puts the perfection of human life beyond the reach of the individual person by emasculating the indispensable medium of that better life, the strong, effective state. It forces the human individual into the pretense of divinity; and a man is always pitifully ludicrous in that rôle. Ultimately, as far as the ordinary individual is concerned, the second is reducible to the first; for in the absence of a state capable of protecting all its citizens, inevitably there arises a force capable of enslaving them.

There is reason enough, then, for a study such as this; nor is it hard to understand why the author has gone to St. Thomas in his search for clarity in the fundamentals of a humanistic politic. The theological pre-eminence of St. Thomas is not so much a reason for caution in a matter so completely on the natural level as is politics; rather it is a reason for confidence. For if grace does not destroy nature but rather perfects it, then,

obviously, it is of first rate importance for one whose writings include the supernatural to be extremely careful of the integrity of the natural.

Aside from this a priori consideration, anyone who has read the second part of Thomas' *Summa Theologica* has first hand knowledge of the ruthless brilliance and understanding penetration of Thomas as a champion of things human.

It is precisely things human that are under fire today. To give the anti-human political extremes their twentieth century names, there are the absolute dictatorships that exalt the state to the destruction of the individual, reducing him to a cog in a machine existing only for the machine; at the other extreme are the individualistic liberal democracies that champion the individual to the enfeeblement of order, unity, of the state itself. When these latter have gone far enough, they have produced an economic dictatorship; when the former have gone far enough, they have obliterated the very formalities of human government.

II

As Father Lachance sees the problem of harmonizing the relations of the state and the individual in its modern dress, the question is one of re-establishing the state. This may come as somewhat of a shock to modern Americans, for, on the surface, some modern states seem to be doing very well for themselves indeed. Yet his way of viewing the problem is accurate. It is the *human* state, as well as its human parts, that has gone by the board under Hitler and it is, even more obviously, the *human* state that decayed in France and is threatened with decay in the rest of the world's democracies.

However, it may alleviate the shock of a modern scholastic defense of the state to point out that this is one of alternate ways of stating the problem. It could be as well, and as accurately, stated, by declaring that the modern problem is one of re-establishing the human person. For, as Father Lachance brings out again and again, the perfection of the two—person and state—are inseparable; it is as impossible to give a practical definition of man to the exclusion of the state as it is to give a definition of the state without human individuals. If the sovereignty of the human person were to be re-established, then the inhumanity of the Nazi state could not survive; while if the subjection of the individual citizen to a human state were established, then the inhumanity of the weakling state could no longer exist.

Whichever approach to the problem is chosen, the preliminary investigation, the central issue, the solution (if correct and adequate) must all be the same. This explains the excellence of the procedure of Father Lachance: he locates the problem in its proper field, the moral field; then, clarifies the terms, person and state; finally, by way of solution of the problem, he examines the interrelation of the individual and the state.

III

In his preliminary investigations the author is magnificent. His opening chapter, an historical one, gives the roots of Thomas' political thought by bringing out the political theories that were at his disposal: the Augustinian continuation of the Roman jurists and the Aristotelian culmination of Greek thought with its strong philosophy of nature. Here the author places the political problem beside its metaphysical analogue of the one and the many; the elements of Thomas' thought are then shown, the predominance of the Greek current necessitating a full statement of the natural foundation of politics. The chapter closes with Thomas' key to the solution—his theory of subordination,—and a statement of the actual form of the problem.

After placing the problem in the moral sphere, where it belongs, and limiting it to the strictly philosophical order, Father Lachance aligns his perspectives and then goes on to his study, first of the human person, and then of the state. The chapters on nature and grace are brilliantly done. But they are only a foretaste of the excellence of those that follow on their heels. The study of person and of the state are both learned, exhaustive, lit up almost to the point of gaiety by the original insight of a man who knows both Aristotle and Thomas. In fact, some of the most satisfying parts of the book are observations tossed off passingly on the differences of the two masters. Thus only one who has retraced his steps again and again in wearied befuddlement, searching for a way to understanding through the maze of similar terms and different concepts, can appreciate Father Lachance's remark that the common good is used by Aristotle in the sense of effect, while Thomas invariably uses it in the sense of cause. Or, again, there is his very brief examination of the apparently similar, but fundamentally different, classifications of types of government by the two.

In his study of person, Father Lachance investigates the metaphysical and physical structure of a person; his dignity, limitations, reason, will, and consequent moral excellence; his wisdom, art, religion, and the work involved in being a man, the realization of human potencies. If later statements or conclusions seem at all to reflect on the individual, the reader need only revert to this section to absolve the author from any taint of statism. He is, as a Thomist must be, a champion of the human individual.

It must be understood that the author is not merely repeating generalities in this study of the human person; it is much more than a merely general defense along paths that have been worn smooth and hard by centuries of use. Rather it is a profound and unusually original study of all that enters into the moral life of man.

Nor is the treatment of the state less excellent. It covers the reality, natural basis, end and form of the state. The author's treatment of the

natural bases of the state and its form, both internal and external, must be particularly singled out for praise.

The last part of the book, the attempted harmonization of the individual and the state, proceeds by a statement of the services of the state (as easily described as the characteristics of the state), an explicit comparison of the whole and the part, the common and the private good with textual support from St. Thomas. This is the heart of the author's solution. By way of corollary there is a treatise on the social conception of moral activity and the perfection of political humanism in social humanism. This final part must be classed as a failure.

IV

When we speak of it as a failure it is not meant that Father Lachance has arrived at erroneous conclusions, nor that he has maintained an untenable thesis. He has simply failed to inject clarity into a question that cannot be solved by increasing the density of its obscurity. The quarrel is not so much with wrong conclusions as with lack of conclusions, or at least with the incompleteness of the conclusions drawn.

Throughout the work the author has so frequently insisted on the subordination of the individual person to the state that the reader is plagued by a double irritation: a thwarted eagerness for a clear and convincing statement of the character of this subordination; and a haunting suspicion that, perhaps, the author insists too much, that, perhaps, he is not too sure of it himself.

Father Lachance sees the state as a universal cause moving subordinate causes, the citizens, to the ultimate end which is the common good. These subordinate causes (not instruments) have their own specific causality, not interfered with by the universal cause, but elevated and perfected by it. They are subordinate because their object is subordinate, because they move immediately to a lesser good, the private good as distinguished from the common good; this latter is identified with the human good, the good life, a thing beyond the powers of an isolated person.

The succinct statement of the interrelation of the individual and state finally comes; and is unsatisfactory. The author concludes (p. 636):

1. Both the common and the private goods are objective ends (*fines quia*):
 - a) The private good, though the immediate objective of the individual will, is not the ultimate but an intermediary objective end.
 - b) The common good is the ultimate objective end, though it is mediate in relation to the individual will, i. e., willed through the intermediary objective end, the private good.

2. The state is a *finis quo*, that is not a means but a causal end in relation to the individual; it is the indispensable organ of the human good.
3. The individuals are the *finis cui* (the subjects attaining the objective end) of the state, it is for their common advantages that the state is instituted.

Granted that the individual and the state are not things opposed, granted, too, that the two goods in some way include and are included in each other, we submit that these conclusions do little to settle the problem of the interrelation of the state and the individual. There is a confusion here that is unwarranted in the expression of clear ideas. The first comparison is between the common good and the private good as objective ends; the second is between the state and the individual only in relation to the common good ("human good" being long since identified with the common good); the third is between the individuals collectively and the state in relation to a collective good.

Obviously at least these further comparisons are to be made:

- 1) Between the state and the individuals in relation to private good under the aspect of *finis quo*.
- 2) Between the state and the individuals, not taken collectively, but as individuals, under the aspect of *finis cui* and under the double aspect of common and private good.

This obscurity is attested to by the cropping up of such nonsensical terms as "collective reason" and "collective will"; it is not diminished but increased by the last two chapters, particularly the treatment of justice, of the good man and the good citizen, and the human perfection that exceeds justice.

V

In other words, in this last portion of the book, Father Lachance has not shown any basis in the individual by way of defense against his complete absorption in the state. Consequently the basis he does advance—the *human* character of the state—is lacking in intelligibility. Speaking not of the ontological or physical but of the moral order, it is still true that in the ultimate analysis the enduring is the end of the less enduring; the latter exists for the former. The political question then reduces itself to this: in what sense is the individual more enduring than the state and in what sense is the state more enduring than the individual. The latter question has been adequately answered by Father Lachance; the ingredients for an answer to the former have been abundantly given but they have not been put together by the author.

It is hardly possible that Father Lachance considered the questions

mutually exclusive, still less that he was thrown off the track by his rejection of Father Schwalm's version of the distinction of individual and person. It might have been that in his attempt to be strictly philosophical, Father Lachance bent over backwards to the point of confusing the natural with the merely temporal in speaking of the individual good. But we prefer to think it is rather a matter of unfinished business in the hope that Father Lachance will put the wealth of his learning to work completing the solution of the problem of the one and the many in the political sphere.

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